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Administrative Law. Champlin's Realty Associates v. Tikoian,
989 A.2d 427 (R.I. 2010). Champlin's Realty Associates
(Champlin's) operates a marina on Block Island; the Coastal
Resources Management Council (CRMC) denied Champlin's
application to expand its operation. After identifying several
procedural irregularities in the CRMC's consideration of the
matter, the Rhode Island Superior Court modified the agency's
decision, handing Champlin's a short-lived victory. On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that a remand to the CRMC was required so
that certain ex parte communications could be placed in the record
and the parties given the opportunity to respond.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 2003, Champlin's filed an application with the CRMC to
expand its marina on Block Island.1 The town of New Shoreham
and several intervenors opposed the application. 2  Michael
Tikoian, the chairman of the CRMC, appointed a five-member
subcommittee to conduct a public hearing on the application. 3
After holding twenty-three "rancorous and hotly disputed" public
hearings on Champlin's application over the course of two years,
the subcommittee issued a recommendation in favor of a scaled-
down version of Champlin's proposal.4 At a hearing of the full
1. Champlin's Realty Assocs. v. Tikoian, 989 A.2d 427, 431-32 (R.I.
2010). Block Island is situated about twelve miles off the Rhode Island coast.
Id. at 431. Champlin's is a Rhode Island corporation. Id. In its application,
Champlin's proposed to extend its existing marina 240 feet into the Great
Salt Pond to accommodate more boats. Id. The CRMC is vested with the
statutory duty to regulate the state's coastal resources. Id.
2. Id. at 431. New Shoreham is the sole municipal entity on Block
Island. Id. at n.1. The Block Island Land Trust, the Conservation Law
Foundation, the Committee for the Great Salt Pond, and the Block Island
Conservancy all intervened in opposition. Id. at 431.
3. Id. One of the five members appointed to the subcommittee (a state
legislator) did not participate in the subcommittee's hearings or
recommendation on this matter. Id. at 432 n.3.
4. Id. at 432-33. The hearings were "reportedly the longest and most
exhaustive in CRMC history." Id. at 432. The tension arose from the conflict
between the environmental implications of a marina expansion and the
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CRMC in February 2006, five members voted to approve the
subcommittee's recommendation and five members voted against
adopting the recommendation. 5  The tie vote operated as a
rejection of the recommendation, and the CRMC later issued a
written decision denying Champlin's application. 6
Pursuant to the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act
(RIAPA),7 Champlin's appealed the CRMC's decision to Superior
Court in March 2006, alleging that the decision suffered from
various defects. 8 Champlin's also moved under the RIAPA for an
evidentiary hearing before the trial justice.9 The trial justice held
sixteen evidentiary hearings to determine whether there were any
irregularities in procedure during the course of the CRMC
proceedings.1O The evidentiary hearings revealed that certain
members of the CRMC had engaged in prohibited ex parte
communications regarding Champlin's application."l Since the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had recently issued a decision that
proscribed ex parte contacts at the agency level, the trial justice
issued an order in January 2008 that directed the parties to show
cause why Champlin's appeal should not be granted.' 2 After the
show-cause hearing, the trial justice held a separate hearing at
which the intervenors presented evidence to support their
contention that one of the subcommittee members should have
reality that more space was necessary to accommodate public access to the
island. Id. The subcommittee recommended that the CRMC allow
Champlin's to extend its marina by 170 feet rather than 240 feet. Id. at 433.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 433. The RIAPA confers jurisdiction on the
Superior Court to hear appeals from the CRMC and other state agencies. R.I.
GEN. LAws § 42-35-15 (2007).
8. Id. at 433-34.
9. Id. at 434. The RIAPA allows a party who has appealed the decision
of an administrative agency to the Superior Court to request an evidentiary
hearing to determine the existence of any procedural irregularities during the
course of the proceedings before the administrative agency. Id. at n.5 (citing
R.I. GEN. LAws. § 42-35-15(f) (2007).
10. Id. at 434.
11. Id. Ex parte contacts are those made in contravention of the RIAPA,
which states that members or employees of an administrative agency
generally shall not communicate with persons or parties in connection with a
contested case except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to
participate. Id. at 440 n.10 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-35-13 (2007)).
12. Id. at 434.
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been disqualified from participating in the matter. 13
Over the course of these eighteen hearings, the trial justice
made extensive factual findings and credibility determinations.14
One salient finding was that three members of the CRMC should
have been disqualified from taking part in the full council's
decision.15 Another significant finding was that one of the CRMC
members, in an ex parte communication, had asked the executive
director of the CRMC to produce a compromise plan for the
marina's expansion.16 Based on these findings, the trial court
held that the CRMC's decision was made upon unlawful procedure
and in excess of the agency's statutory authority and that
Champlin's substantial and constitutional rights were violated.17
As a remedy, the trial justice modified the vote of the full CRMC
by subtracting the votes of the three disqualified members; the
refigured vote constituted an adoption of the subcommittee's
recommendation. 18 The Superior Court upheld the modified
decision adopting the subcommittee. recommendation because it
was "supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence of record."' 9 In April 2009, the CRMC, Tikoian, the
Town of New Shoreham, and the intervenors filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court seeking review of the trial court's
decision; the Supreme Court granted the petition.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The RIAPA provides that in reviewing the Superior Court's
judgment in administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court shall
consider questions of law de novo.2 1 As for questions of fact, when
review of the trial court's decision is conducted under a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court simply "reviews the record to
13. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 434-35.
14. Id. at 435.
15. Id. The trial justice found that Michael Tikoian, Paul Lemont, and
Gerald P. Zarrella should have been disqualified. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 436.
18. Id.
19. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 436-37.
20. Id. at 437.
21. Id. (citing Rossi v. Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I., 895 A.2d 106, 110
(R.I. 2006)).
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determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support
the findings."22 Initially, the Court addressed Champlin's claim
that the CRMC, Tikoian, and the intervenors did not have
standing to seek review of the Superior Court's decision because
they had not alleged an environmental injury in fact.23 After
considering the language of the RIAPA, the Court held that the
petitioners were all aggrieved parties within the meaning of the
statute and were therefore properly before the Court.24
The Court then considered the petitioners' claims of error
regarding the evidentiary hearing. 25 The Court rejected the claim
that the trial justice erred in granting the evidentiary hearing,
holding that the allegations of impropriety sufficed to support her
decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on the alleged procedural
irregularities. 26 The Court agreed, however, with the petitioners'
claim that the hearing improperly delved into the mental
processes of the CRMC members. 27 Because the CRMC is a quasi-
judicial agency, its members are entitled to immunity from
testifying about their mental process in decision-making. 28
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously
recognized quasi-judicial immunity only in the context of
immunity from suit, it held here that "agency adjudicators also
are cloaked with immunity from rendering testimony about their
mental processes in reaching decisions.. ."29 This holding reflects
the Court's desire to discourage litigants from compelling agency
adjudicators to testify about their mental processes. 30 The Court
noted that it would not consider testimony regarding the mental
processes of the CRMC members. 31
Turning next to the trial justice's finding that certain
members of the CRMC had engaged in prohibited ex parte
22. Id. (quoting Sartor v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 542 A.2d 1077,
1082-83 (R.I. 1988)).
23. Id. at 437-38.
24. Id. at 438. The RIAPA requires that a petitioner for a writ of
certiorari be aggrieved by a final judgment of the Superior, Family, or
District Court. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWs § 42-35-16 (2007)).
25. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 438.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 438-40.
28. Id. at 439.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 440.
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communications, the Court stated that "no litigious facts should
reach the decision maker off the record in an administrative
hearing."3 2 The Court left undisturbed the trial justice's finding
that the "Goulet plan" constituted an ex parte contact; 33 similarly,
the Court declined to overturn the trial court's finding that
Tikoian's contacts with Governor Carcieri and his staff were
impermissible ex parte contacts. 3 4  After affirming the trial
justice's finding of ex parte contacts, the Court next considered her
finding of bias on the part of three members of the CRMC.35
The trial justice found that three members of the CRMC
"were biased" with regard to Champlin's application: Tikoian,
Lemont, and Zarrella.3 6 While legally competent evidence existed
to support her finding of bias on the part of Tikoian and Zarrella,
the Court held that her finding of bias as to Lemont was not
supported by legally competent evidence. 37  In finding that
Lemont was biased, the trial court impermissibly relied on
Lemont's testimony as to his mental process, and the remaining
legally competent evidence was "far too flimsy" to support a
finding of bias.38
Finally, the Court considered whether the trial justice's
remedy was appropriate, reviewing this issue de novo.39 While
the trial court asserted broad authority to fashion an equitable
remedy, the Court held that "a remand to the agency [was]
necessary so that the ex parte contacts of the sort found by the
trial justice may be placed in the record and the parties be offered
the opportunity to respond."40 The Court distinguished this case
from others in which remand might not be the most appropriate
remedy by noting that the record was not complete; accordingly,
the impermissible ex parte information must be made available for
32. Id. at 440-41 (quoting Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 821 (R.I. 2007)).
33. Id. at 441. The "Goulet plan" refers to the compromise plan that
Lemont, one of the CRMC members, asked the CRMC's executive director to
produce. Fugate, the executive director, delegated this task to Dan Goulet, a
staff engineer at the CRMC. Id. at 435.
34. Idat 441.
35. Id. at 441, 443.
36. Id. at 443.
37. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 444, 447-48.
38. Id. at 447.
39. Id. at 448.
40. Id.
2011] 397
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both parties to examine. 41 Echoing the trial court's concern that a
remand would result in further delay, the decision noted that "the
Superior Court is to direct that the CRMC is to proceed forthwith
in bringing this matter to a close." 42
In separate opinions, Justice Robinson and Chief Justice
Williams concurred in part and dissented in part.43 Justice
Robinson "concur[red] in virtually every aspect of [the decision] . .
. except with respect to the Court's affirmance of the Superior
Court's finding of disqualifying bias on the part of Michael
Tikoian."44 Chief Justice Williams dissented from the Court's
decision to reverse the trial justice and remand the matter to the
CRMC; he also disagreed with the majority's suggestion that the
Superior Court must remand a case to the administrative agency
in every instance in which ex parte contacts are found to have
occurred. 45 Justice Goldberg did not participate in the Court's
decision. 46
COMMENTARY
Although Chief Justice Williams took issue with the
majority's suggestion that the Superior Court must remand a case
to the administrative agency in every instance in which ex parte
contacts are found to have occurred, the Court properly valued a
party's right to examine off-the-record communications over the
need for an expeditious decision. The trial justice's decision to
fashion an equitable remedy rather than remand the matter to the
CRMC was driven by her concern that remand would result in
further delay.47 While the Court's decision characterized the
drawn-out procedural history of this matter as "unfortunate," it
wisely cautioned that any resolution on this issue "[could not] be
made lightly," given the potential for major environmental
consequences. 48 The decision thus confirms for administrative
41. Id. at 449.
42. Id. at 436, 449.
43. See Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 450 (Robinson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 460 (Williams, C.J. (ret.), concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 450 (Robinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 461 (Williams, C.J. (ret.), concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
46. Id. at 466.
47. See id. at 436.
48. Id. at 442-43.
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agencies the need to provide agency adjudicators proper guidance
on the prohibition against ex parte communications. If agency
adjudicators are unaware of the law regarding ex parte contacts,
many administrative decisions will be remanded for further
proceedings, resulting in costly delay for all parties involved.
The majority indirectly responds to Justice Robinson's opinion
that the trial justice committed clear error when she found
disqualifying bias on the part of Tikoian by pointing out that its
holding on this issue is constrained by the standard of review. 49
Because a finding of bias is a finding of fact to which a reviewing
court must afford great deference, the Court properly affirmed the
trial court's finding that Tikoian was biased. Whether or not the
trial justice erred in giving insufficient weight to the presumption
of regularity that attaches to public officials, as Justice Robinson
opined, the Court was bound by law to affirm her finding so long
as it was supported by legally competent evidence. 50 In affirming
the trial court on this issue, the Court notes that it was "mindful
of our standard of review." 5 1 The portion of the opinion that
discusses the trial court's findings regarding Tikoian clearly shows
that sufficient evidence existed to support her finding of bias.52
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Rhode Island Superior Court was
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Superior
Court with instructions that it remand the matter to the CRMC
for further proceedings. 53 After the Court's decision was issued, a
subcommittee of the CRMC held three hearings over the course of
two months, concluding its consideration of this issue in July
2010.54 On January 11, 2011, the full CRMC rejected Champlin's
proposal for expansion. 5 5 Soon after, Champlin's appealed this
49. Champlin's, 989 A.2d at 444-45.
50. Id. at 443.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 444-45.
53. Id. at 450.
54. Peter B. Lord, Hearing on Marina's Expansion Closes, PROVIDENCE J.
BULL., Jul. 16, 2010, at A8, available at 2010 WLNR 14273935.
55. Peter Lord, State Gives Thumbs Down to Expansion, PROVIDENCE J.
BULL., Jan. 12, 2011, at A4, available at 2011 WLNR 679143.
2011]
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decision to Superior Court. 56 Given the importance of the outcome
in this matter to Champlin's, the Town of New Shoreham, and the
intervenors, it seems likely that the losing side will once again
appeal the decision of the CRMC to the Supreme Court. Now that
a second round of appeals has begun, the Court's direction that
the matter be remanded to the CRMC seems well-considered. The
record was rightly supplemented by the ex parte contacts so that
the parties could appropriately respond and cross-examine this
additional evidence. Reviewing courts will surely benefit from a
thorough vetting of the evidence in this case and in all other cases
in which exparte contacts occurred at the agency level.
Amy H. Goins
56. Peter Voskamp, Champlin's Appeals, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES, Feb. 19,
2011, http://blockislandtimes.com/bookmark/11530983.
Arbitration/Excusable Neglect. Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d
834 (R.I. 2009). Where a party seeks permission to reject an
arbitration award after the twenty-day deadline has passed, the
correct standard to use to determine whether the Rhode Island
Supreme Court may grant relief is one of "excusable neglect"
under Rule 6(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Peter Boranian was injured in a rear-end automobile
collision and the defendants, Elaine Richer and C. Real Richer, did
not dispute liability. 1  The parties entered court-annexed
arbitration.2  After arbitration, defendants filed a motion to
extend by one day, the twenty-day deadline to reject the
arbitration award. 3 The rejection of the arbitration award was
late because defendants' counsel's secretary miscalculated the
deadline for filing.4
Defendants argued that the late filing should be extended
under Rule 60(b), which provided that the Superior Court, in its
discretion, could grant relief due to "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect."5  In particular, defendants
asserted that the late filing was due to "inadvertence."6 The
Superior Court allowed the defendants to file their rejection based
on the presence of "excusable neglect."7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Rule
6(b) rather than Rule 60(b) applied to the facts of this case. 8 Rule




5. Id. at 838 n.3.
6. Id. at 838.
7. Boranian, 983 A.2d at 836.
8. Id. at 837.
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60(b) states that, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
from final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.... ."9 The Court held
that when the defendants attempted to reject the arbitration
award there was no final judgment and Rule 60(b) did not apply.lO
In contrast, Rule 6(b) states that
when . . . an act is required or allowed to be done at or
within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at
any time in its discretion... upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be
done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect .... 11
The Court held that the rejection of the arbitration award was "an
act . . . required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time" and therefore the "excusable neglect" standard that the
Superior Court used was the correct standard, albeit from the
wrong rule.12
"[Flor a party to establish excusable neglect, the party
generally must show that the circumstances that caused the party
to miss a deadline were out of that party or counsel's control." 13
Where opposing counsel provided misleading information that
resulted in a default judgment, this was held to be excusable
neglect.14 A plaintiff missing an appellate court fees-payment
deadline, but correcting it immediately, was also held to be
excusable neglect.15 In the instant case, however, the Court held
that defendants' counsel's secretary miscalculating a deadline was
not "out of that party or counsel's control" and was consequently
not excusable neglect.16
9. Id. at 838 n.3.
10. Id. at 838.
11. Id. at n.2.
12. Id.
13. Boranian, 983 A.2d at 840.
14. Id. at 839 (citing Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216, 225
(R.I. 2008)).
15. Id. (citing Gardener v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 952-53 (R.I. 2005)).
16. Id. at 840.
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COMMENTARY
The Court chose to construe "excusable neglect" narrowly
when it explained that "[i]n the present situation, the error ...
was entirely under defendants' attorney's control."17 In so doing,
the Court takes a less deferential position than it otherwise could
have, and diminishes the ability of trial justices to evaluate the
facts of each case independently to arrive at a just result. Where
counsel's secretary's miscalculation of a filing deadline causes an
adverse effect on the defendant's case, the Court could have found
that it was within the trial court's discretion to determine that
this is not the type of neglect that should be shouldered by the
defendants. As it stands, the Court's decision has the potential to
create additional litigation if a party's only remedy, when faced
with a relatively minor error made by Counsel's employee that is
nonetheless outcome determinative, is to file a legal malpractice
claim.
CONCLUSION
The Court further defines the "excusable neglect" standard
that appears in Rules 6(b) and 60(b) of the Rhode Island Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.' 8 "[T]he party generally must
show that the circumstances that caused the party to miss a
deadline were out of that party or counsel's control."19 According
to the Court, the miscalculation of a deadline by the secretary of
defendants' counsel was not sufficiently "out of the party or
counsel's control" for a trial justice to determine that it was
'excusable neglect,' without it being an abuse of discretion.20
Scott Ewing
17. Id. at 840.
18. Id. at 837-39.
19. Boranian, 983 A.2d at 840.
20. Id.
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Arbitration. Buttie v. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 995 A.2d 546 (R.I. 2010). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that it was irrational to give preferential treatment to the
passengers in an automobile accident under the
driver/policyholder's automobile insurance policy. In Rhode
Island, when multiple individuals suffer damages in an accident
and those individuals have equal rights under an insurance policy
that does not provide sufficient coverage, a pro rata distribution
should be accomplished in proportion to each claimant's relative
damages. An arbitration award that does not follow these
guidelines may be considered irrational and modifiable by a court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 12, 1996, plaintiff Robert Buttie and passengers
Raymond and Joan Cataldo suffered damages in an automobile
accident with an underinsured motorist (UM).1 Mr. Buttie owned
the motor vehicle involved in the crash and was not at fault for the
accident. 2 After exhausting the tortfeasor's liability insurance,
plaintiff and the Cataldos sought to recoup the remaining balance
of their damages in UM benefits from the plaintiffs insurance
carrier, and the Cataldos also sought UM benefits from Raymond
Cataldo's insurance policy.3 Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire
Insurance Company (Norfolk) insured Mr. Buttie's vehicle with
UM coverage up to $300,000, and Travelers Insurance Company
(Travelers) insured Mr. Cataldo with UM coverage up to
$100,000.4 Plaintiff and the Cataldos entered into binding
arbitration to determine the amount each party was entitled to
out of the $400,000 in combined UM benefits. 5
The arbitrator concluded that the $400,000 in available
coverage was inadequate to compensate the parties for their total
1. Buttie v. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 995 A.2d 546, 547
(R.I. 2010).
2. Id. at 550.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 548.
404
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damages from the car accident, which totaled $636,838.6 The
arbitrator prioritized the Cataldos in the distribution of the
available funds from Mr. Buttie's Norfolk policy. 7 The arbitrator
first awarded the Cataldos the full amount of their damages under
the Norfolk and Travelers policies leaving Mr. Buttie with the
remaining $169,937 from the Norfolk policy, or approximately
37% of his total damages. 8
Mr. Buttie moved to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator's
award in Superior Court, and the Cataldos filed an answer to
affirm the arbitration award. 9 Travelers also answered and
opposed plaintiffs motion.10 A hearing on the motion concluded
with entry of an order confirming the arbitration award.n The
Court dismissed plaintiffs original appeal on procedural
grounds.12 Mr. Buttie then appealed this dismissal and the Court
denied the second appeal without prejudice to allow the plaintiff to
seek a writ of certiorari. 13 Thereafter, Mr. Buttie filed a petition
for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator erred in the
manner in which he apportioned the available UM benefits.15
Specifically, Mr. Buttie contended that it was "manifestly
erroneous and plainly irrational" for the arbitrator to give the
Cataldos preferential treatment under a policy for which he paid
the premiums.16 As a threshold matter, the Court acknowledged
that the authority to review an arbitral award is prescribed by
6. Id. The arbitrator also found that the plaintiff suffered $463,420 in
damages, Mr. Cataldo suffered $93,272, and Mrs. Cataldo suffered $80,146 in
damages. Id.
7. Buttie, 995 A.2d at 548.
8. Id. The arbitrator awarded Mr. Cataldo $69,954 from the Norfolk
policy and $23,318 from the Travelers policy; Mrs. Cataldo was awarded




12. Id. at 548-49.
13. Buttie, 995 A.2d at 549.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 550.
16. Id.
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statute and is limited in nature.17 The Court can vacate an award
of arbitration "if the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law or
if the award was irrational." 18 Furthermore, the Court previously
held that an arbitrator's decision to rewrite a contract may be
overturned. 19
In the instant case, there was no express provision in the
Norfolk insurance policy that directed preferential treatment of
passengers over the owner of the policy in the distribution of UM
benefits. 20  Therefore, the Court held that the arbitrator
essentially rewrote the Norfolk contract by giving the Cataldos
priority for their damages, and deemed it "irrational to
subordinate the rights of the named insured under the policy to
those of the other occupants of the automobile."21 The Court also
announced that, "[logic and fairness dictate that when multiple
individuals suffer damages and those individuals have equal
rights under a policy that does not provide sufficient coverage, a
pro rata distribution should be accomplished in proportion to each
claimant's relative damages." 22 The Court applied this rule to Mr.
Buttie's Norfolk policy, which yielded the following pro rata
allocations: plaintiff incurred 73% of the total damages and was
entitled to 73% of the $300,000 UM benefits ($219,000); Mr.
Cataldo incurred 15% of the total damages and was entitled to
$45,000 of the UM benefits; finally, Mrs. Cataldo incurred 12% of
the total damages and was entitled to $36,000.23 The Court
directed this distribution of the UM benefits under the Norfolk
policy upon remand.24
The Court disagreed with Travelers' assertion that the
arbiter's award concerning Travelers' liability should remain
undisturbed even if the plaintiff was entitled to an additional
recovery under the Norfolk policy.2 5 The Court asserted that the
17. Id. at 549.
18. Id. (citing Aponik v. Lauricella, 844 A.2d 698, 703 (R.I. 2004)).
19. Buttie, 995 A.2d at 550 (citing Town of Coventry v. Turco, 574 A.2d




23. Id. at 551.
24. Id.
25. Buttie, 995 A.2d at 551. In doing so, the Court agreed with the
Cataldos' argument that if Mr. Buttie's award was increased under the
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arbitrator's irrational method in the distribution of the Norfolk
UM benefits "infected the entire award."26  Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that it would lead to a "plainly unjust result" if
Travelers denied the Cataldos the remaining amount of their
damages when Mr. Cataldo's policy allowed recovery up to
$100,000 in UM benefits. 27 Therefore, the Court directed that Mr.
and Mrs. Cataldo's awards under the Travelers policy be increased
to satisfy their total damages amount.28
COMMENTARY
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty vehemently disagrees with the
majority's decision to disturb the arbitrator's award. 29  He
emphasizes the stringent standard of review that the court must
abide by to review an arbitration award, and concludes that, in his
opinion, the arbiter's award in this case cannot be considered
"completely irrational."30  However, although passengers in a
motor vehicle involved in an automobile accident are entitled to
liability insurance benefits of the owner of the vehicle, common
sense dictates that passengers should not take priority in the
distribution of these benefits over the owner who pays premiums
to own the policy. Any arbitration award that goes against this
basic premise is inherently irrational. In this case, the
arbitrator's award was especially unfair as Mr. Buttie was not at
fault for the accident. 3 1
Additionally, the Court was correct to increase the Cataldos'
awards under the Travelers policy. If it did not alter the award,
then the Cataldos would have only received a combined
$43,354.50 out of the possible $100,000 UM benefits in Mr.
Cataldo's policy.32 This would have resulted in a $49,063.50
windfall for Travelers ($92,418 in total damages minus
Norfolk policy, the portion of their award under the Travelers policy must
also be altered to achieve a just result. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Mr. Cataldo's award under the Travelers policy was increased to
$48,272; Mrs. Cataldo's award was increased to $44,146. Id. at 552.
29. Id. at 553 (Flaherty, J. dissenting).
30. Id. (Flaherty, J. dissenting).
31. Buttie, at 550.
32. Id. at 552.
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$43,354.50).33 Fairness directs that Mr. and Mrs. Cataldo should
receive compensation for the remaining amount of their damages
not covered by the Norfolk policy from the Travelers policy.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it is irrational to
give preferential treatment to the passengers in an automobile
accident under the policyholder's liability insurance policy. The
Court announced that when multiple individuals suffer damages
in an accident and those individuals have equal rights under an
insurance policy that does not provide sufficient coverage, a pro




Civil Procedure/New Trial. Manning v. Bellafiore, 991 A.2d
399 (R.I. 2010). Plaintiff, whose husband died after suffering a
stroke, brought a negligence and wrongful death action against
her husband's doctors and the hospital where he was treated.
After the jury found in favor of the defendants, plaintiff moved for
a new trial. The trial justice granted plaintiffs motion against
one of the defendants due to the defendant's misconduct during
discovery and because of a finding that the jury's verdict was
against the fair preponderance of the evidence. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice's grant of a new trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 4, 1998, Michael Manning, a forty-year-old father
of four, lost consciousness and fell in his home after suffering a
stroke. 1 When his wife, Kathryn Manning (plaintiff) found him he
was "unable to sit up or open his eyes" and had a "mild facial
droop on his right side."2 Mr. Manning was taken to South
County Hospital where Dr. Peter Bellafiore (defendant) took
charge of Mr. Manning's care and made an initial diagnosis that
the symptoms could be caused by "complex migraine, aneurysm,
tumor, and stroke."3 Defendant determined that Mr. Manning
should have magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and magnetic
resonance angiography (MRA) tests in order to determine if the
symptoms were caused by a stroke.4
The first attempt to perform the MRI/MRA test on Mr.
Manning took place on the day he was admitted to the hospital;
however, he had a "claustrophobic reaction and became nauseous"
while inside the diagnostic machine and was "unable to complete
the test."5  Mr. Manning was then given antianxiety and
antinausea medication, but a second test also failed.6 After the
1. Manning v. Bellafiore, 991 A.2d 399, 400-01 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id. at 400.
3. Id. at 400-01.
4. Id. at 401.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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unsuccessful attempts to diagnose the patient's condition using
the MRI/MRA test, defendant tried to arrange for an "open
architecture MRI" which may have been able to perform the
necessary tests without inducing the claustrophobic reaction. 7
The open MRI test was not an option, however, after defendant
learned that the machine at Rhode Island Hospital was being
repaired.8
On March 6, 1998, at 3 a.m., Mr. Manning began experiencing
a severe headache and visual impairment. 9 Defendant ordered a
computerized tomography (CT) scan to determine the cause of
these new symptoms and discovered "a new prominent segmental
abnormality in the left occipital lobe," which served as
confirmation that Mr. Manning had, in fact, suffered from a
stroke.O The next day Mr. Manning "suffered a second,
catastrophic stroke" and was airlifted to Massachusetts General
Hospital where the clot that likely caused his stroke was
discovered."1 After treatment to attempt to break up and dislodge
the clot, Mr. Manning "steadily lost brain function" and died on
March 9, 1998, after life support was withdrawn.12
Plaintiff filed suit against Dr. Bellafiore, Dr. McNiece (Mr.
Manning's primary care physician), and South County Hospital
"alleging negligence and wrongful death."13 The main issue at
trial was whether defendant breached the standard of care by
failing to administer the MRIIMRA exam and promptly diagnose
Mr. Manning's condition.14 Three experts who testified on behalf
of the plaintiff said that defendant breached the standard of care
7. Manning, 991 A.2d at 401. Expert testimony at trial indicated that
the open MRI test may have been inadequate to diagnose the patient's
condition because the images it produces are not of high enough quality. Id.
at 405.
8. Id. at 401.
9. Id.
10. Id. "Dr. Bellafiore conceded at trial that had he ordered a CT scan a
day earlier on March 5, it would have revealed the same information." Id. at
n.5.
11. Id. at 401-02.
12. Id. at 402.
13. Manning, 991 A.2d at 400, 402. A new trial was not granted against
defendants Dr. McNiece or South County Hospital; thus, they are not parties
to this appeal. Id. at 407 n.17.
14. Id. at 402.
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by not promptly performing the imaging tests. 15 The experts
testified that if a closed MRIJMRA or another test called a cerebral
angiogram had been performed soon after the first stroke had
occurred then it is likely the second stroke could have been
prevented and Mr. Manning's "long-term prognosis would have
been good."16 Two of the experts indicated that the best option for
treatment would have been to have an anesthesiologist put Mr.
Manning into "conscious sedation" so that he could undergo the
closed MRI/MRA diagnostic procedure without risk of a
claustrophobic reaction. 17
At trial, defendant testified that he had offered "conscious
sedation" as an option to Mr. Manning, but that Mr. Manning had
refused the procedure.1 8 He also testified that he had discussed a
cerebral angiogram procedure with Mr. Manning as an option for
diagnosis, but this had been refused as well.19 This testimony,
however, was "vigorously disputed" by the plaintiff because "in
both his answers to interrogatories and his deposition testimony"
defendant failed to mention that he had offered conscious sedation
or a cerebral angiogram as options to Mr. Manning. 20 Defendant
also failed to document in his treatment notes any instance of Mr.
Manning refusing to undergo the conscious sedation or cerebral
angiogram procedures. 2 1
After the jury returned a verdict in favor of all three
defendants, "plaintiff filed a timely motion for judgment as a
matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial," arguing that the
new trial was justified because defendant "had withheld vital
information during the discovery process and also because the
jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence." 22 The trial
justice agreed that a new trial was necessary because the
defendant's discovery abuses misled the jury and caused them to
15. Id. at 405-06.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 403.
19. Manning, 991 A.2d at 403-04.
20. Id. at 404. Additionally, the Court noted that "[s]ignificantly, Dr.
McNiece [Mr. Manning's primary care physician] testified that he had no
knowledge of Mr. Manning having refused conscious sedation." Id. at 403
n.12.
21. Id. at 403-04.
22. Id. at 407.
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return a verdict that was against the "fair preponderance of the
evidence." 23 Defendant, on appeal, argued that the "trial justice
abused his discretion" in granting a new trial to sanction discovery
abuse and that the "trial justice's determination that the jury's
verdict was against the weight of the evidence was clearly
wrong."2 4
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Standard of Review
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its analysis by using
precedent to explain the role of the trial justice in ruling on a
motion for a new trial and the role that the Supreme Court plays
in reviewing that decision on appeal.25 The Court said that
"[w]hen ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as
a 'superjuror' and 'should review the evidence and exercise his or
her independent judgment in passing upon the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses."'26 The Court also
presented a set of principles that the trial justice should apply
when ruling on a motion for a new trial:
The trial justice may accept some or all of the evidence.
[He or she] may reject evidence that is impeached or
contradicted by other positive testimony or circumstantial
evidence. Or [he or she] may disregard testimony that
contains inherent improbabilities or contradictions or
which is totally at variance with undisputed physical
facts or laws. [He or she] may also add to the evidence by
drawing proper inferences. 27
If the trial justice finds that the evidence is evenly balanced,
or "is such that reasonable minds, in considering that same
evidence, could come to different conclusions," then he or she
should deny the motion and let the verdict stand. 28 However,
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Manning, 991 A.2d at 407-08.
26. Id. at 408 (quoting Seddon v. Duke, 884 A.2d 413, 413 (R.I. 2005))
(internal quotations omitted).
27. Id. (quoting Murray v. Bromley, 945 A.2d 330, 333 (R.I. 2008)).
28. Id. (quoting Seddon, 884 A.2d at 413-14) (internal quotations
omitted).
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the motion should be granted when the trial justice finds that the
verdict "is wrong because it fails to respond truly to the merits of
the controversy and to administer substantial justice and is
against the fair preponderance of the evidence."29
When reviewing a trial justice's decision to grant a motion for
a new trial, the Supreme Court will affirm the decision "as long as
the trial justice conducts the appropriate analysis, does not
overlook or misconceive material evidence, and is not otherwise
clearly wrong."30 The decision of the trial justice is not overturned
lightly and his or her ruling on the motion is given "great
weight."3 1
Application of the Standard of Review
The Supreme Court first reviewed the trial justice's findings
and decided that when ruling on the motion for a new trial, the
trial justice thoroughly reviewed the evidence and testimony and
made "specific credibility findings" for the expert witnesses and
the defendant. 32 The trial justice found the testimony of plaintiffs
experts to be credible and that their testimony established a
standard of care which required defendant to provide prompt
MRI/MRA imaging tests to Mr. Manning.33 The testimony of the
defendant's expert witnesses was found to be "unconvincing" and
less credible.34 The defendant's testimony that he "offered Mr.
Manning the option of conscious sedation" was also deemed by the
trial justice not to be credible. 35 A careful review of the evidence
and testimony convinced the trial justice that defendant had
breached the standard of care.3 6
The Court then discussed defendant's argument that reversal
and reinstatement of the jury verdict was necessary because "the
trial justice relied on several material misconceptions of the
29. Id. (quoting Murray, 945 A.2d at 333) (internal quotations omitted).
30. Id. (quoting Murray, 945 A.2d at 334) (internal quotations omitted).
31. Manning, 991 A.2d at 408 (quoting Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d
843, 851-52 (R.I. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
32. Id. at 408-09.
33. Id. at 408.
34. Id. at 409.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 408-09.
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evidence" in making his ruling.37 Defendant argued that the trial
justice erred by failing to make a "specific credibility
determination" for one of the plaintiffs experts, mischaracterizing
the type of medicine that one of the experts practiced, and
misspelling the name of one of the experts. 38 Other errors alleged
by the defense included a misunderstanding of a defense witness'
testimony concerning his role in Mr. Manning's care and an
acceptance of expert testimony that the standard of care was
breached because defendant did not discuss treatment options
with plaintiff during her husband's treatment.3 9
The Court concluded that none of the arguments presented by
the defense were "sufficient to require reversal" of the trial
justice's findings.4 0 It was unnecessary for the trial justice to
make a specific finding of credibility for each witness, and the
other alleged errors were immaterial to the Supreme Court's
decision to grant a new trial.4 1 Instead, the Court rationalized
that the expert witnesses established a standard of care, which
was breached by the defendant. 42 Interestingly, the Supreme
Court did not address the defendant's contention that the trial
justice wrongly ordered the new trial as a sanction for discovery
abuse. 43
The Court affirmed the trial justice's decision to grant a new
trial and held that the trial justice "conducted the appropriate
analysis" when making his ruling, "did not overlook or
misconceive material evidence," and "was not otherwise clearly
wrong."4 4 The jury was presented with strong evidence of the
defendant's negligence but was misled by defendant's failure to
disclose crucial information in discovery that was later introduced
through his testimony.4 5 Therefore, the trial justice was justified
in finding that the verdict "was against the fair preponderance of
the evidence and failed to do justice or respond to the merits of the
37. Manning, 991 A.2d at 409.
38. Id. at 409-10.
39. Id. at 410.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 409.
42. Id. at 409-10.
43. See Manning, 991 A.2d at 407.
44. Id. at 410-11 (emphasis added).




The Rhode Island Supreme Court used the present case as an
opportunity to demonstrate the deference given to the trial
justice's findings when reviewing, on appeal, a motion for a new
trial.47 The Court emphasized that the trial justice must fail to
apply the correct test in reviewing the evidence or must come to a
conclusion that is clearly wrong for a reversal to be warranted. 48
The Court was able to easily overcome the defendant's arguments
on appeal because they did not go to material issues that factored
into the trial justice's findings. 49 Instead, defendant's arguments
were characterized by the Court as frivolous criticisms of the
opinion written by the trial justice, seeking to point out issues as
inconsequential as the misspelling of a witness's name.50
This case also provides insight into the role of the trial justice
when ruling on a motion for a new trial. It is not necessary for the
trial justice to have any specialized medical knowledge in order to
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of expert
witnesses in a complicated medical malpractice case. The
defendant would argue that it was a crucial mistake for the trial
justice to not know the difference between a "neuro-interventional
radiologist" and an "interventional neuro-radiologist," but it is
clear from the opinion that this type of information is not material
to findings by the trial justice.51 Since the trial justice acts as a
"superjuror" he or she should not be required to have expert
knowledge and understanding of the medical field that the typical
juror would not possess. 52
No weight was given to the defendant's argument that the
new trial was granted improperly because it was being used as a
sanction for discovery abuse.53 It is clear from the trial justice's
analysis and the opinion of the Supreme Court that the new trial
46. Id. at 410.
47. See id. at 408.
48. See id. at 408, 410-11.
49. See Manning, 991 A.2d at 409-10.
50. See id. at 410.
51. Id. at 409-10.
52. See id. at 408.
53. See id. at 407.
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was necessary not to punish the defendant's misconduct, but
because his misconduct prevented the jury from making an
informed decision based on the merits of the case.5 4 When the
defendant testified about Mr. Manning's refusal to undergo the
tests that were necessary to diagnose his condition without
disclosing this information in discovery, defendant provided
information to the jury that the plaintiff was unable to anticipate
and the jury was unable to correctly weigh.55 A new trial was
necessary to correct this mistake and was not intended to punish
the offending party.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
trial justice granting a new trial in this negligence and wrongful
death case. The findings by the trial justice are given great
deference and reversal is only warranted if he or she fails to
conduct the correct analysis, misconceives material evidence, or is
clearly wrong. Because the trial justice thoroughly reviewed all
the evidence and testimony and found that the verdict was against
the fair preponderance of the evidence, it was not an abuse of
discretion to grant a new trial.
Stephen J. Sypole
54. See id.
55. See Manning, 991 A.2d at 407.
Civil Procedure. McNulty v. City of Providence, 994 A.2d 1221
(R.I. 2010). The notice requirement section 45-15-9 of the Rhode
Island General Laws must be strictly obeyed. In order to
overcome this notice requirement through a claim of equitable
estoppel a plaintiff must show (1) "an affirmative representation
or equivalent conduct" on the part of one party "for the purpose of
inducing the [plaintiff] to act or fail to act in reliance thereon"; and
(2) "proof that such representation or conduct in fact did induce
the [plaintiff] to act or fail to act to his or her injury."1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 9, 2002, the plaintiff, Susan McNulty (McNulty),
allegedly tripped and fell while walking on a sidewalk in
Providence, Rhode Island (the City).2 McNulty alleged that her
fall was due to "protrusions of conduit type material" that were
jutting out of the sidewalk. 3 As a result of her fall, McNulty
allegedly suffered injuries and incurred medical expenses. 4
Within a week of the incident, McNulty contacted the City's
Department of the City Clerk and advised the clerk with whom
she spoke of the circumstances surrounding her fall, her allegation
that she had sustained injuries and incurred medical expenses as
a result of the fall, and her intent to file a claim against the City.5
According to McNulty, the clerk with whom she spoke informed
her that the documentation necessary to file a claim with the City
and "instructions as to how to complete the documentation would
be sent to her."6 McNulty maintained that at no time during this
conversation did the clerk advise her that there was any time
limitation required to file a claim with the City.7
McNulty subsequently "received a letter, dated October 29,
1. McNulty v. City of Providence, 994 A.2d 1221, 1225 (R.I. 2010).





7. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1222-23.
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2002, from City Clerk Michael Clement."8 Enclosed with the
letter was a '"lank petition form." 9 The letter advised McNulty
that if it was her intention to file a claim against the City, she
must fill out the petition form in detail and return it to the City
with any documents pertaining to the claim, including medical
bills.10 The letter further advised that if the petition form was not
filled out in detail, McNulty's claim would be returned to her.11
Neither the letter nor the petition form indicated that, pursuant to
sections 45-15-9 and 45-15-10 of the Rhode Island General Laws,12
a person alleging injury (in circumstances such as McNulty's) 13
must give a city or town written notice within sixty days of the
alleged injury as a prerequisite to seeking recovery from the city
or town. 14 McNulty contended that, based on her conversation
with the clerk of the City Clerk's office and McNulty's
understanding of the letter and petition form, she believed that if
she submitted the petition form to the City upon her receipt of the
letter, her claim would be returned to her as incomplete because
her medical treatment had yet to be concluded at that point. 15
McNulty's written notice was received by the City on April 4, 2003
- nearly six months after the October 9, 2002 fall. 16
On November 6, 2003, McNulty filed suit in Providence
County Superior Court, alleging that she had suffered injuries as
a proximate result of the City's failure to maintain the sidewalk in
a "reasonably safe and secure condition' and "to warn those
reasonably expected upon the [sidewalk] of any unsafe or
dangerous conditions." 17 The City filed a motion for summary
8. Id. at 1223.
9. Id.
10. Id. at n.2.
11. Id.
12. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 45-15-9 to -10 (2009).
13. McNulty alleged that her injuries resulted from the City's negligent
failure to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe and secure condition.
McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1223.
14. Id. Although section 45-15-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws
directs that notice be given to "the town," the Rhode Island Supreme Court
"has consistently understood that term in this statute as referring to cities as
well as towns." Id. at 1224 n.4.
15. Id. at 1223.
16. Id.
17. Id. McNulty also filed suit against "John Doe Corporation," which
was allegedly responsible for the condition of the sidewalk where her fall
allegedly took place; however, the appeal before the Court only pertained to
SURVEY SECTION
judgment, which was granted by a motion justice of the Superior
Court on the grounds that, under sections 45-15-9 and 45-15-10 of
the Rhode Island General Laws,' 8 McNulty's claim was not timely
filed.19 In response to McNulty's claim that summary judgment
should not be granted because the doctrine of equitable estoppel
applied to allow her claim to go forward notwithstanding her
failure to comply with the statutory time limitations, the motion
justice concluded that the elements of estoppel were not
satisfied. 2 0 Specifically, "the motion justice found that the [C]ity
had not made any affirmative representations and that there was
no evidence of 'intentionally induced prejudicial reliance."' 2 '
Accordingly, the motion justice entered partial final judgment in
favor of the City and McNulty subsequently filed a timely notice of
appeal. 2 2
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, McNulty argued that the motion justice erred in
granting the City's motion for summary judgment. 2 3 Specifically,
McNulty contended that "in spite of her failure to have given
timely notice, she should be permitted to pursue her claim because
the [C]ity should be equitably estopped from raising the statutory
notice provision as a defense." 24  McNulty argued that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel applied to this case because the
City, through its authorized representative (i.e., the city clerk with
whom McNulty spoke) and the documents sent to McNulty by the
City, affirmatively misled McNulty as to the steps necessary to file
a claim with the City by not telling her about the statutorily
imposed time limitations.2 5 Based on this omission, McNulty
asserted, she was misled into not filing her petition with the City
McNulty's allegation against the City. Id. at n.3.
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-15-9 to -10 (2009).
19. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1223.
20. Id. at 1223-24.
21. Id. at 1224.
22. Id. The case came before the "[Rhode Island] Supreme Court
pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided." Id. at 1222.
After consideration, the Court decided that the appeal would be resolved
without further briefing or argument. Id.
23. Id. at 1224.
24. Id. at 1225.
25. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1225.
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in a timely manner.26 Upon a de novo review, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the motion justice's grant of
summary judgment to the City.27
The Court first examined whether McNulty had complied
with the statutory notice requirement. 28  Relying on prior
decisions interpreting the statutory provisions at issue, the Court
explained that it has "repeatedly stated" that the notice
requirement set forth in the "straightforward statutory language"
of section 45-15-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws 29 "must be
strictly obeyed." 30 The Court further explained that "the notice
requirement is a condition precedent to the plaintiffs right of
action" which is necessary "to afford the [city or] town with an
opportunity to make just and due satisfaction before the
commencement of litigation."31 The Court then concluded that
because it was "undisputed that [McNulty] failed to provide notice
to the city within the statutorily required sixty days," the motion
justice's grant of summary judgment for the City was proper.32
Turning next to McNulty's equitable estoppel argument, the
Court set forth the two requisite elements of the doctrine: (1) "an
affirmative representation or equivalent conduct on the part of the
person against whom the estoppel is claimed which is directed to
another for the purpose of inducing the other to act or fail to act in
reliance thereon"; and (2) "[proof] that such representation or
conduct in fact did induce the other to act or fail to act to his [or
her] injury."33 The Court found that "there were no explicit
instructions or directives made on behalf of the city as to the time
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1224. Justice Robinson authored the opinion for the Court,
joined by Chief Justice Suttell and Justices Goldberg and Flaherty. Id. at
1222. Justice Indeglia took no part in the consideration or decision of the
appeal. Id. at 1226.
28. Id. at 1224.
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-9 (2009).
30. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Moseley v. Fitzgerald, 773 A.2d
254, 258 (R.I. 2001)). The Court did not mention section 45-15-10 of the
Rhode Island General Laws in its analysis. This is most likely because the
sixty day "notice requirement" referenced by the Court is contained in section
45-15-9, while section 45-15-10 simply adds that this notice must be given in
writing. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 45-15-9 to -10 (2009).
31. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Moseley, 773 A.2d at 258).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1225 (quoting Providence Teacher's Union v. Providence Sch.
Bd., 689 A.2d 388, 391-92 (alteration in original) (R.I. 1997)).
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within which [McNulty] would have to file a claim."34 Therefore,
because the City did not make any "affirmative representation" or
engage in "equivalent conduct," either through its representative
or through the documents sent to McNulty, the Court held that
there was "no basis for applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel"
in this case.35
COMMENTARY
The Court tempered its strict interpretation of the notice
requirement of section 45-15-9 of the Rhode Island General
Laws 36 with a footnote at the end of the opinion emphasizing that
the Court's decision should not be read as "dissuad[ing]
municipalities from providing would-be claimants with
information concerning the rigorous temporal requirements that
are set forth in [section] 45-15-9."37 The Court further stated that
the "government may on occasion, for the good of the citizenry,
exceed what strict duty requires." 38  The Court should be
commended for explicitly recognizing the desirability of
municipalities voluntarily disclosing the notice requirement to
injured individuals while at the same time not compromising
sound statutory interpretation and legal analysis. The language
of the notice requirement is indeed "straightforward" as the Court
suggests, 39  and such straightforward language should be
interpreted literally. Moreover, as the Court pointed out, it was
uncontested that no instructions as to the time within which
McNulty was required to file her claim were given by the City.40
A court would be hard pressed to equate the absence of any
information regarding the time limitations with an "affirmative
representation or equivalent conduct" that time limitations did
not exist, and the Court rightly held that the first element of
equitable estoppel was not present in this case.41
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
36. R.L. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-9 (2009).
37. Id. at 1225 n.6.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1224; see R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-15-9(a) (2009) ("A person so
injured or damaged shall, within sixty (60) days, give to the town.., notice of
the time, place, and cause of the injury or damage[.]").
40. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1225.
41. Id.
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On the other hand, the ease with which a municipality could
advise a potential claimant of the sixty day time limitation should
not be ignored. In this case, if the facts alleged by McNulty are
taken as true, as they must be at the summary judgment stage, 42
this ease becomes quite apparent. The City knew that McNulty
was considering filing a complaint against the City, and yet the
clerk and the documents sent by the City failed to apprise her of
the sixty day notice requirement. 43 A simple statement by the
clerk or an extra line or two in the letter sent by the Clerk's office
could have easily alerted McNulty to the fact that she had only
sixty days in which to give written notice to the City.
Nevertheless, the Court struck the appropriate balance in this
decision by rejecting McNulty's equitable estoppel argument while
encouraging, or at least explicitly not discouraging, municipalities
from taking the simple step of informing a potential litigant of the
sixty day statutory notice requirement. The Court wisely used
judicial restraint in not imposing a duty on municipalities that
clearly is not imposed by the "straightforward statutory language"
of section 45-15-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws.44 Hopefully,
in the future, municipalities will follow the Court's suggestion
and, "for the good of the citizenry, exceed what strict duty
requires" by voluntarily informing potential claimants of the
notice requirement.45
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the motion
justice's grant of summary judgment for the City because McNulty
failed to comply with the sixty day notice requirement of section
45-15-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws.46 The Court rejected
McNulty's equitable estoppel argument because the record was
devoid of any "affirmative representation or equivalent conduct"
on the part of the City, a necessary element of the equitable
estoppel doctrine.
Joshua Dunn
42. See id. at 1224.
43. Id. at 1222-23.
44. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-9 (2009); McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1224.
45. McNulty, 994 A.2d at 1225 n.6.
46. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-15-9 (2009).
Contract Law. Haffenreffer v. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d 1226 (R.I.
2010). The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the summary
judgment granted below, rejecting the trial justice's finding that
the Offer Document precluded the defendant, Karl Haffenreffer,
from purchasing certain property with shares due to him from a
trust agreement as coexecutor of his mother's estate. The Court
held that the Offer Document was unambiguous on its face;
however, the Court disagreed with the trial justice's finding that
the interpretation supported the plaintiff, David Haffenreffer.
Although holding that the Offer Document was unambiguous on
its face, the Court further considered extrinsic evidence. Finding
the extrinsic evidence to be consistent with its interpretation, the
Court held that Karl was entitled to summary judgment in his
favor.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Carolyn B. Haffenreffer passed away in 2003 triggering the
execution of her will by her two sons, David and Karl Haffenreffer,
as coexecutors of her estate.1 Her will set forth an estate plan for
the distribution of her probate estate, and further "provided that
the residue and remainder of her estate should be transferred into
her trust ..."2 Thus, her Overall Estate was divided between her
probate estate and her Trust Agreement. 3
The probate estate "consisted mainly of various parcels of real
property"; several parcels located in Little Compton were at issue
in this case.4 Carolyn's will "directed the coexecutors to sell
several . . . parcels of real estate located in Little Compton."5
1. Haffenreffer v. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d 1226, 1227-28 (R.I. 2010). The
will also named a third coexecutor, Attorney Noel M. Field. Id. at 1228.
Attorney Field "in his capacity as coexecutor" was "only a nominal defendant
in this action." Id. at n.2.
2. Id. at 1228.
3. Id. "The Trust Agreement provided that, after accounting for taxes,
debts, and expenses, Karl would receive one-third of the remainder of the
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Section 10 of the will further required that "the coexecutors first
offer to sell the parcels to a select group of family members"; if
such family members refused the sale, then the parcels were to be
offered for sale to the public.6 To "facilitate the sale of the ...
parcels as directed by [section 10 of the] will," the three
coexecutors created an Offer Document. 7 The Offer Document
provided a credit provision "which [set] forth the terms of
payment" for the purchase of the parcels.S
On May 2, 2005, pursuant to section 10 of the will and to the
terms as provided in the Offer Document, Karl "submitted his
response to the Offer Document-accepting the offer by indicating
that he wished to purchase three specific units [of the probate
estate]."9 Karl further indicated that he would produce most of
the purchase price 0 "by using in the form of a credit, the
approximately $4.1 million that was due to him from Carolyn's
Overall Estate to be distributed in accordance with the Trust
Agreement.""1
In response, David and Attorney Field provided Karl with a
memorandum "assert[ing] that the credit provision set forth in the
Offer Document did not permit Karl to purchase the... units by
using a credit reflective of the amount due to him from the Overall
Estate"; rather, the Offer Document mandated payment "in the
form of cash, certified check, bank check, or wire transfer."12
Thus, David and Attorney Field denied Karl's acceptance to
purchase the parcels because his form of payment did not conform
to the payment provision set forth in the Offer Document.13 Karl
objected to this interpretation of the Offer Document.14 Although
the Offer Document provided "payment shall be made in the form
of cash, certified check, bank check or wire transfer," Karl,
6. Id.
7. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1229.
8. Id. The Offer Document also required that family members who
wished to purchase any of the parcels accept the offer no later than May 2,
2005. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The purchase price totaled $5,215,500. Id.
11. Id. An accounting of the Overall Estate found that "Karl could expect
to receive approximately $4.1M and that David could expect to receive
approximately $8.3M." Id. at 1229-30.
12. Id. at 1229.
13. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1229.
14. Id.
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through his attorney, asserted that the Offer Document also
permitted "payment ... subject to adjustment for credit for shares
or amounts due to such offeree from the Estate of Carolyn B.
Haffenreffer pursuant to the terms of the Will."15 Because of the
dispute regarding the interpretation of the Offer Document,
"David and Attorney Field... refused to consummate the sale."16
David then brought suit in the Rhode Island Superior Court
"seeking (1) a declaratory judgment and (2) a temporary
restraining order to prevent the sale of the properties."17 David
later amended his complaint to include "a declaration that Karl
had breached the contract to purchase the ... [properties] because
he had failed to close on the properties within the time set forth in
the Will."18 Karl answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim
asserting that David and Attorney Field had breached the
contract by refusing to sell him the property "when he accepted
the offer set forth in the Offer Document."19 Karl asserted "that,
in drafting the Offer Document, the coexecutors intended that the
credit provision . . would allow him to use his intended
distribution from Carolyn's Overall Estate as a credit for a portion
of the purchase price."20
The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.21
The hearing justice ruled in David's favor finding that Karl had
breached the contract and that "the credit provision clearly and
unambiguously permitted Karl to use a credit from his anticipated
share of Carolyn's probate estate only-and not from the Overall
Estate."22 The hearing justice did not analyze any extrinsic
evidence in reaching this decision, finding that extrinsic evidence
would be both "unnecessary and impermissible" under the parol
evidence rule.2 3
Karl filed a timely appeal from the Superior Court's grant of
summary judgment in David's favor, which brought the action
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1229-30.
18. Id. at 1230.
19. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1230.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id.
2011] 425
426 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:423
before the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal Karl contended that the Superior Court erred in
granting summary judgment in David's favor rather than in his
favor.25 Karl contended that although the credit provision in the
Offer Document is ambiguous, the only "reasonable
interpretation" of the provision is that the credit applies to the
Overall Estate, and not just the probate estate.26 He further
contended that the hearing justice erred in failing to look to
extrinsic evidence in interpreting the credit provision, since the
extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the credit provision
"refer[ed] to the Overall Estate" at the time the three coexecutors
drafted the Offer Document. 27
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews a trial justice's
grant of summary judgment de novo.28 A grant of summary
judgment will be "affirm[edI . . .if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and [the Court] concludes that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."29 The Court also employs
a de novo review in contract interpretation. 30 Finally, since
"whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law" the
Court also conducts a de novo review on this issue. 31
The parties did not dispute that Karl's acceptance of the Offer
Document created a valid contract.32 Thus, "the well-settled rules
on the interpretation of contracts" governed the Court's
determination with respect to the disputed credit provision.33
24. Id. at 1230-31.
25. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1230-31.
26. Id. at 1231.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Estate of Guiliano v. Guiliano, 949 A.2d 386, 391 (R.I.
2008)). Since "there was no dispute between the parties as to the material
facts, but rather only as to the legal conclusion to be drawn," summary
judgment was an "entirely appropriate" option here. Id. at n.8.
29. Id. at 1231 (quoting O'Sullivan v. R.I. Hosp., 874 A.2d 179, 182 (R.I.
2005)).
30. Id. (citing Zarella v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249,
1259 (R.I. 2003)).
31. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1231 (citing Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d
732, 738 n.8 (R.I. 2005)).
32. Id. at 1231 n.9.
33. Id.
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Because the credit provision in the Offer Document referred to the
terms of Carolyn's will, the Court regarded the will "as
incorporated by reference" and thus "considered [the will] in the
construction of the contract."34
The Court noted that the will contained a "pour-over
provision"3 5 that "transfer[ed] a large portion of [Carolyn's] estate
to a trust," "inextricably link[ing]" these two documents. 36
Therefore, since the credit provision in the Offer Document
"expressly allows ... payment through an adjustment of credit for
shares . . .due to [Karl] from [Carolyn's Estate] pursuant to the
terms of the Will," the Court concluded that this provision referred
to shares from both the probate estate and the trust.37 Karl was
thus entitled to use shares due to him from the trust to pay for the
Little Compton parcels specified in the Offer Document. 38
Although the Court held that the language of the Offer
Document unambiguously permitted Karl to use his shares of the
Overall Estate to pay for the parcels, thus "resolv[ing] the instant
controversy," the Court also "believe[d] it worthwhile to note" that
its interpretation of the credit provision "[was] entirely consistent
with the intentions of the parties in preparing the Offer
Document, as reflected in the copious extrinsic evidence in the
record."39  Thus, even after holding that the contract was
unambiguous on its face, the Court "nonetheless consider[ed] the
situation of the parties and the accompanying circumstances at
the time the contract was entered into . . . to aid in the
interpretive process and to assist in determining its meaning."40
Here, the parol evidence rule was inapplicable because the
extrinsic evidence was not used to "modify or contradict" the terms
of the Offer Document; rather, the extrinsic evidence "provide[d]
insight into the parties' intent at the time of the drafting."41 The
depositions of David and Attorney Field revealed that the
34. Id. at 1232 (quoting Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I. 1996)).
35. Id. (citing Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 615 (R.I. 2003)).
36. Id. (citing Merrill v. Boal, 132 A. 721, 725 (R.I. 1926)).
37. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1232 (quoting the Offer Document).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1233.
40. Id. (quoting Hill v. M.S. Alper & Son, Inc., 256 A.2d 10, 15 (R.I.
1969)).
41. Id. at 1233 n.13.
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coexecutors "understood the credit provision of the Offer
Document as referring to the trust and the will put together."42
Additionally, an affidavit from the attorney who actually drafted
the Offer Document stated that his objective was to carry out the
intention of the executors "as he understood it."43 Moreover, this
attorney "[could] not recall" the coexecutors ever precluding
shares from the trust in the Offer Document's credit provision. 44
Thus, the extrinsic evidence demonstrated that the parties
intended to include the shares from the trust as part of the credit
provision. The Court therefore held that the Superior Court
improperly granted summary judgment in David's favor, noting
that in its view, "Karl was entitled to summary judgment."45
COMMENTARY
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law, as well as being
well settled in this state, that 'clear and unambiguous language
set out in a contract is controlling in regard to the intent of the
parties to such contract and governs the legal consequences of its
provisions."' 46 The majority held that an analysis of the Offer
Document devoid of extrinsic evidence "suffice[d] to resolve the
instant controversy."4 7 The Court then muddied this holding by
considering extrinsic evidence. Here, the extrinsic evidence
revealed that the parties intended the Offer Document to permit
payment in the form of a credit from shares distributed in
accordance with the trust agreement. Conversely, had the
extrinsic evidence revealed the intent of the parties to preclude
such an interpretation, it is unclear how the Court would have
ultimately ruled. The dissent criticized the majority for engaging
in "interpretative acrobatics"48 by concluding that the phrase
"pursuant to the terms of the Will"49 actually meant "pursuant to
42. Id. at 1234 (quoting the Offer Document).
43. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1234.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1234-35.
46. Id. at 1240 n.21 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Elias v. Youngken,
493 A.2d 158, 163 (R.I. 1985)).
47. Id. at 1233.
48. Id. at 1235 (Goldberg, J. dissenting).
49. Haffenreffer, 994 A.2d at 1235 (quoting the Offer Document).
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the terms of the Will and trust instrument."50 Further, the
dissent characterized the majority's holding as both "confusing"
and "foreign to our appellate jurisprudence." 51  Since the
majority's analysis required a review of extrinsic evidence, the
Offer Document could not have been unambiguous and clear on its
face, and therefore the Court should have vacated the summary
judgment order and remanded the case for trial.52
CONCLUSION
The Court determined that the Offer Document's
incorporation of Carolyn's will by reference inextricably linked the
credit provision in the Offer Document with the terms of the trust.
Therefore, Karl's acceptance of the offer to purchase the parcels
with credit due to him under the trust agreement created a valid
contract. David breached this contract when he failed to
consummate the sale. Further, extrinsic evidence revealed that
the intent of the parties upon drafting the Offer Document was to
include the shares due under the trust as part of the credit
provision. Thus, the Superior Court erred in finding that the
Offer Document disallowed Karl to use his distributed shares from
the trust to pay for the parcels in the Offer Document.
Accordingly, Karl was entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
Jamie R. Johnson
50. Id. at 1235 (emphasis in original).
51. Id.
52. Id. (Goldberg, J. dissenting).
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Criminal Law/Sentencing. Curtis v. State, 996 A.2d 601 (R.I.
2010). A prisoner released on parole is not entitled to receive
credit toward his full sentence of imprisonment for time served
while on electronically monitored community confinement. The
defendant, after having been released from incarceration pursuant
to a parole permit for electronically monitored community
confinement, was reincarcerated as a parole violator. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court vacated a judgment by the Rhode Island
Superior Court which awarded the defendant credit toward the
completion of his full sentence for time served as a parolee on
electronically monitored community confinement.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On July 30, 2003, the defendant, Harold Curtis, was
sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with five years to serve and
five years suspended with probation, after pleading nolo
contendere to breaking and entering a dwelling with felonious
intent. 1 In March 2006, Curtis was released on a parole permit,
with the condition that he cooperate with the electronic
monitoring program (EMP) for at least ninety days, 2 which
entailed wearing an electronic ankle bracelet and agreeing not to
leave his residence except for work, education, training, court,
medical services, approved counseling services, or religious
services. 3 The EMP agreement also included a clause which read,
"in computing the period of my confinement [pursuant to a
revocation of the parole permit], the time between my release
upon said permit and my return to the place of my original
confinement shall not be considered as any part of the term of my
original sentence."4 On July 1, 2007, Curtis was reincarcerated as
a parole violator, and subsequently scheduled to be released on
July 14, 2008.5 On April 7, 2008, Curtis filed an application
1. Curtis v. State, 996 A.2d 601, 603 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at n.2.




seeking immediate release from incarceration, asserting that the
ninety days he spent on electronically monitored community
confinement as a parolee beginning in March 2006 should be
credited toward the time he had left to serve after his parole was
revoked.6
The Superior Court hearing justice issued an order granting
Curtis's request to receive credit for time spent on electronically
monitored community confinement toward the completion of his
full sentence, reasoning that a parolee on community
"confinement" could not be considered "at liberty" upon parole, as
required by section 13-8-16 of the Rhode Island General Laws.7
The state timely appealed.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the state argued that: (1) the hearing justice was
incorrect in her interpretation of the relevant statutes; (2) the
EMP agreement signed by Curtis specifically excluded time spent
on parole from being credited toward his full sentence; and (3) the
General Assembly distinguishes between community confinement
and time served.9 Curtis argued that: (1) the hearing justice did
not err in her interpretation of the relevant statutes; (2) the EMP
agreement signed by Curtis was void as a contract of adhesion;
and (3) the EMP agreement, as a waiver of his liberty, constituted
an "usurpation of legislative power by the parole board."10
The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that although the
standard of review on a motion to correct a sentence is normally
whether the hearing justice's sentence is "without justification,"
the standard of review in this case is de novo because statutory
interpretation is required.1l
According to the Court, "the issue presented on appeal
concern[ed] the interplay of three statutes, viz., §§ 13-8-16(a), 13-
6. Id. Curtis actually filed an application for postconviction relief, but
the hearing justice decided it was more appropriate to treat the application
as a motion for a corrected sentence. Id. at 602 n.1.
7. Curtis, 996 A.2d at 603, 605 (quotation marks in original).
8. Id. at 603 & n.3.
9. Id. at 604.
10. Id. at 605.
11. Id. at 604.
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8-19(b), and 13-8-9."12 As summarized by the Court, section 13-8-
19(b) of the Rhode Island General Laws "generally precludes a
prisoner from receiving credit toward his or her full sentence for
time spent on parole"; section 13-8-9 "grants the parole board the
authority to issue a permit to a qualified prisoner 'to be at liberty
upon parole' that 'entitle [s] the prisoner... to be at liberty during
the remainder of his or her term of sentence upon any terms and
conditions that the board may prescribe"'; and section 13-8-16(a)
states that "a parole permit entitles a parolee 'to be at liberty
upon parole during the remainder of the term which he or she is
under sentence to serve, upon any terms and conditions that the
board may see fit in its discretion to prescribe .... "'13
The Court reasoned from the plain language of sections 13-8-9
and 13-8-16(a) that a permit "to be at liberty upon parole" is
conditional in nature and "subject to whatever reasonable
conditions the parole board may prescribe."14 Turning to section
13-8-19(b) the Court held, "[i]t is clear to us under the plain
meaning of the statutory language, as well as by Mr. Curtis's
assent to the terms of his permit, that the ninety days he spent on
community confinement may not be credited against his original
sentence." 15 The Court noted that it "need not examine the
contemporary notions of liberty and contrast them with the
realities of community confinement," as the hearing justice did. 16
COMMENTARY
Whether electronically monitored community confinement
constitutes a sufficient deprivation of liberty such that the law
should allow for time thus served to be credited to the prisoner's
original sentence appears to be a matter redressable only through
the political process. The Court's holding in this case reflects a
cogent analysis of the applicable statutory and case law. The
hearing justice's reliance on the fundamental contradictoriness of
12. Id. at 605.
13. Curtis, 996 A.2d at 605 (internal quotation marks and ellipses in
original).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 606.
16. The Court proceeded immediately to note that "[cilearly, the meaning
of liberty within the parole context cannot be construed as an absolute liberty
or an absolute freedom." Id.
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the terms "at liberty" and "confinement" seems erroneous given
the parole context and the fact that the term "at liberty" is
modified by the term "upon parole" in the applicable statutes. 17
Further, section 13-8-19(b) clearly provides that community
confinement shall not be credited toward a prisoner's original
sentence.18 Curtis's argument that the EMP agreement, as a
waiver of his liberty, constituted an "usurpation of legislative
power by the parole board" is also unpersuasive given that section
13-8-9 explicitly authorizes the parole board to issue parole
permits to qualified prisoners "upon any terms and conditions that
the board may prescribe."'19
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant was "at liberty upon parole" within the meaning of
sections 13-8-16(a) and 13-8-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws
during the time of his electronically monitored community
confinement, from which it followed that under section 13-8-19(b),
the defendant was not entitled to credit that time toward the
completion of his full sentence. 2 0
Jaime M. Rogers
17. Id. at 605; R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 13-8-9, -16(a) (2010).
18. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 13-8-19(b) (2010).
19. Curtis, 996 A.2d at 605; see R.I. GEN. LAws § 13-8-9 (2010). The
Court did not reach Curtis's argument that the EMP agreement was void as a
contract of adhesion because the Court held that "parole is a privilege and not
a right of the prisoner." Curtis, 996 A.2d at 607. However, the applicable
statutes, which authorize the parole board to prescribe the conditions of
parole and which bar parole time from being credited to the original sentence,
seem to militate against a finding that the contract was void for adhesion.
See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 13-8-16(a), -19(b) (2010).
20. Curtis, 996 A.2d at 606.
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Criminal Law and Procedure. Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934 (R.I.
2010). The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the denial of
postconviction relief in relation to the assistance of trial counsel,
but found appellate counsel's representation was ineffective;
appellate counsel failed to invoke the statutory right to a de novo
review, pursuant to Rhode Island law, of a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole. After finding the assistance of appellate
counsel ineffective, the Court conducted its review of the sentence
and found it to be appropriate given the violent circumstances of
the crime, notwithstanding any mitigating characteristics of the
applicant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Stemming from the "brutal killing of Sylvester Gardiner,"
applicant William Page was convicted, after a jury-waived trial, of
first-degree murder and commission of a crime of violence while
armed with a firearm. 1 Following the conviction and a sentencing
proceeding, the trial justice sentenced Mr. Page to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for what the trial
justice called the "most atrocious, barbaric killing imaginable." 2
The trial justice "looked in vain for some mitigating factor" to
avoid imposing such a sentence, but his efforts proved fruitless. 3
In imposing the sentence, the trial justice described Mr. Page as
"'violently savage and vicious, unnaturally sadistic, and
relentlessly inhumane and totally incorrigible,"' and 'beyond
rehabilitation."' 4
Mr. Page appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
making multiple contentions that were ultimately rejected by the
1. Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 936-37 (R.I. 2010). The firearm in this
case was a BB gun. Id. at 936.
2. Id. at 937. Mr. Page was also sentenced to a concurrent ten-year
sentence for committing a crime of violence while armed with a firearm. Id.
3. Id. The trial justice stated that "[t]he only factor-if it [wa]s a factor
at all-[wa]s [Mr. Page's] age," which was eighteen at the time of the crimes
and twenty at the time of sentencing. Id. at 937 & n.3.
4. Id. at 937.
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Court, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 5 After the
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Mr. Page filed an
application for postconviction relief with the Superior Court based
on ineffective assistance of both his trial counsel and his appellate
counsel.6
At the postconviction relief hearing, Mr. Page's trial counsel
was the only witness and testified that he had thought about
using an insanity or diminished capacity defense. 7 However, after
the evaluating psychiatrist described Mr. Page as "one of the most
dangerous individuals [whom the psychiatrist had] ever met," trial
counsel decided against either defense. 8 Trial counsel likewise
testified that he decided against using a defense of intoxication
based on his evaluation that it would not be successful;9 after
attempts to plea bargain were unsuccessful, trial counsel
concluded that his best strategy was to focus on sentencing.10
Trial counsel testified that he advised Mr. Page to proceed with a
nonjury trial with stipulated facts, hoping to secure some leniency
from the trial justice at sentencing.'1 The hearing justice rejected
Mr. Page's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and
found that trial counsel's decisions were "sound tactical
decisions."1 2
In his application for postconviction relief, Mr. Page also
contended that he had ineffective assistance of counsel during the
sentencing proceeding of his trial.13 Trial counsel testified as to
5. Id. at 937-38. The Court did not substantively rule upon the
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because the Court held
that the ineffective assistance claim should have been raised in an
application for postconviction relief. Id. at 937 & n.6.
6. Id. at 938.
7. Page, 995 A.2d at 938.
8. Id. (alteration in original).
9. See id. at 938-39.
10. See id. at 939.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 939-40. The hearing justice did not think that, had Mr. Page
not waived a jury trial, he could have been convicted of second-degree murder
as was the man with whom Mr. Page committed the crime. The hearing
justice, who had also been the trial justice, stated that there was "no way on
God's green earth that [the trial justice] could conceive of ever inviting ...
anything but a first degree murder instruction to the jury based on the facts
that would have been produced as [the trial justice] reviewed the file." Id. at
940, 941 n.15.
13. See Page, 995 A.2d at 940.
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his decision to have Mr. Page's stepfather testify at the sentencing
proceeding.14 The hearing justice was "satisfied in every respect
that [Mr. Page] was effectively represented," and thus denied his
application for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance
of counsel at sentencing.15
Regarding Mr. Page's allegation that his appellate counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that "his client
was entitled to a de novo review by th[e] Court of the
appropriateness (vel non) of his sentence," the postconviction relief
hearing justice declined to decide the matter because he felt that
"the Superior Court was not the proper forum for the
consideration of claims of ineffective assistance by appellate
counsel." 16 Mr. Page appealed the Superior Court's denial of his
application for postconviction relief.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that it "will not
disturb the findings of a hearing justice in the postconviction relief
context 'absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice
overlooked or misconceived material evidence."" 8 However, for
"questions of fact concerning whether a defendant's constitutional
rights have been infringed, and mixed questions of law and fact
with constitutional implications," the Court reviews de novo. 19
The Court stated that it would "pattern its evaluations of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims," on the two-prongs of
Strickland v. Washington, regardless of whether those claims are
related to the trial, sentencing, or appeal.20  According to
Strickland, an applicant must first show "that counsel's
14. Id.
15. Id. at 941 (alteration in original). The hearing justice stated that Mr.
Page's sentence was "not because of [trial counsel], but in spite of [trial
counsel's] efforts," and that, regarding his decision on the sentence, he
doubted that anyone "would have changed [his] mind that day, or [the day of
the postconviction relief hearing], for that matter." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 936.
18. Id. at 942 (quoting State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 993 (R.I. 2002)).
19. Page, 995 A.2d at 942 (quoting Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132,
1135 (R.I. 2001)).
20. See id. at 942-43 (quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I.
2001)).
SURVEY SECTION
performance was deficient," that is, it falls below an "objective
standard of reasonableness." 21 The applicant must then also show
that the "deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense
and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the
applicant's right to a fair trial."22
The Court reviewed the record of the trial based on Mr. Page's
contention that his counsel erred in: (1) failing to investigate and
present defenses at trial; (2) advising Mr. Page to waive his right
to a jury trial; and (3) stipulating to the facts of the case. 23 Based
on the tactical decisions made by trial counsel, the Court
concluded the postconviction relief hearing justice did not clearly
err in holding that counsel's performance was reasonable. 24
Likewise, the Court considered Mr. Page's contention that trial
counsel failed "to investigate and to highlight" for the sentencing
justice items that Mr. Page "contend[ed] would have had a
mitigating effect."25 Noting that the presentence report available
to the trial justice contained all of the information that Mr. Page
thought trial counsel should have "highlighted" and that the trial
justice reviewed the report before imposing the sentence, the
Court found no error in the postconviction relief hearing justice's
conclusion that trial counsel represented Mr. Page effectively at
sentencing. 26
The Court found, however, that, in failing to argue that Mr.
Page was entitled to a de novo review of his sentence, 27 the
assistance of Mr. Page's appellate counsel28 was ineffective in that
21. Id. at 942.
22. Id. at 942-43.
23. Id. at 944-45.
24. Id. at 945.
25. Page, 995 A.2d at 945. Specifically, Mr. Page argued that trial
counsel should have emphasized his "learning disability," "behavioral
disorder," "history of substance abuse," and "progress' while serving a
sentence at the Rhode Island Training School"' for an unrelated incident. Id.
at 946.
26. See id. at 947-48.
27. See id. at 948-49. The statute gives the defendant a "right to appeal
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to the [Slupreme [C]ourt,"
which, "after review of the transcript . . . may, in its discretion, ratify [the
sentence] or may reduce the sentence to life imprisonment"; although it does
not use the term de novo, the Court has "consistently conducted [its] review of
the life without parole issue in a de novo manner." Id. at 948 (quoting R.I.
GEN. LAws § 12-19.2-5 (2002)).
28. An attorney different from his trial counsel represented Mr. Page on
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it was "deficient" and Mr. Page "was prejudiced" by the
deficiency. 29 As the Court has required in the past to establish
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the issue "was not only
meritorious, but 'clearly stronger' than those issues that actually
were raised on appeal."'30 In remedying the ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel, the Court conducted a review of the sentence,
noting that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is
permitted for first-degree murder when one of seven
characteristics exists. 31  One such characteristic is when the
murder is "committed in a manner involving torture or an
aggravated battery to the victim." 3 2  The Court found this
characteristic present in Mr. Page's case because the victim was
"virtually unrecognizable" and because Mr. Page confessed that
the victim was conscious and moving during much of the
beating.33 After determining that a life sentence without the
possibility of parole was possible, the Court weighed the only
mitigating factor, Mr. Page's age,34 against the "heinousness of
the crime and the blatant disregard for human life that Mr. Page
exhibited."35 The Court found the sentence appropriate, pointing
to the trial justice's conclusion that Mr. Page was "the one who,
with a final Satanic flurry, drove an ax handle through the
victim's head."36
Justice Flaherty wrote separately, concurring with most of
the majority's opinion, but dissenting from the majority's
affirmation of the life sentence without the possibility of parole.37
While agreeing that Mr. Page had committed an act "with almost
incomprehensible savagery" that justified a life sentence, Justice
Flaherty found that mitigating factors, such as Mr. Page's difficult
family history, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and low
his direct appeal. Id. at 941 n.17.
29. Id. at 949.
30. Id. at 943-44, 949 (quoting Chalk v. State, 949 A.2d 395, 399 (R.I.
2008)).
31. Page, 995 A.2d at 949.
32. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-23-2 (2002)).
33. See id. at 949-50.
34. See id. at 950. Mr. Page was eighteen years old when he committed
the murder and twenty years old when he was sentenced. See id. at 937 n.3.
35. Id. at 950.
36. Id. at 950-51.
37. Page, 995 A.2d at 951.
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IQ, pointed to a fate other than "consign[ment] to the rubbish
heap of life." 38 Mr. Page's age was of particular importance to
Justice Flaherty's determination, as he acknowledged that,
although Mr. Page was beyond the age of majority, there is "no
question that few, if any, young people are imbued with the
attributes of adulthood as soon as their eighteenth birthday is
achieved." 39 Justice Flaherty also pointed out that a possibility of
parole does not mean Mr. Page would ever be released on parole,
and that, if he were released, he would need to have already
served fifteen years. 40 Thus, Mr. Page would be in his mid-
thirties, which would give him the opportunity to show that he
had "reformed, matured, and that he [wa]s no longer the angry,
violent, and impulsive person that he was at age eighteen."41
Calling it a "close case," Justice Flaherty thought that Mr. Page
should be allowed the "opportunity for reform and for a return to
society for the remainder of his natural life." 42
COMMENTARY
The particular facts of this case seem to have made the
decision easier for the Court. 43 Mr. Page's act was described in
various instances by the Court or the record as "atrocious,"
"barbaric," "savage and vicious," "unnaturally sadistic,"
"relentlessly inhumane," "horrendous," and "heinous[ ]."44 While
the Court did find ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for
failure to invoke Mr. Page's right to de novo review of his life
sentence without the possibility of parole,45 the Court conducted
that de novo review and found the sentence appropriate. 46 At the
same time, The Supreme Court also affirmed the Superior Court's
denial of postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. 47 While notions of forgiveness and a second chance
38. Id.
39. Id. at 952.
40. See id. at 952-53 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2.2 (2002)).
41. Id. at 953.
42. Id.
43. See Page, 995 A.2d at 945, 947-48.
44. Id. at 937, 941, 950.
45. See id. at 948-49.
46. See id. at 951.
47. See id. at 945, 948.
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weigh against sending someone so young to, as Justice Flaherty
described, the "rubbish heap of life,"48 the sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole does exist and
must be applicable in some cases. In this case, which Justice
Flaherty, even while favoring a reduction in sentence to include
the possibility of parole, conceded was close,4 9 the facts suggest
that the sentence was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief
regarding the representation of counsel at trial and at sentencing,
but found that Mr. Page had ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. However, the Court's de novo review of the life sentence
without the possibility of parole found the imposition of the
sentence to be appropriate.
Stephen Nelson
48. Id. at 951.
49. See Page, 995 A.2d at 953.
Criminal Law and Procedure. State v. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d 235
(R.I. 2010). When a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to
suppress statements that are allegedly involuntary, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court accords great deference to the factual
determinations and credibility assessments of the hearing justice
and will only overturn those findings if clearly erroneous. When
not found to be clearly erroneous, the Court applies the hearing
justice's findings of fact to the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the statements and conducts a de novo review of
whether the statements were involuntarily given. In State v.
Gonzalez, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction of second-degree child molestation sexual
assault. In considering defendant's appeal of his denied motion to
suppress, the Court determined that the hearing justice's findings
of fact and credibility adverse to the defendant were not clearly
erroneous, and that the defendant's self-incriminating statements
were voluntary.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 9, 2004, defendant, Victor H. Gonzalez, was
arrested and charged with four counts of second-degree child
molestation sexual assault stemming from alleged sexual contacts
with his girlfriend's daughter when she was between
approximately ten and twelve years old.' The alleged offenses
took place between October 1, 1998 and June 30, 2000, and came
to the attention of police when the victim, Kaitlin,2 disclosed them
to a counselor in December of 2004.3 The counselor reported the
allegations to the Department of Children, Youth and Families
1. State v. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d 235, 237 (R.I. 2010). The four counts
involved alleged violations of section 11-37-8.3 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, which states that: "A person is guilty of a second degree child
molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with
another person fourteen (14) years of age or under." Id. at 237 n.2 (quoting
R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-8.3 (2010)).
2. The Court refers to the victim and her mother pseudonymously in
order to protect their privacy. Id. at n.4.
3. Id. at 237.
442 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:441
(DCYF), which began an investigation with Pawtucket police.4 At
the time of the alleged offenses and up until his arrest over four
years later, the defendant lived with his girlfriend, Caroline, two
of Caroline's daughters, including Kaitlin, and a third daughter
that he fathered with Caroline. 5
Before his trial, defendant moved to suppress certain
incriminating statements he made to the Pawtucket police during
their investigation prior to his arrest.6 At the suppression hearing
in Superior Court, the court heard testimony from two
witnesses-Pawtucket Police Detective John McIlmail and the
defendant.7
Detective McIlmail testified that, on December 9, 2004,
Kaitlin, Caroline, and the defendant voluntarily reported to the
Pawtucket police station and he interviewed each of them
separately.8 Detective McIlmail brought defendant into an
interview room and gave him a rights form, which set forth the
Miranda9 rights.' 0 Detective McIlmail testified that defendant
read the form and gave no indication that he did not understand
it.11 According to the detective's testimony, defendant then signed
the form and checked the word "YES" next to the statement: "I
understand my rights."12
Detective McIlmail testified that he then informed the
defendant of Kaitlin's allegations against him.13 The detective
testified that defendant acknowledged he had indeed touched
Kaitlin inappropriately and the conduct had taken place "a few
times" over the course of "a few months."' 4 The defendant then
4. Id. at 238.
5. Id. at 239-40.
6. Id. In those statements he admitted to having inappropriately
touched Kaitlin's breasts. Id. at 238.
7. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 238.
8. Id. Detective McIlmail testified that Kaitlin informed him that,
several years earlier, defendant had "felt her breasts area underneath her
clothing and rubbed her vagina." He also testified that Caroline informed
him that during a discussion among family members a couple of years prior,
defendant had admitted to having touched Kaitlin inappropriately. Id.
9. Id. at 238 n.8 (citing generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
10. Id. at 238-39.
11. Id. at 239.
12. Id.
13. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 239.
14. Id.
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wrote and signed a statement describing the occurrences.1 5
During defendant's testimony at the hearing, he indicated
that he arrived home on December 9, 2004, and was informed by
Caroline and Kaitlin that a DCYF investigator wanted to speak to
him.16 He testified that he then spoke to the DCYF investigator
and admitted that he had inappropriately touched Kaitlin.17
Defendant then proceeded with Caroline and Kaitlin to the
Pawtucket police station, where he gave police a signed statement
admitting to the allegations.i8
However, defendant also testified at the hearing that he
"never did anything to [Kaitlin]";19 rather, he only confessed
because the DCYF investigator had told him that if he did not go
to the police station and report himself, she was going to take his
daughter and Caroline's daughters from their home. 20 Defendant
testified that because he felt he had done nothing wrong to
Kaitlin, he would not have gone to the police station but for the
fact that he felt threatened by the DCYF investigator's
comment. 21 Therefore, defendant argued that his statements to
the Pawtucket police should be suppressed because they were
involuntarily given under the coercion of threats made by the
DCYF investigator. 22
After considering the testimony of both witnesses, the hearing
justice found that the prosecution had established by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant's confession was voluntary.23
Most significant was the hearing justice's statement on the record
that she did "not accept as fact that DCYF threatened to take
defendant's children if he did not give a police statement."24 As a
result, the hearing justice denied defendant's motion to suppress
and he was subsequently convicted by a jury on two counts of
15. Id. Detective McIlmail also testified that he did not recall defendant
mentioning anything about threats made to him by DCYF. Id.
16. Id. at 240.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 240-41.
19. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 241.
20. Id. at 240.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 241. The defendant did not allege any misconduct by the
police, nor did the hearing justice find any such misconduct. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 243.
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second-degree child molestation sexual assault.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, defendant argued that the hearing justice
committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress the
incriminating statements made to Pawtucket police in December
of 2004.26 He asserted that the threat made by the DCYF
investigator to take away the children from his home caused him
to make an involuntary confession to police and amounted to state
coercion in violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. 27
Standard of Review
A confession or other incriminating statement should be
admitted only "if the state can first prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in
Miranda v. Arizona."28  When reviewing a hearing justice's
decision with respect to a motion to suppress an alleged
involuntary statement, the Rhode Island Supreme Court employs
a two-step analysis.29  First, the Court reviews the hearing
justice's findings of facts relevant to the issue of voluntariness of
the statement. 30 The Court pays great deference to the factual
determinations and credibility assessments of the hearing
justice,31 and will not overturn the findings unless they are
25. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 241. Following his conviction, defendant's
motion for a new trial was denied and he was sentenced to twenty years of
imprisonment, with four to serve and the remainder suspended with
probation. Id.
26. Id. at 237.
27. Id. at 242. Defendant cites the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, section 13 of the Rhode Island Constitution
as authorities granting the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at n.14.
28. Id. at 242 (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I. 2008)).
29. Id. (citing State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I. 2009)).
30. Id. (citing Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146).
31. The Court's reason for deferring to the factual findings of the trial
justice is because she "has actually observed the human drama that is part
and parcel of every trial" and "has had an opportunity to appraise witness
demeanor and to take into account other realities that cannot be grasped
from reading a cold record." Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 242 (quoting In the
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"clearly erroneous." 32  Second, as long as they are not clearly
erroneous, the Court applies those facts and reviews de novo the
voluntariness of the statement.3 3  The Court examines the
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the incriminating
statement and makes an independent determination of whether
the facts establish a constitutional violation. 3 4
Review of Hearing Justice's Findings of Fact
In the first step of the Court's analysis, the Court reviewed
the hearing justice's findings of historical facts relevant to the
voluntariness of the defendant's confession to ensure those
findings were not "clearly erroneous."35
At the conclusion of defendant's suppression hearing, the
hearing justice found that the defendant voluntarily waived his
right against self-incrimination when he signed a waiver form and
agreed to speak with Pawtucket police. 36 She reasoned that the
defendant had gone to the police station voluntarily and was not
in custody when he made the incriminating statements, because
his "freedom of movement was never curtailed" and defendant
testified to having a subjective belief that he was free to leave.3 7
Moreover, the Court emphasized that "of capital importance
to the resolution of this case is the fact that the hearing justice
expressly found that no threat was made to defendant by the
Matter of the Dissolution of Anderson, Zangari & Bossian, 888 A.2d 973, 975
(R.I. 2006)).
32. Id. (citing Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146). A finding is clearly erroneous
"when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." Id. (quoting State v. LaRosa, 313 A.2d 375,
377 (R.I. 1974)).
33. Id. at 242-43 (citing Bido, 941 A.2d at 836). This step is reviewed de
novo because "the ultimate question of whether a confession was given
voluntarily is legal in nature." Id. at 243 n.15 (quoting State v. Dennis, 893
A.2d 250, 261 (R.I. 2006)).
34. Id. at 243 (citing State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I.
1998)). A statement is voluntary if it is the "product of [the defendant's] free
and rational choice" and involuntary if it was "extracted from the defendant
by coercion or improper inducement, including threats, violence, or any
undue influence that overcomes the free will of the defendant." Id. (quoting
Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274).
35. See id. at 244.
36. Id.
37. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 243.
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DCYF investigator."38  The hearing justice was "not at all
convinced" by defendant's claim that threats from a DCYF
investigator caused him to go to the police station and confess to
the allegations.39 She found it "totally illogical" that defendant
would think that making incriminating statements to the police
would help him and Caroline keep the children. 40 In effect, the
hearing justice made a credibility assessment with respect to the
defendant's testimony and determined it was not believable. 41
The Court held that there was no basis to find the hearing
justice's factual and credibility assessments to be erroneous. 42
The Court reasoned that "it is a fundamental principle that
credibility assessments are primarily the responsibility of hearing
justices; they are deferred to by appellate courts except in
instances where the trial court failed to touch all the right
bases."4 3 Consequently, the Court then proceeded to the second
part of its analysis.
De Novo Review of Voluntariness of the Statement
Applying the hearing justice's factual and credibility findings,
the Court conducted a de novo review of whether the totality of
those facts actually satisfied the State's burden to prove that
defendant's statements were voluntary. 44 The Court first noted
that there was no indication, and no contention by the defendant,
that the police had coerced the defendant in any manner that
resulted in him making an involuntary statement.4 5 Instead, the
38. Id. at 244 (emphasis in original). However, the hearing justice
acknowledged the possibility that the DCYF investigator may have
recommended that defendant go to the police station. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 244-45.
42. Id.
43. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 245.
44. See id.
45. Id. In summarizing the totality of the circumstances that occurred
between defendant and Pawtucket police, the Court noted that: (1) defendant
went to the police station on his own free will and accompanied by family
members; (2) while waiting to be interviewed, defendant testified that he
believed he was free to leave; (3) before interviewing the defendant, police
presented him with a Miranda form, and defendant voluntary waived his
Fifth Amendment rights when he signed it and indicated he understood it; (4)
defendant was not placed in custody until after he confessed; and (5) no
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crucial factor in deciding the outcome of this case remained the
hearing justice's decision to discredit defendant's testimony that a
DCYF investigator threatened to take his children away if he did
not confess to the police.46  Because the hearing justice
determined that there was no misconduct by either the Pawtucket
police or DCYF, the Court had no evidence to consider in regard to
the voluntariness of defendant's statement.47  Therefore, the
Court held, under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, no
factual circumstances existed to support a finding that defendant's
confession was involuntary. 48 Agreeing with the hearing justice's
decision, the Court denied the appeal and affirmed the judgment
of conviction.49
COMMENTARY
Gonzalez illustrates the almost insurmountable burden on a
defendant attempting to overturn the factual and credibility
assessments of a lower court. Because there is always a
presumption that the hearing justice was in the best position to
make those determinations and prudently considered the
evidence, it is very difficult for the defendant to demonstrate that
the hearing justice's findings were "clearly erroneous." This
challenge is particularly evident in the appeal of a failed motion to
suppress incriminating statements that the defendant claims were
involuntary. Markedly, in the fifteen published Rhode Island
Supreme Court decisions since 1974 that have cited the "clearly
erroneous" standard of LaRosa50 in voluntariness determinations,
the trial justice's factual and credibility findings were never
overturned on appeal.
While a defendant can still successfully appeal the
erroneous admission of an involuntary statement if he satisfies
only the second step of the analysis, doing so is likewise extremely
difficult when applied to the hearing justice's findings of fact.
Although the second step requires the more favorable de novo
evidence suggested that police used any verbal threats, intimidation, physical
force, or other potential forms of coercion. Id.
46. See id. at 244, 246.
47. See id. at 244-45.
48. Id. at 245.
49. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d at 247.
50. See State v. LaRosa, 313 A.2d 375, 377 (R.I. 1974).
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standard to determine the legal question of whether a confession
was voluntarily given, satisfying this prong has proven to be just
as difficult for defendants as satisfying the first prong. Because
there is no bright-line rule for when a statement becomes
involuntary as a matter of law, the Court examines each on a
case-by-case basis under the "totality of the circumstances."51
However, since the "totality of the circumstances" on appellate
review is derived from the hearing justice's findings of fact, the
appellate court virtually always comes to the same legal
determination as the hearing justice.
Gonzalez displays exactly why success at the suppression
hearing is so crucial. Had the hearing justice believed defendant's
testimony that he was threatened by a DCYF investigator, the
outcome would have been the exact opposite and the confession
would have been suppressed as coerced and involuntary within
the "totality of the circumstances." 52 Instead, the defendant failed
to convince the hearing justice that he was giving honest
testimony. That adverse credibility determination turned out to
be the single deciding factor in this case.53
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction. The Court held that the hearing justice's findings were
not clearly erroneous and that, based on those findings, the
defendant had voluntarily waived his right against self-
incrimination when confessing to police.
Brandon B. Fontaine
51. See id. at 243 (citing State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I.
1998)).
52. See id. at 243, 246. Defendant had also supported his argument with
a case from the Kansas Supreme Court, State v. Brown, which held that a
defendant's confession to child abuse was obtained involuntarily when a state
social worker threatened to take his children away if he did not make a
confession to police. The Court distinguished that case from the case at bar
on the sole basis that in Gonzalez there was no threat made to defendant by a
DCYF employee. Id. at 246 (discussing State v. Brown, 182 P.3d 1205, 1211-
12 (Kan. 2008)).
53. See id. at 244.
Criminal Law and Procedure. State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887
(R.I. 2010). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in order to
find a witness competent to testify, the trial justice must
determine that the witness is able to observe, recollect,
communicate, and appreciate the necessity of telling the truth.
Additionally, severance of counts is not required where the
evidence related to each count is straightforward, simple, and
distinct. Finally, the Court held that the trial justice has
discretion to allow leading questions of a witness of diminished
understanding.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Defendant, Jose Rivera, worked as a bus driver for the RIde
division of the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA)
which provides transportation to the developmentally disabled
and the elderly.1 Defendant was accused of sexually assaulting
three developmentally disabled women, Tracy, Elaine, and
Deborah, 2 who were passengers on his bus in June and July of
2005.3 Tracy testified that defendant sexually assaulted her on
two occasions when they were alone on the bus, including touching
her breasts and attempting to vaginally rape her.4 Tracy reported
the assaults to her mother and was taken to physician's assistant
Josephine Barnes-Brown for an examination. 5 Defendant denied
the sexual assault and claimed that Tracy wanted to get him fired
because he was transferring to a different bus route.6
Elaine testified that defendant sexually assaulted her by
touching her breast and vagina on the bus, and two other
passengers corroborated Elaine's testimony. 7 Defendant claimed
1. State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 892-93 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id. at 893. The Court used pseudonyms to refer to the complaining
witnesses. Id. at n.1.
3. Id. at 893.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 893-94.
6. Id. at 894.
7. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 894.
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that Elaine sought revenge against him for reprimanding her on
the bus.8 He also claimed that Elaine colluded with the other two
complaining witnesses and had a propensity to lie.9 The third
complaining witness, Deborah, testified that defendant placed a
finger on her upper body while they were alone on the bus.1O
On February 10, 2006, a grand jury issued an indictment
charging defendant with second-degree sexual assault of Deborah,
two counts of first-degree sexual assault of Tracy, two counts of
second-degree sexual assault of Tracy, and two counts of second-
degree sexual assault of Elaine.11 Before trial, the trial justice
Stephen P. Nugent conducted a hearing to determine the
competency of the three complaining witnesses, 12 listening to
their testimony and that of defense expert Ronald L. Steward,
M.D.13 After the hearing, on May 22, 2007, the trial justice found
all three complaining witnesses competent to testify and also
denied defendant's motion to sever the counts. 14 On May 23,
2007, the trial commenced and on June 4, 2007, the jury returned
a verdict finding defendant guilty on two counts of first-degree
sexual assault, four counts of second-degree sexual assault, and
one count of simple assault or battery.15 Defendant's motion for a
new trial was denied and the trial justice imposed a sentence
amounting to life imprisonment plus sixteen years. 16 Defendant
appealed his conviction. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial justice erred in
finding Tracy and Deborah competent to testify, denying the
motion to sever the counts, denying the motion for new trial, and
on several rulings on evidentiary issues. 18
8. Id. at 895.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 895-96.
12. Id. at 887, 896. Defendant only appealed the trial justice's rulings
regarding Tracy and Deborah at the competency hearing. Id. at 896 n.3.
13. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 896.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 896-97.
16. Id. at 897.
17. Id. at 892.
18. Id. at 892, 897.
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The Competency of the Complaining Witnesses to Testify
Defendant contended that Tracy was not competent to testify
because of discrepancies in her testimony at the competency
hearing as well as her statements that she would be unable to
identify the defendant if she saw him, unable to explain the
differences between a man and a woman, and unable to explain
the word "promise."19 Furthermore, defendant stressed the fact
that Tracy admitted to rehearsing her testimony. 20 Defendant
also contended that Deborah was not competent to testify because
of her inability to explain the difference between a man and
woman or the meaning of the word "oath."2 1
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice is
afforded considerable deference on competency rulings and will
only be overturned for an abuse of discretion.2 2 To find a witness
competent to testify, the trial justice must determine that the
witness is able to "observe, recollect, communicate, and appreciate
the necessity of telling the truth."2 3 Tracy was able to demonstrate
her ability to observe and communicate when identifying a pen
and paper the prosecutor was holding. 2 4 She demonstrated her
ability to recollect and communicate by stating her address, the
people that she lives with and her pets. 25 Additionally, she
showed her appreciation for the necessity of telling the truth by
agreeing to say "I don't remember" when she did not recall the
answer to a question.2 6  Furthermore, the fact that Tracy
admitted to rehearsing her testimony goes to show her honesty
and credibility as a witness. 2 7 A witness does not need to be able
to explain abstract concepts like the definition of the word
"promise," and although Tracy said she would be unable to
identify the defendant, she did so at trial.28 Thus, the trial justice
19. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 897.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 897-98.
22. Id. at 897.
23. Id. at 898 (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1029 (R.I. 2004))
(emphasis in original).
24. Id.
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did not abuse his discretion in declaring Tracy competent to
testify.2 9
Deborah also demonstrated an appreciation for telling the
truth by stating "you should tell the truth" and "a lie is bad."30
Additionally, Deborah stated that she would testify that she did
not understand a question if that was the case. 3 1 Furthermore,
her inability to state the difference between man and woman or
define "oath" are insufficient grounds for finding her incompetent
to testify.3 2 Accordingly, the Court decided that the trial justice
did not err in ruling that Deborah was competent to testify.33
Motion to Sever
Defendant contended that having three developmentally
disabled witnesses testify against him confused the jury and, thus,
a motion to sever the counts should have been granted.3 4 The
Court held that a trial justice will only be overturned on a motion
to sever where there is a clear abuse of discretion. 35 Rule 14 of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require
severance where the evidence related to each count is
"straightforward, simple, and distinct."36  Furthermore, the
defendant must show substantial prejudice 3 7 in order to overturn
a trial justice's decision on a motion to sever. 38
The Court stated that the testimony of the allegations came
only from the complaining witnesses and their mothers, and the
remaining witnesses only gave testimony of background
information.3 9 This testimony was presented in a manner that
facilitated the jury's understanding of the separate counts and
29. Id. at 899.
30. Id.




35. Id. (citing State v. Pereira, 973 A.2d 19, 28 (R.I. 2009)).
36. Id. at 900 (quoting State v. Day, 898 A.2d 698, 705 (R.I. 2006)); see
also R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 14.
37. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 900. The court uses a balancing test comparingjudicial efficiency versus the defendant's right to a fair trial when
determining whether or not the trial justice's ruling on a motion to sever
resulted in substantial prejudice. Id.
38. Id. (citing Pereira, 973 A.2d at 28).
39. Id. at 901.
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was, therefore, "straightforward, simple, and distinct."40
Furthermore, the jury's finding of guilt on a lesser-included
offense demonstrates that the jurors followed the trial justice's
instructions to consider each charge separately and, thus, the
defendant was not "substantially prejudiced."4 1
Motion for New Trial
In ruling on a motion for a new trial, "the trial justice acts as
a thirteenth juror,"42 and will not be overturned unless he or she
is "clearly wrong."43 Here, defendant argued that the testimony of
the complaining witnesses "was neither competent, legally
sufficient nor credible."44 However, the Court held that the trial
justice did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the
complaining witnesses were credible and the defendant was not,
relying on the defendant's inaccurate description of the bus and
contradictions about being alone with Tracy. 45
Defendant also argued that the trial justice should not have
allowed the introduction of the May 2005 driver's manifest into
evidence because it was outside the scope of the bill of
particulars. 46 However, since defendant had testified that he was
never alone on the bus with Tracy, but the driver's manifest
showed that they were alone on two occasions, the Court
concluded that the trial justice did not err in determining that the
manifest was admissible solely for the purpose of impeachment. 47
"[W]hen a bill of particulars is produced but extraneous evidence
is nevertheless admitted," the trial justice must instruct the jury
40. Id.
41. Id. at 900-01. On appeal, defendant also posited the argument that
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights were violated by
the denial of his motion to sever because 'a defendant,' not necessarily Mr.
Rivera himself' would be confronted with a dilemma as to whether to testify
about one victim and not another. Id. The court stated that this argument
was undeveloped and difficult to decipher and refused to address it because it
was not raised below. Id.
42. Id. at 902 (quoting State v. Cerda, 957 A.2d 382, 385 (R.I. 2008)).
43. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 902 (quoting State v. Flori, 963 A.2d 932, 937
(R.I. 2009)).
44. Id. at 902-03.
45. Id. at 903.
46. Id. at 903.04.
47. Id.
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to convict the defendant only for the precise charges in the bill.48
Here, the trial justice clearly instructed the jury in this manner. 49
Additionally, the Court held that the trial justice did not
commit error of law by excluding evidence of Elaine's promiscuity
because defendant failed to notify the trial justice of his intention
to elicit such testimony and failed to make a specific offer of proof
as required by the rape-shield statute. 50 Also, the trial justice did
not err in preventing the defendant from questioning Elaine's
mother about a previous false allegation of sexual assault because
the defendant never proffered any evidence that the allegation
had occurred or was false.51 Furthermore, the trial justice acted
within his discretion when limiting the scope of defendant's cross-
examination of witnesses to matters that were explored on direct
examination and not allowing questioning that was overly broad
or called for speculation. 52
Motion to Lead the Complaining Witnesses
Instead of making a broad ruling, the trial justice ruled that
he would consider each question separately to determine if, in
context, leading questions were appropriate. 53 The Court stated
that the trial justice has discretion to allow leading questions of a
juvenile or "other witness of diminished understanding."54
Accordingly, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in
allowing leading questions to be asked of Tracy because she was
developmentally disabled. 55
48. Id. at 904 (quoting State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 527 (R.I.
1994)).
49. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 904.
50. Id. at 905; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13 (2002).
51. Rivera, 987 A.2d at 905. Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence gives the trial justice discretion in allowing extrinsic evidence of
prior similar false accusations going to a witness's credibility. R.I. R. EVID.
608(b).
52. Rivera, 963 A.2d at 906.
53. Id. at 907.
54. Id. at 907-08 (quoting State v. Vanasse, 593 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 1991)).
55. Id. at 908.
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COMMENTARY
This case is an excellent illustration of the clash between two
major goals of the criminal justice system: protecting the public
against criminals, and only depriving defendants of their liberties
when they have, in fact, committed the crimes of which they are
accused. These two objectives are strongly at odds with each other
in this case considering the mental capacities of the complaining
witnesses. On one hand, a man was sentenced to life in prison
based primarily on the testimony of three severely
developmentally disabled women who lacked the ability to
understand certain basic details of life and, at times, contradicted
themselves.56  On the other hand, the rights of the
developmentally disabled must be protected like all citizens,
regardless of how competent their testimony is.
In a situation like this, our trust in the jury's ability to make
findings of fact based on testimony is truly tested. Given the
amount of evidence against defendant and the lack of a convincing
defense, it appears that the jury reached the correct verdict. The
fact that the jury convicted Rivera only on the lesser-included
offense of simple assault or battery of Deborah instead of second-
degree sexual assault demonstrates that they considered the
weight of evidence for each count and for each complaining
witness separately. 57 This fact bolsters trust in this jury and in
the jury system in general, especially in their ability to decide
difficult cases like this one. The Court's deference to the jury and
trial justice here was correct because the people who heard all of
the testimony first-hand were in the best place to weigh the
evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in order to find a
witness competent to testify, the trial justice must determine that
the witness is able to "observe, recollect, communicate, and
appreciate the necessity of telling the truth."58 Additionally,
severance of counts is not required where the evidence related to
56. Id. at 893, 897-98.
57. Id. at 901.
58. Rivera, 963 A.2d at 898 (quoting Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1029).
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each count is "straightforward, simple, and distinct."59 Finally,
the Court held that the trial justice has discretion to allow leading
questions of a witness of diminished understanding.60
David M. DiSegna
59. Id. at 900 (quoting Day, 898 A.2d at 705).
60. Id. at 907-08 (citing Vanasse, 593 A.2d at 68).
Criminal Law and Procedure. State v. Scanlon, 982 A.2d 1268
(R.I. 2009). The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial
justice's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, thereby
affirming the defendant's jury conviction of three counts of first
degree sexual assault, two counts of felony assault, and one count
of first degree robbery. The Court held that the trial justice
properly excluded the testimony of the victim's boyfriend as
inadmissible collateral evidence pursuant to Rule 608(b) of the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The Court further determined
that defendant failed to preserve his right to appeal the denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the felony assault
charges. Rejecting defendant's argument, the Court determined
that the felony assault convictions did not violate double jeopardy
because the acts underlying the two convictions were distinct acts
and not one continuous incident.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 2, 2003, the victim, Janet S.,1 left a bar in
Woonsocket sometime after midnight to meet up with one of her
drug suppliers to purchase $70 worth of cocaine. 2 At that time,
Janet was heavily intoxicated to the extent that she was having
difficulty walking. 3 As she walked down Arnold Street, the
defendant, Timothy Scanlon, pulled up to her in a truck and asked
if she "wanted to party."4  Janet got into the truck with the
understanding that she would either have sex with defendant for
money or use drugs with him.5 Shortly after she got into the car,
defendant drove to a Sovereign Bank and withdrew $100 from the
1. Court uses alias to protect the victim's privacy.
2. State v. Scanlon, 982 A.2d 1268, 1270 (R.I. 2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Janet recognized the driver from two months prior and noted that
the truck he drove was the same as before, but the color was different. Id.
Later, investigation proved that defendant had repainted his truck. Id.
However, the investigation completed by the police could not definitely prove
that defendant repainted the truck before or after his assault against Janet.
Id.
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automatic teller machine (ATM).6 After leaving the bank, Janet
asked the defendant to take her home since she was feeling
"weird."7 As she directed him to take a left, defendant took a
sharp right instead and instantly became infuriated with her.8 All
of a sudden, defendant started stabbing Janet in the head, face,
and neck with a screwdriver. 9 As he assaulted Janet, he also
yelled obscenities at her.O
Soon after, defendant stopped the car among some abandoned
mills in northwestern Woonsocket."i As he continued to jab the
screwdriver into Janet's face, head, and neck, he commanded that
she take out her money.' 2 After she complied, defendant then
ordered Janet to take her clothes off, which she did.J3 Defendant
then "penetrated Janet digitally, all the while berating and
threatening her."14 Following all of this, he kicked her out of the
car and sexually assaulted her once again.l5 He eventually
yanked her by the arm until her shoulder snapped.' 6 Before
defendant left her out in the cold, he threatened to kill her if she
reported him to the police.' 7 Later in the evening, Janet was
found by a passing motorist who called the police.' 8 Immediately,
she was taken to the hospital and was examined by a doctor.J9
With great reluctance, Janet made a statement to the police
regarding what had transpired earlier that evening.20 About a
month after the incident, Janet was able to remember that while
she was in the vehicle her attacker stopped at the Sovereign Bank
earlier in the evening.2 ' The police used this information to
identify the defendant and arrested him on April 15, 2003.22
6. Id.
7. Id.




12. Id. By this point, Janet was bleeding profusely. Id.
13. Id. at 1270-71.






20. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1271.
21. Id. at 1272.
22. Id.
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Investigation revealed that the sample of DNA defendant
voluntarily offered matched the DNA extracted from Janet by the
doctor. 23
The jury convicted defendant on three counts of first degree
sexual assault, in addition to assault with a dangerous weapon,
first degree robbery, and assault and battery resulting in serious
injury.24 The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial
and sentenced him to fifty years concurrently for the counts of
sexual assault and robbery, and a consecutive sentence of twenty
years suspended with twenty years probation for the other
counts.25 Subsequently, defendant appealed the convictions. 26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Exclusion of Testimony
On appeal, defendant first argued that the trial judge erred in
granting the State's motion in limine because Janet's boyfriend's,
Richard Miles, testimony was material, not collateral, and
therefore, Rule 608(b) was not a basis for excluding his
testimony.27 The Rhode Island Supreme Court will "consider only
whether the challenged evidence was proper and admissible and,
if not, whether there was sufficient prejudice to constitute
reversible error" when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion in
limine.28 Evidence is material "if the evidence is admissible for a
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1272-73.
25. Id. at 1273.
26. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1273.
27. Id. Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, or, in the discretion of
the trial judge, evidence of prior similar false accusations, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning
the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified.
R.I. R. Evid. 608(b).
28. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1274 (quoting State v. Gomes, 881 A.2d 97, 111
(R.I. 2005)).
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reason other than to contradict the witness's testimony."29 The
defendant has the duty to make some "reasonably specific offer of
proof as to who the perpetrator might be" when the defendant has
accused someone else of committing the crime that the defendant
is currently charged with.30 In the absence of such proof, the
evidence could potentially be "an impermissible invitation to the
jury to speculate on a collateral matter."31 In the instant case, the
testimony of Janet's boyfriend could only have been used to
impeach Janet's credibility on a collateral issue, which would have
been inadmissible. 32 The Court was not persuaded by defendant's
argument that the person who Janet used drugs with had any
implication of defendant's guilt or innocence. 33 In its ruling, the
Court held that Rule 608(b) barred defendant's use of Richard
Miles's testimony to impeach the victim's recollection. 34
Felony Assault Conviction
In regard to defendant's conviction for felony assault resulting
from the dislocation of Janet's shoulder, defendant raised two
challenges. 35 He first argued that as a matter of law, the severity
of the injury to Janet's shoulder failed to rise to the level
necessary to support a conviction, and therefore, his motion for
judgment on acquittal should have been granted.36 Defendant
then argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution and the Rhode Island Constitution barred his
convictions for both counts five and six. 37 Before addressing both
arguments advanced by defendant, the Court noted that
defendant failed to preserve his right to make these challenges on
appeal. 38 Even if preserved, the first challenge would have failed
because the dislocation of Janet's shoulder was adequate to allow
29. Id. at 1275 (quoting State v. Martinez, 824 A.2d 443, 449 (R.I. 2003)).
30. Id. (citing Gomes, 881 A.2d at 112).
31. Id. (quoting Gomes, 881 A.2d at 112).
32. Id. at 1275.
33. Id.
34. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1275.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1276. Count five includes the charge of assault with a
dangerous weapon and count six is for the assault or battery resulting in
serious bodily injury. Id.
38. Id.
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the jury to find that Janet suffered a protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily part, thus satisfying the
requisite standard of the statute.39
Addressing defendant's second challenge, the Court applied
the "same evidence" test to determine whether defendant's
constitutional protection against being placed in double jeopardy
was violated. 4 0 The test states that "where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not."4 1  Defendant's charges of
assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery did not
merge, as defendant adamantly claimed. 42 The Court reasoned
that the acts that led to the two convictions were two separate
acts supported by different evidence.4 3 Count five alleged that
defendant assaulted the victim with a dangerous weapon, the
screwdriver. 4 4 Count six alleged that defendant was guilty of a
felony assault because he grabbed and dislocated Janet's arm.45
The Court further noted that there was no evidence within the
record that suggested that the use of the screwdriver was the
cause of Janet's arm being dislocated.4 6 Therefore, counts five and
six did not merge and defendant was not deprived of his
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 4 7
Motion for New Trial
Defendant raised two arguments in support of his motion for
a new trial on appeal.48 First, he contended that there was an
insufficient amount of evidence introduced at trial to support a
conviction.4 9 Second, defendant argued that the State waited
until the night before trial to disclose information pertinent to his
39. Id. at 1277.
40. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1277.
41. Id. at 1277-78 (quoting State v. Davis, 384 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1978)).




46. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1278.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1279.
49. Id.
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defense, thereby violating the State's discovery responsibilities
and, thus, warranting grant of a new trial.50
A motion for a new trial is reviewed by the Court with
deference to the trial justice's decision. 51 "Unless the trial justice
was clearly wrong.., or overlooked or misconceived material and
relevant evidence that related to a critical issue in the case" the
Court will not overturn the trial justice's ruling.52 To address
defendant's first argument, the Court noted that the trial justice
took into account all of the evidence presented at trial in making
his determination to deny defendant's motion for a new trial.53
Therefore, the trial justice's decision on the motion was not clearly
wrong, nor did he overlook material evidence. 54
In regard to defendant's second argument, the Court noted
that defendant failed to object to the introduction of the evidence
when presented at trial. 55 Defendant also failed to move for a
continuance in order to review the evidence that was provided by
the State at the last minute. 56 The Court citied Cronan ex rel.
State v. Cronan,57 which held that a "defendant may not press...
objections [on appeal] when they were available for him to raise
before or at the trial, yet he neglected to do sO."58 Since defendant
failed to object to the introduction of the late discovery items at
the time they were disclosed, the Court held that he was
precluded from raising this argument on appeal. 59
COMMENTARY
Throughout State v. Scanlon, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court decided to address a number of issues raised by defendant
despite defendant's failure to properly preserve the challenges.
50. Id. Pertinent information included the victims delayed memory of
sexual intercourse with her attacker and the delayed notice on the results
from the forensic examination of the truck used by defendant. Id.
51. Id.




55. Id. at 1280. The evidence introduced was the late discovery of Janet's
recovered memory and the examination of defendant's truck. Id.
56. Id.
57. Cronan ex. rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 879 (R.I. 2001).
58. Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1280 (quoting Cronan, 774 A.2d at 879).
59. Id.
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The decision by the Court to address these issues indicates the
importance of clarification on this matter. The magnitude of the
offense committed by defendant also provides weight to the
Court's ultimate determination to decide the case as they did. As
illustrated by the facts, this was a heinous crime committed by
defendant and it seems as though the court strategically
addressed each issue in-depth even though defendant failed to
properly preserve the issues. Another reason for the Court's
thorough review was due to the fact that defendant raised State
and Federal Constitutional arguments. 60 This shows the Court's
concern for ensuring that Constitutional rights are not violated.
The procedure that is required to preserve the defense of
double jeopardy was not clarified until two years after defendant's
trial took place.61 Prior to this, the case law in this area remained
unclear. The decision of this case will provide guidance to future
defendants who seek to raise potentially valid arguments on
appeal. The importance of properly preserving the party's
argument is great since this could conceivably result in the Court
refusing to address issues that could potentially lead to reversal.
In order to avoid such injustice, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
made a point to fully discuss the issues and indicate to future
litigants the seriousness of this procedure. From here on, parties
do not have a valid excuse for failure to adequately secure
challenges given that this case has explicitly indicated the proper
procedure.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a defendant is
precluded from raising a claim for a motion on a new trial when
the defendant failed to object at the time the evidence was
introduced at trial.62 Denial of a new trial is appropriate when
the trial justice finds evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.63 The Court affirmed the judgment of
convictions. 64
Basannya Babumba
60. See Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1276.
61. Id. at 1277 (citing State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 977 (R.I. 2007)).
62. Id. at 1280.
63. Id. at 1279.
64. Id. at 1280.
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Environmental Law. Lynch v. Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management et al., 994 A.2d 64 (R.I. 2010). The
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM)
requires refuse facilities in Rhode Island to apply for a permit,
pursuant to section 23-18.9-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
in order to operate at a particular capacity. Section 23-18.9-9 also
governs the subsequent expiration, renewal, and transfer of refuse
facility licenses. Any individual who provides substantive
comment at any time during the public comment period before
DEM issues or denies a particular license may appeal the decision
of the DEM director. The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that
the legitimacy of the subsequent renewal and transfer license
issued to TLA-Providence LLC (TLA) hinged on the validity of the
original license; thus, it was proper on appeal for Rhode Island
Attorney General, Patrick C. Lynch, to challenge the validity of
the original license, regardless of whether there had been a
renewal or transfer since the original issuance.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case involves an extensive procedural history that began
almost a decade ago and that ended temporarily with the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decision on May 5, 2010.1 Rhode Island
Attorney General, Patrick C. Lynch, originally challenged a
license application filed between August of 2000 and July of 2002
by Pond View Recycling, Inc. 2 Pond View applied for a new
license to expand from operating at a limit of 150 tons per day of
construction and demolition debris to operating at a capacity of
500 tons per day. 3 In accordance with section 23-18.9-9(a)(4)
through (6) of the Rhode Island General Laws, the Attorney
General provided "substantive comment" at public hearings on
September 10 and 11, 2002 contesting the issuance of Pond View's
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license on two grounds: (1) the company was not currently in
compliance with state environmental laws; and (2) the company
neglected to obtain the licenses required to operate. 4
Nevertheless, Pond View's license was issued on January 10,
2003 and, again in accordance with section 23-18.9-9(c) of the
Rhode Island General Laws, was set to expire three years later on
January 10, 2006.5 In April 2003, the Attorney General filed an
administrative appeal to be heard before the Administrative
Adjudication Division for Environmental Matters of the
Department of Environmental Management (AAD), and the
hearings were subsequently held.6 Unfortunately, in May 2004,
the hearings were stayed when the hearing officer determined
that she did not have authority to compel a DEM witness to testify
when the witness refused to answer one of the Attorney General's
questions. 7 While the hearings were stayed, the Attorney General
4. Id. at 66 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.9-9(a)(6) (2008)). Attorney
General Lynch also insisted that Pond View's license application was
deficient in numerous ways. Id. at 66. Section 23-18.9-9(a) provides in
relevant part:
(4) No earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than seventy-five (75)
days following the initial public notice of the issuance of the draft
license or tentative denial, a hearing shall be held for public
comment. Comments from the applicant and/or any interested
persons shall be recorded at the public hearing. Written comments,
which shall be considered part of the record, may be submitted for
thirty (30) days following the close of the public comment hearing.
(6) The applicant and/or any person who provided substantive
comment at any time during the public comment period may appeal
the decision of the director; provided, however, any person who shall
demonstrate good cause for failure to so participate and demonstrate
that his or her interests shall be substantially impacted if prohibited
from appearance in the appeal, may in the discretion of the hearing
officer be permitted to participate in the appeal process.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.9-9(a) (2008).
5. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 66 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.9-9(c) (2008)).
6. Id. at 66. The Attorney General and Pond View attempted to resolve
the issue through voluntary mediation after the Attorney General's appeal
was filed; however, no resolution materialized and the administrative process
continued. Id. at n.4.
7. Id. at 66-67. The Attorney General asked the chief of DEM's Office of
Waste Management about information contained in DEM's regulations and
DEM counsel objected that the question required expert testimony. The
hearing officer ruled that the question did not require expert testimony, but
DEM counsel refused to allow the DEM witness to answer the question. Id.
at 67 & n.5.
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filed for a declaratory judgment with the Rhode Island Superior
Court seeking to enforce the witness's subpoena, and to compel
the witness to testify.8 The Attorney General also filed a petition
with the director of DEM for a declaratory ruling that would
determine the type of questions DEM employees were required to
answer. 9 Though DEM issued an order requiring DEM witnesses
to answer only fact-specific and non-opinion inquiries, the
Superior Court on December 31, 2007, ordered the DEM witness
to "comply with the Hearing Officer's directive to answer
questions calling for factual or opinion evidence."10
At this point, about five years had passed since the public
hearings were held in which the Attorney General provided
substantive comment in opposition to the issuance of Pond View's
license application."l The stay of proceedings was lifted after the
Superior Court's order on December 31, 2007, and the AAD
hearings continued; however, they continued only with respect to
Pond View's motion to dismiss, which had been filed while the
proceedings were stayed.12  The gravamen of Pond View's
argument was that the controversy was now moot because its
2003 license had since expired and the Attorney General had not
preserved his right to challenge the renewed license issued on
January 10, 2006.13 In response, the Attorney General argued
that the controversy was not moot because the 2006 license was a
renewal of the original 2003 license and its validity was therefore
dependent upon the validity of the original license. 14 On January
4, 2008, the AAD hearing officer issued an order dismissing the
Attorney General's appeal as moot, despite the Superior Court's
order that the DEM witness be compelled to testify at further
8. Id. at 67.
9. Id. at n.6.
10. Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted).
11. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 66-67.
12. Id. at 67.
13. Id. Pond View also argued in support of its motion to dismiss the
case for mootness that the doctrine of laches applied because the Attorney
General exercised unreasonable delay in prosecuting the case. Id.
14. Id. at 67-68. The Attorney General also argued the following: there
were unresolved constitutional and due process issues regarding DEM's
administrative proceedings; the appeal involved issues of "extreme public
importance"; the appeal was not time-barred by the doctrine of laches; and
Pond View offered no evidence of unreasonable delay or prejudice. Id.
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AAD hearings.15
In February 2008, the Attorney General filed a complaint
with the Superior Court seeking review of the AAD's mootness
decision and declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Pond
View's 2006 license.' 6 However, before the Superior Court issued
its ruling on the appeal, another company, TLA-Providence LLC
(TLA), bought out Pond View and had Pond View's license
transferred.17 At that point, TLA was issued a three-year renewal
license, which would expire February 28, 2011.18 On May 29,
2008, the Superior Court affirmed the AAD hearing officer's
judgment that the issue of the validity of the 2003 license was
moot, reasoning that the Attorney General should have done
something to stop the issuance of the 2006 license, which rendered
the 2003 license moot. 19 The Superior Court dismissed the
declaratory judgment count. 20  Notwithstanding the court's
holding, the trial justice expressed disapproval regarding the non-
compliance of the parties with the Superior Court's first order of
December 31, 2007 that the DEM witness respond to questions
and with the fact that no further evidence was taken during the
proceedings.2 1
After entry of judgment, the Attorney General filed a notice of
appeal regarding the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim
and filed a petition for writ of certiori seeking review of the
Superior Court's mootness decision.2 2 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court granted the petition for writ of certiori and consolidated
both the certiori petition and the appeal, addressing specifically
whether or not the appeal of the 2003 license was moot.2 3
15. See id. at 68.
16. Id. Pond View counterclaimed on numerous counts, including
compensation for litigation expenses, abuse of process, and malicious
prosecution. Id.
17. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 68-69.
18. Id. at 69 & n.9 (citing 12-030-021 R.I. Code R. § 1.6.03(a)(3) (2010)).
TLA was also substituted as a defendant in the action. Id. at 69.
19. Id. at 69-70.
20. Id. at 70.
21. Id. at 69-70. The trial justice also stated that the "internal friction
within the executive department of government" was "unseemly." Id. at 69.
22. Id. at 70.
23. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 70.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its analysis with an
examination of section 23-18.9-9 of the Rhode Island General
Laws.24 The crux of the Court's analysis hinged specifically on
section 23-18.9-9(c), which concerns the expiration and renewal of
licenses. 25 The Court focused on the portion of section 23-18.9-9(c)
that provides:
[t]he provisions in this section for issuance of a license
shall not apply to the renewal of a license and any facility
shall be relicensed if it meets the criteria in effect when
the facility was licensed; provided, however, that any
renewal application which substantially deviates from the
use or purpose of the license shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter .... 26
The Court interpreted the statute to mean that the provisions
of section 23-18.9-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws do not apply
to the renewal of a license and that a renewal license follows from,
and is directly dependent upon, the validity of the original license;
essentially, renewal and transfer licenses are not "truly new
24. Id. at 71.
25. Id. Section 23-18.9-9(c) provides in relevant part:
(c) Licenses shall expire three (3) years from the date of issuance
unless sooner suspended or revoked. The provisions in this section
for issuance of a license shall not apply to the renewal of a license
and any facility shall be relicensed if it meets the criteria in effect
when the facility was licensed; provided, however, that any renewal
application which substantially deviates from the use or purpose of
the license shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter and
further provided that any facility shall be relicensed if it meets the
criteria in effect when the facility was licensed. The director is
authorized to promulgate by regulation procedures for license
renewals. The director shall publish a schedule of fees to be paid to
renew a license. These fees shall be reasonable and shall account for
the size and complexity of the project, and costs incurred to monitor
the project, and any other criteria that the director may determine;
provided, however, that no renewal license fees shall exceed one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000). All licensed solid waste
disposal facilities shall be deemed to comply with all local
ordinances.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.9-9(c) (2008).
26. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 71 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.9-9(c) (2008))
(emphasis omitted).
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licenses." 27 It follows from that interpretation of the statute, the
Court reasoned, that the validity of the original license is not moot
and that its validity can still be challenged, "even though it
survives only in the form of the [subsequent] permutations."28
Additionally, the process for a renewal and transfer license is
basically a formality that does not require: (1) a certificate from
the municipality stating that the facility conforms with local land
use and control ordinances; (2) a certificate of approval from the
state planning council for the proposed site; or (3) a renewal or
transfer license subject to the public notice and comment
requirements. 29 In contrast, an application for a new license is
subject to all of these requirements. 30 Thus, the Court agreed
with the Attorney General that TLA's renewal and transfer
licenses were dependent upon the validity of the original license
and that the issue of the validity of the original license was not
moot.3 1
The Court disagreed with DEM and the trial justice that the
Attorney General had not preserved his right to appeal the issue
of the validity of the 2003 license, as the Court found that the
limited statutory requirements for a renewal and transfer license
did not provide recourse for a challenge to either type of license,
and that the Attorney General's only option was to continue his
challenge to the original 2003 license. 32 The Court also disagreed
with DEM's argument that the issue of the validity of the original
license was moot because the 2006 and 2008 licenses contained
different conditions from the 2003 license and were thus not the
same as the original. 33 The Court found that, based on DEM's
own reasoning, licenses are frequently modified and renewal
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id. at 71-72.
29. Id. at 72.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 72. The Court also found persuasive the Attorney General's
alternative argument that if TLA's renewal and transfer licenses were in fact
new licenses, then they were not in compliance with the statutory
requirements for a new license. Id. at 72 & n. 14.
32. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 73. The Court also noted that the DEM
regulations only provide for an appeal process for the applicant who has been
denied a license, but not an appeal process for interested parties to object to
or appeal an issuance of a renewal or transfer license. Id. at 73 & n.16.
33. Id. at 73.
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licenses are revised according to subsequent modifications. 34 Only
when there is a "substantial deviation" from the original license is
there an issuance of an entirely new license; the modifications of
conditions on licenses are simply a reflection of changes that
facilities experience over time.35 Thus, the Court concluded,
"absent such substantial deviations, the renewed licenses are in
fact a product of the issuance of the original license," which in this
case was the 2003 license. 36
Finally, the Court rejected DEM's argument that the Court's
decision in Hallsmith-Sysco Food Services v. Marques supports the
conclusion that the 2003 license is moot. 37 The Court held in
Halismith-Sysco Food Services that the elimination of a liquor
license rendered moot an objection to the license's future
transfer.38 The Court distinguished the 2003 license in this case
from the license in Hallsmith-Sysco Food Services because the
2003 license expired on its own terms and was subsequently
renewed and transferred, unlike the Halismith-Sysco Food
Services license, which was completely eliminated by the town.39
The Court further indicated that its analysis was similar to that of
the Supreme Court of Texas in Harris County Bail Bond Board v.
Blackwood, where the court recognized that the expiration and
renewal of licenses do not moot the issue of the validity of the
original license. 40
COMMENTARY
This case involves a number of instances where the parties
were encouraged to reach a settlement and were subsequently
admonished for their behavior in dragging out a dispute beyond
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.9-9(c) (2008)). The Court noted that
with regard to a transfer license, a new license is only issued when the
transfer involves "significant amendments and/or revisions to the operating
plan or facility." Id. at 73 & n.17 (citing 12-030-021 R.I. CODE R. §
1.6.03(a)(2) (2010)).
36. Id. at 73.
37. Id. at 72; Hallsmith-Sysco Food Services v. Marques, 970 A.2d 1211
(R.I. 2009).
38. Lynch, 994 A.2d at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at n.15; Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Blackwood, 41 S.W.3d
123 (Tex. 2001).
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the orders of the Superior Court.41 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court noted that the Superior Court justice admonished the
parties when he wrote in his opinion, "[When the Superior Court]
issues orders, they are not to be ignored. In the event that end
runs are going to be attempted around them, the Court through
appropriate motion practice ought to be made aware of it before it
happens."4 2 Agreeing with the Superior Court's admonition, the
Supreme Court declared, "[iut should go without saying that we
unequivocally share in the displeasure voiced by the Superior
Court justice."43 Also, the Superior Court justice reprovingly
stated that the "internal friction within the executive department
of government" was "unseemly."4 4 Similarly, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he parties were repeatedly
encouraged by [the Superior Court justices] to pursue
settlement."4 5
This case raises a number of issues, including the function of
the executive department of government in Rhode Island, the
appropriate use of taxpayer funds, and, in particular, whether the
exhaustion of administrative remedies is an appropriate use of
government time and money. Though these issues are
speculative, it is a reasonable expectation that the executive
branch of the Rhode Island government should be able to resolve
or settle disputes with other in-state government agencies through
negotiation and arbitration. That the executive branch cannot
come to a resolution with other state agencies is unsettling at a
time when Rhode Island citizens need their government to
function as quickly and efficiently as possible in order to properly
allocate funds and stimulate job growth. Moreover, it is not
inconceivable to believe that had the parties settled their issues in
2003 and not dragged out the dispute into 2010 and beyond,
taxpayer funds could have been saved or spent elsewhere. Lastly,
exhaustion of administrative remedies ought to be a tool used
primarily by individual citizens or non-governmental
organizations to challenge or appeal governmental or state agency
decisions. In the majority of situations, the executive branch of
41. See Lynch, 994 A.2d at 67 n.6, 69, 70 n.11.
42. See id. at 70 n. 11 (alteration in original).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 69.
45. See id. at 67 n.6.
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the Rhode Island government and other state agencies should be
able to resolve disputes in a timely manner through negotiation
and arbitration.
CONCLUSION
Despite close to a decade of litigation over the license at issue
in this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the
judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case back to
the Superior Court with further instructions that it remand the
case back to the Administrative Adjudication Division for
Environmental Matters of the Department of Environmental
Management for further proceedings "to commence expeditiously
in a manner consistent with this opinion and the December 31,
2007 order of the Superior Court."46
Lindsay M. Vick
46. Id. at 74.
Excusable Neglect. UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio, 987
A.2d 873 (R.I. 2010). A Superior Court clerk's failure to mail an
entry of judgment to the parties in the case does not invalidate the
judgment where the parties were both present when the judgment
was signed by the trial judge. Nor does a Superior Court clerk's
erroneous recording of the date of entry of judgment on the civil
docket invalidate the judgment when both parties were present at
the signing of the judgment and the deadline for appeal is the
same day whether calculated from the actual date of judgment or
the erroneous date. A busy legal practice is not excusable neglect
which warrants an extension of time to file a notice of appeal
under Rule 4(a) of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, UAG West Bay AM, LLC, manages the Inskip
Auto Mall car dealership in Warwick Rhode Island.1 Car War
LLC, also a plaintiff, owns the property and a remote parking area
near the dealership which Inskip uses as employee parking and
long term parking for inventory.2 The defendant, Bald Hill
Condominiums, owns a commercial shopping center which abuts
the Inskip Auto Mall. 3  For the last ten years the Inskip
dealership had maintained a curb cut which connected the main
Inskip property to the remote parking area through an access
drive, which was within Bald Hill Condominium's property.4
In June 2004, Nicholas Cambio, the original developer of Bald
Hill Condominiums, contacted the plaintiff, claiming that he had
the exclusive right to grant access through the Bald Hill property
and demanding a one-time access fee. 5 The plaintiff refused to
1. UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio, 987 A.2d 873, 874-75 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id. at 875. Plaintiff UAG West Bay AM, LLC, the company that
manages the Inskip dealership, leased the property from plaintiff Car War
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make the payment and when, in January 2005, Cambio
threatened to block the dealership's curbs with concrete blocks,
the plaintiff filed the instant action.6  The plaintiff sought
injunctive relief in the Superior Court of Rhode Island to prevent
its easement right of entry to the access road from being blocked
and requested a declaratory judgment stating its easement
rights.7 In addition, the plaintiff requested a judgment stating
that it had no responsibility to pay an access fee to Cambio or
Bald Hill Condominiums. 8
The plaintiff alleged it held certain declarant rights in Bald
Hill Condominiums which allowed it access to an easement over
the property.9 After the suit was filed, it was discovered that
there was an issue with the declarant rights in the original deed,
which the plaintiff attempted to correct.lo However, the
defendant used the issue with the deed to argue that any
easement interest the plaintiff may have had was defeated.1l In
November 2006, the Superior Court granted partial summary
judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff held valid
declarant rights.12 The parties negotiated to solve the remaining
issues. 13  On December 10, 2007 the plaintiffs attorney,
defendant's attorney, and the hearing justice signed a document
entitled "Final Judgment", which contained the partial summary
judgment and negotiation results. 14 The defendant's attorney
asked plaintiff to file the judgment "and to provide him with a
fully executed copy." 15 The plaintiffs attorney filed with the
clerk's office the same day and mailed a copy to the defendant. 16
The judgment that was mailed had a clerk's office time stamp of
December 10, 2007 but was not signed by the clerk;17 rather, the
clerk signed the judgment on December 11, 2007.18 In addition,
6. Id.






13. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 875.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 875-76.
17. Id. at 876.
18. Id.
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"[tihe clerk's office never sent any party a notice of entry of
judgment."19
The period within which the defendant could have filed an
appeal of the partial summary judgment ended on December 31,
2007.20 "On January 4, 2008, [the] defendant filed an emergency
motion for a brief extension of time to file notice of appeal."2 1 The
defendant, in its motion, asserted that there was excusable neglect
which justified an extension because the attorney of record had
delegated the job to an associate and the associate had failed to
file the notice of appeal by the deadline because of serious
illness.2 2
An evidentiary hearing was held on January 23 and 24,
2008.23 At the hearing, the defendant raised an additional
argument that the judgment was defective because the judgment
had not actually been signed by the clerk until December 11, 2007
and the clerk had failed to mail notice of final judgment to the
attorneys. 24 The defendant's attorney testified that he had not
"huddle[d] over" the associate and had trusted her to get the
notice of appeal in on time because he was very busy.25 He had
only asked her once, in passing, if it was done and when she said
it was not, he never checked with her again.2 6 On January 3,
2008, he emailed the associate to check that the notice of appeal
had been filed and then learned that she had failed to file it.27
The defendant's attorney further testified that he was unaware of
what the filing deadline was and that the associate had been ill at
the time. 28
On February 6, 2008, the hearing justice denied the
defendant's motion for extension of time to file, 2 9 Finding that the
appeal period had begun to run on December 11, 2007.30 The
19. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 876.
20. Id. at 877.
21. Id. at 876.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 876, 877.
25. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 876.
26. Id.
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clerk's failure to mail notice did not alter the appeal period since
both attorneys were present at the signing of the judgment, and
thus, were on notice that the appeal period had begun. 31 In
addition, the hearing justice held that a "busy legal practice does
not meet the standard of excusable neglect."32 The associate was
not the attorney on record and therefore her illness had no
bearing on the case.33 In response, the defendant timely filed this
appeal. 34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the question of the
entry of judgment de novo since it was a question of law.3 5 The
Court reviewed the issue of excusable neglect under the abuse of
discretion standard. 36
Entry of Judgment
The defendant claimed that the clerk's office failed to follow
Rule 79(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires the clerk to enter each civil action onto the civil docket,
because the docket does not reflect the December 11, 2007 entry of
the judgment. 37 The defendant additionally claimed that the
clerk's office failed to follow Rule 77(d) when the office failed to
mail notice of entry of judgment to the parties. 3 8
However, Rule 58(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure states that a "judgment is effective and shall be
deemed entered when so set forth and signed by the Clerk."39
Rule 4(a) of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Appellate
Procedure says that a judgment is entered when it is set forth and
signed by the clerk in the trial court in accordance with the rules




35. Id. (citing Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 408 (R.I. 2001)).
36. Id. at 878 (citing Friedman v. Lee Pare Assocs., Inc., 593 A.2d 1354,
1356 (R.I. 1991)).
37. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 878. n.6 (citing R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIv.
P. 79(a)).
38. Id. n.7 (citing R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 77(d)).
39. Id. (quoting R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 58(a)).
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of the trial court. 40 Rule 4(a) provides for twenty days from the
entry of judgment to file an appeal. 4 1
The Court held that although Rule 77(d) requires the clerk to
mail notice of judgment, failure to do so "does not void the
judgment."4 2 Rule 77(d) also authorizes a party to give notice of
the entry of judgment by sending a copy to the other party, which
is exactly what occurred in the instant case. 43 In addition, the
defendant's attorney believed that the appeal period had begun to
run after December 10, 2007.44 The defendant cited, Kay v.
Menard, "in support of its contention."45 However, in Kay, the
judge signed the order outside of the presence of the attorneys and
nothing on the order indicated when it was prepared or signed by
the court clerk.4 6 Another order was prepared and signed at a
later date in Kay, thus the Court held the original order invalid
because the parties lacked notice and knowledge of its entry.4 7 In
the instant case, however, both parties had notice and knowledge
of the entry of judgment because their attorneys were present at
the signing of the judgment. 48  Furthermore, the plaintiffs
attorney notified the defendant's attorney that the judgment had
been filed with the clerk on December 10, 2007. 49
In the present case, the Court further held that the clerk's
erroneous recording of the date of entry of judgment on the docket,
under Rule 79(a), did not invalidate the judgment because the
''ministerial act is not essential to the effectiveness of the
judgment. It is deemed entered and is effective when the clerk
signs it."50 The Court also noted that the twenty day appeal
period, if started on December 10, 2007, would end on a Sunday
40. Id. (quoting R.I. Sup. CT. R., ART. I, Rule 4(a)).
41. Id. (citing R.I. SuP. CT. R., ART. I, Rule 4(a)).
42. Id. at 878-79 (citing McClellan v. Thompson, 333 A.2d 424, 428 (R.I.
1975)).
43. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 879 (quoting R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P.
77(d)).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Kay v. Menard, 727 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1999)).
46. Id. (citing Kay, 727 A.2d at 666).
47. Id. (citing Kay, 727 A.2d at 666-67).
48. Id.
49. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 879.
50. Id. (quoting Robert B. Kent, et al., Rhode Island Civil Procedure and
Appellate Procedure § 58:2 at 41 (2006)).
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and thus be extended to the following Monday.51 Therefore, the
end of the appeal period was the same regardless of whether it
was calculated from December 10 or 11, 2007.52
Excusable Neglect
The Court held that a busy law practice is insufficient to
establish the excusable neglect required under Rule 4(a) of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure to
obtain an extension of the time to file a notice of appeal. 53 Such
relief will only be granted if it is established that the counsel's
neglect was the result of some extenuating circumstances that are
sufficiently significant to make it excusable. 54  These
circumstances are those that are out of the party's control. 55 The
Court previously held in Astors' Beechwood v. People Coal Co.,
that overlooking a filing deadline because of "duties attendant" to
an attorney's practice did not establish excusable neglect; it must
be more than failure to remember a deadline. 56 In the instant
case, the associate who had been ill never entered an appearance
in the case and the defendant's attorney, who was the attorney of
record, claimed that he was extremely busy and did not know the
date of the filing deadline. 57 The Court held that this did not
constitute excusable neglect.58 "A reasonably prudent attorney
would have confirmed that his or her associate had actually filed
the notice of appeal within the time period, or, discovering that he
or she was incapable of doing so, would have assumed
responsibility himself or herself."59
COMMENTARY
In holding that a clerk's failure to mail notice of entry of
51. Id. at 879-80.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 880-81.
54. Id. at 880 (quoting King v. Brown, 235 A.2d 874, 875 (R.I. 1967)).
55. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 880 (quoting Boranian v. Richer, 983
A.2d 834, 840 (R.I. 2009)).
56. Id. (citing Astors' Beechwood v. People Coal Co., 659 A.2d 1109, 1115
(R.I. 1995)).




judgment did not void the judgment in the instant case, the Court
essentially adopted an ad-hoc analysis for situations like the one
presented. The Court compared the facts of the instant case to a
previous case, cited by the defendant, where it held a judgment
void due to a failure by the clerk to mail notice of judgment.60 By
distinguishing these two cases, the Court made clear that it is still
possible for a judgment to be found void for failure to mail notice.
However, the Court failed to lay out a definitive test for when a
judgment may be void. It was suggested that the fact that the
attorneys had actual notice of the date of final judgment barred an
invalidation of the judgment under Rule 77(d).61 Thus, in future
cases, attorney knowledge would be an important, but not
necessarily determinative, factor.
The issue of the clerk's erroneous recording of the date of
entry of judgment on the docket under Rule 79(a) was very quickly
disposed of by the Court, suggesting that it would be a rare
situation where such a failure by the clerk would invalidate a
judgment.62 In addition, the Court made a point of calculating the
appeal period for the actual and erroneous date of final judgment,
pointing out that they were the same.63 The analysis of the
defendant attorney's claim of excusable neglect seems to have
been an easy one for the Court. This may have been due, in part,
to the abuse of discretion standard of review, but also reflects the
Court's firm stance that a busy law practice is not excusable
neglect. The Court made a point of laying out the failures made
by the defendant's attorney and claiming that a reasonably
prudent attorney would not have acted in a similar manner. 64
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a failure by the
Superior Court clerk to mail notice of judgment to both parties in
a civil suit, where both attorneys were present at the signing of
the judgment and the plaintiffs attorney mailed the time stamped
judgment to the defendant's attorney, was not a voidable error.
60. UAG West Bay AM, 987 A.2d at 879.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 879-80.
64. Id. at 881.
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The erroneous recording of the date of final judgment on the civil
docket by the clerk was also not a voidable error. In addition, the
Court affirmed previous decisions by holding, in the instant case,
that a busy law practice is not excusable neglect sufficient to
warrant an extension of the time to file a notice of appeal.
Erin Paquette
Family Law. Fravala v. City of Cranston, 996 A.2d 696 (R.I.
2010). A claimant proved by clear and convincing evidence that
she was the common-law spouse of a deceased firefighter, thereby
enabling her to collect his pension benefits. Evidence of claimant's
relationship with firefighter prior to the death of his estranged
wife was admissible. 1 Envelopes addressed to claimant as if she
had taken firefighter's last name were not considered hearsay and
were thus admissible. 2  The claimant was not entitled to
prejudgment interest.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Constance Fravala met Wilbur Phillips while both were
married to other people.4 Ms. Fravala divorced her husband in
1968; Mr. Phillips was granted a divorce from "bed, board, and
future cohabitation" from his wife (Lillian Cantone) in 1967,
though his legal separation was never converted into a final
decree of divorce. 5 Ms. Fravala testified that Mr. Phillips told her
he was divorced. 6 Ms. Fravala and her five young children began
living with Mr. Phillips in 1969.7 Ms. Fravala's grandson also
lived with them from the time of his birth in 1978.8 The couple
cohabited continuously until Mr. Phillips' death in 2004.9 Mr.
Phillips worked as a firefighter for the City of Cranston for
approximately twenty years and at the time of his death, in 2004,
he was duly collecting a pension.10 When she was denied a
widow's pension upon Mr. Phillips' death, Ms. Fravala brought an
action against the City of Cranston seeking a judgment declaring
1. Fravala v. City of Cranston, 996 A.2d 696, 703 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id. at 704.
3. Id. at 707.
4. Id. at 698.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 699.
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that she was the common-law wife of Mr. Phillips.l"
Before the trial began, the city filed a motion in limine
seeking to exclude any evidence of the relationship of Ms. Fravala
and Mr. Phillips prior to Ms. Cantone's death in 1999.12 The city
argued that the evidence should be excluded as irrelevant under
Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.13 The trial judge
denied the motion.14
Ms. Fravala provided extensive testimony concerning her
relationship with Mr. Phillips.15 She spoke to the intimacy and
commitment of their relationship, testifying that for thirty-five
years the couple lived together continuously, never dated other
people, were intimate and shared a bed.16 According to Ms.
Fravala, the couple "attended family functions, birthday parties
and weddings as a couple, and they went on vacations together...
."17
As to finances, Ms. Fravala testified that the couple pooled
their income and jointly paid bills until their retirement in 2000,
at which point they began to split living expenses.i 8 Bank
statements were introduced showing that the couple had a joint
bank account in September 2001 and in March 2004.19 Ms.
Fravala testified that she had not known whether common-law-
married couples were allowed to file joint tax returns, so the
couple filed separately. 20 Mr. Phillips named Ms. Fravala as the
beneficiary of his life insurance policy and also listed her as his
emergency contact on his Medicare enrollment form.21
According to Ms. Fravala, the couple "discussed getting
married 'just for a ceremony,"' but never followed through with
11. Id. at 698-99. Ms. Fravala originally filed an action seeking a writ of
mandamus and a mandatory injunction and only later incorporated a petition
for declaratory relief. The petition for a writ of mandamus and mandatory
injunction were dismissed, and the case went forward solely on the petition
for declaratory judgment. Id.
12. Id. at 699.










one.2 2 Mr. Phillips gave Ms. Fravala two rings over the course of
their relationship, one of which Ms. Fravala testified was meant
as an engagement ring.23
Though they never were formally married, Ms. Fravala
testified that, for "some things," she signed her name "Constance
Fravala Phillips," and for others "Constance Fravala."24 She
testified that a lease from 2000 was signed "Wilbur Phillips" and
"Constance Fravala Phillips."2 5 There was also a membership
application for health insurance admitted into evidence which
bore Mr. Phillips' signature and indicated that the couple was
married in 1988.26
Regarding Mr. Phillips' funeral arrangement, Ms. Fravala
testified that she paid all of the expenses and provided
information for the obituary to the newspaper. 27 The obituary
noted that Mr. Phillips was the husband of "Constance 'Connie'
(Davidson) Fravala and the late Lillian (Cantone) Phillips."2 8 Ms.
Cantone was listed as Mr. Phillips' spouse on his death certificate,
and Ms. Fravala testified that she was informed that one of Mr.
Phillips' daughters changed the listing from Ms. Fravala to Ms.
Cantone. 29
Admitted into evidence were photocopies of envelopes
variously addressed to "Mrs. Constance Phillips" and 'Mr. and
Mrs. Buddy Phillips."30 Additionally, Ms. Fravala was permitted
to admit the affidavit of a deceased firefighter, someone Fravala
testified was a long time friend. 31 The affidavit asserted that Ms.
Fravala and Mr. Phillips "lived together as a married couple until
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 700. For instance, Ms. Fravala used only the surname Fravala
on documents pertaining to her children, who bore the same name. She also
testified that she used only Fravala on her credit union account, Mr. Phillips'
funeral bill, and her driver's license. Id.
25. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 700.
26. Id. at 699. Ms. Fravala testified that the date was of no importance
to her. Id.
27. Id. at 700.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The trial justice admitted the envelopes over the city's objection
on the grounds of hearsay. Id.
31. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 700.
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[Mr. Phillips] passed away."3 2
At least ten witnesses testified on behalf of Ms. Fravala.33
Among other things, these witnesses testified that the couple:
shared a bedroom, held themselves out as a couple, socialized as a
couple, appeared to be monogamous, and appeared to cohabit
continuously. 34 Three of Ms. Fravala's children each testified that
Mr. Phillips was a father figure to them, was actively involved in
their lives, and that they referred to Mr. Phillips as their father.35
Ms. Fravala's grandson, who lived with the couple, testified that
Mr. Phillips brought him to "the fire station, fishing, and to
bowling tournaments," that he introduced Mr. Phillips to people
as his grandfather, and that Mr. Phillips called him his
grandson. 36 One retired firefighter testified that he believed the
couple to be married.37
The trial justice rendered the decision, stating that she was
"clearly convinced that [Ms. Fravala] and [Mr. Phillips] intended
to live together as husband and wife for over thirty-five years" and
that Ms. Fravala had "met her burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that a common-law marriage existed between
the parties at the time of [Mr. Phillips'] death."3 8 The trial justice
declared that Ms. Fravala was entitled to a widow's pension as of
the date of Mr. Phillips' death in 2004 through January 2009 and
to future monthly payments during her lifetime, but denied Ms.
32. Id. A friend of the deceased firefighter testified as to the authenticity
of the affidavit. "He . . . testified that he recognized the affidavit, had
knowledge of [the affiant] preparing the affidavit, and had witnessed him
sign it in the absence of coercion." Id. at 701.
33. Id. at 700-01. While many witnesses testified on behalf of Ms.
Fravala, the city called only one witness: an account clerk in the city's finance
office. The clerk testified that it was her responsibility to send bereavement
letters and affidavits to deceased city pension recipients' surviving spouses.
To apply for a survivor's pension, a spouse would have to provide a death
certificate and a marriage certificate. The account clerk also testified that, if
Ms. Fravala qualified to collect the pension, "she would be entitled to receive
$2,486.29 per month as of February 2009, and a lump sum of $199,308.22 for
benefits accrued from the time of [Mr. Phillips'] death through January
2009." Id. at 701.
34. Id. at 700-01.
35. Id. at 701.
36. Id. at 700.
37. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 700.
38. Id.
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Fravala's request for prejudgment interest.3 9
The city moved for an order staying enforcement of the
judgment, and the motion was granted conditionally. 40 Both
parties filed timely cross-appeals. 4 1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The city argued on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1)
denying its motion in limine to exclude evidence of the couple's
relationship prior to the death of Mr. Phillips' wife, Ms. Cantone;
(2) allowing the introduction of five envelopes addressed to
variations of 'Mrs. Constance Phillips" and the affidavit by the
deceased firefighter; and (3) wrongly concluding that a common-
law marriage existed by misconstruing the evidence. 4 2  Ms.
Fravala argued on appeal that the city breached its contract with
the local unit of the International Association of Fire Fighters and
breached its contract with her as a beneficiary of Mr. Phillips'
pension; she also argued that the trial court erred by not awarding
her prejudgment interest.4 3
The city argued that evidence of Ms. Fravala's relationship
with Mr. Phillips prior to the death of Ms. Cantone should not
have been admitted. 44 Its contention rested on the fact that, as a
matter of law, Ms. Fravala and Mr. Phillips could not have been
married under the common law until the death of Mr. Phillips'
39. Id. at 702. An order and judgment was entered on April 2, 2009,
consistent with the bench decision,
(1) declaring [Ms. Fravala] the common-law wife of [Mr. Phillips] at
the time of his death; (2) granting her widow's pension benefits of
$199,308.22 from October 25, 2004 through January 31, 2009; (3)
granting future monthly widow's pension benefits of $2,486.29
during her lifetime for the months February 2009 through June
2009, and thereafter in an amount to be determined by the terms of
the pension agreement; and (4) denying [Ms. Fravala's] request for
prejudgment interest.
Id.
40. Id. "[T]he motion was granted conditionally provided the issuance of
a supersedeas bond pursuant to Rule 62 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 702, 703, 704.
43. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 707.
44. Id. at 702.
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wife, Ms. Cantone. 45 According to the city's argument, any
evidence of the couple's relationship prior to Ms. Cantone's death
was irrelevant. 46 The Supreme Court found that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing this evidence to be
admitted 47 because the "intent of the parties is crucial in
determining whether a common-law marriage exist[ed]." 48 Thus,
"the conduct of the parties, even at a time when an impediment
preclude[d] the lawful existence of a common-law marriage, could
be probative of the parties' intent after the impediment [was]
removed."49
As to the admission of the five envelopes and the affidavit of
the deceased firefighter, the city argued that the evidence
constituted inadmissible hearsay.50 The Supreme Court applied a
deferential standard of review, and held that neither the
envelopes nor the affidavit were inadmissible hearsay under Rule
801 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 51 Under Rule 801(c),
hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."52  The
envelopes were not offered to prove that Ms. Fravala was, in fact,
"Mrs. Phillips," which would have gone to the truth of the matter
asserted. 53 Instead, the envelopes were offered to prove that some
members of the community addressed Ms. Fravala as "Mrs.
Phillips" or a variation thereof.54 Likewise, the affidavit of the
deceased firefighter was offered to prove that "members of their
community viewed [Ms. Fravala and Mr. Phillips] as a married
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 703.
48. A common-law marriage "can be established by clear and convincing
evidence that the parties seriously intended to enter into the husband-wife
relationship and that their conduct was of such a character as to lead to a
belief in the community that they were married." Id. (quoting Sardonis v.
Sardonis, 261 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1970)). The required intent of the couple and
belief of the community may be demonstrated by "inference from
cohabitation, declarations, reputation among kindred and friends, and other
competent circumstantial evidence." Id. (quoting Sardonis, 261 A.2d at 24).
49. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 703.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 703, 704.




couple," not to prove that Ms. Fravala's name was a variation of
'"Mrs. Constance Phillips."5 5
The city also argued that the trial justice misconstrued the
evidence in concluding Ms. Fravala and Mr. Phillips were married
under the common-law at the time of Mr. Phillips' death. 56 The
Court concluded "that, given the deference that this Court accords
to the trial justice's inferences and conclusions drawn from the
evidence and the trial justice's extensive findings of fact, we are
satisfied that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive
material evidence or otherwise commit clear error."57 The Court
noted that the trial justice rightly attributed great weight to Ms.
Fravala's testimony concerning the nature of her relationship with
Mr. Phillips, specifically finding that the couple intended to enter
a husband-wife relationship from the beginning of their
cohabitation in 1969 with such intent continuing beyond Ms.
Cantone's death. 58  The trial justice made specific findings
concerning the couple's continuous cohabitation, monogamy,
intimacy, marriage-like commitment, joint finances, and intent to
be husband and wife. 59
Furthermore, the trial justice found that there existed
"overwhelming evidence supporting the fact that the community
55. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 704.
56. Id. The city's specific arguments were:
(1) the trial justice over-looked the evidentiary weaknesses in [Ms.
Fravala's] case; (2) the trial justice found a 'family relationship'
when she should have made a finding of a 'husband-wife
relationship' and was inappropriately 'moved by the length of
cohabitation and Mr. Phillips' relationship with Ms. Fravala's
children and grandchildren'; (3) the trial justice erroneously stated
in her bench decision that [Ms. Fravala] testified that people
referred to [Ms. Fravala and Mr. Phillips] as husband and wife; (4)
[Mr. Phillips'] 2001 insurance membership application suggests that
[Mr. Phillips] did not believe that he and [Ms. Fravala] were in a
common-law marriage because he 'was very careful to identify a year
for the marriage and a maiden name.'
Id.
57. Id. at 706.
58. Id. at 705.
59. Id. at 705-06. The documentary evidence relied upon to prove
marital intention included a cosigned lease, Mr. Phillips' life insurance policy
naming Ms. Fravala as sole beneficiary, an insurance application in which
Mr. Phillips' named Ms. Fravala as his spouse, various documents in which
the couple listed each other's names as emergency contacts, and a loan
application in which Mr. Phillips and Ms. Fravala were co-borrowers. Id.
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recognized the parties to be in a husband-wife relationship for
over thirty-five years."60 The Court acknowledged that the trial
justice gave some weight to Mr. Phillips' relationship with Ms.
Fravala's children and grandchildren, finding the familial nature
of those relationships to be persuasive evidence that the
community perceived the couple as husband and wife. 61 The trial
justice recognized the weaknesses of Ms. Fravala's case, noting
the absence of evidence that the couple referred to themselves as
husband and wife, filed joint tax returns, listed themselves as
married on major documents, paid bills jointly, or pooled
finances. 62  The Court held that the trial justice properly
conducted what is "intrinsically a fact-intensive inquiry" to
determine that the couple's common-law marriage existed.63
Finally, Ms. Fravala argued that the city breached its
contract with the local unit of the International Association of Fire
Fighters and breached its contract with her as a beneficiary of Mr.
Phillips' pension, and also that the court should have awarded her
prejudgment interest pursuant to section 9-21-10(a) of the Rhode
Island General Laws.64 The Court found that Ms. Fravala's
underlying action did not contain a breach-of-contract claim, and
that she requested only declaratory relief.6 5 The Court also found
that, under section 9-21-10, a plaintiff is only entitled to
prejudgment interest when "a decision is made for pecuniary
damages."66 Here, the trial justice determined that Ms. Fravala
was entitled to benefits, not damages, so the Court found that
section 9-21-10 did not apply.67
COMMENTARY
Rhode Island is one of only a handful of states that continue
to recognize common-law marriage. 6 8 Trial Justice Savage, after
60. Id. at 706.
61. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 706.
62. Id. The trial justice also noted that it was Ms. Cantone who was
listed as Mr. Phillips' wife on his death certificate. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 707.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 707.
68. Id. at 703. The Court cited a 2007 article which stated that Rhode
Island was one of only nine states that recognize common law marriage. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
rendering her decision, commented that "the outdated doctrine of
common-law marriage should be abrogated judicially with the rule
being given prospective application only."6 9 One well-accepted
understanding of the doctrine is that it was necessary to frontier
settlements of the early United States, in which access to
officiants was limited, communities were sparse, and life was
dangerous.70  Urbanization eliminated this rationale. 71 Courts
have also based abolition of the doctrine on "fears of fraud in the
transmission of property; a desire to protect marriage and the
family against alternative forms of sexual unions; racism and
eugenics; the movement to maintain vital statistics and enforce
various health-related requirements for marriage through the
licensing process; and administrative and judicial efficiency." 72
Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman argues that states should
retain or reinstitute the doctrine of common law marriage,
pointing to the disparate adverse impact on women when courts
do not recognize the doctrine. 73 Cases alleging common law
marriage are almost always brought by women, and
nonrecognition limits a woman's rights to alimony, property
distribution, inheritance, Social Security and workers'
compensation benefits. 74 Professor Bowman argues that the most
vulnerable women, minorities and those in lower income groups,
are most likely to be affected by nonrecognition since informal
unions are more frequent among these groups. 75
CONCLUSION
The Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment and
remanded the record to the Superior Court. 76 The Court declined
to consider, in the context of this case, whether the common-law
69. Id. at 706 n.3. The Court declined to address the continued vitality of
the doctrine and added that a decision to abrogate would be better suited to
the General Assembly. Id.
70. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common
Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 717 (1996).
71. Id. at 750.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 755.
74. Id. at 754-55.
75. Id. at 765-67.
76. Fravala, 996 A.2d at 708.
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marriage doctrine should be abrogated. 77 Instead, the Court
suggested that the continued vitality of the doctrine would be
more appropriately addressed by the General Assembly. 78
Sheila Vennell O'Rourke
77. Id. at 707 n. 3.
78. Id.
Family Law. In re Paul Harrison, 992 A.2d 990 (R.I. 2010). A
Rhode Island Family Court justice has the authority to transfer a
juvenile to a Temporary Community Placement once the juvenile
has been charged with a serious crime, certified as an adult for
trial, and thereafter sentenced to serve the period of the child's
minority at the Rhode Island Training School. Transfer to a TCP
does not constitute a modification of the certified minor's sentence
and is consistent with state statutes governing the certification
process and the governing principles of the juvenile justice system.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In December 2007, Paul Harrison, then sixteen years old,
sexually assaulted a female of the same age, "whom he described
as a friend."1 Due to the nature of the allegations, the state
initially sought to try Harrison as an adult and requested a waiver
of jurisdiction from the Rhode Island Family Court.2 After an
apparent agreement had been reached by the parties on June 16,
2008, the state requested a certification hearing in lieu of the
waiver hearing so that Harrison could be tried as an adult in
Family Court. 3 Following certification by a Family Court justice,
Harrison pleaded nolo contendere to first-degree sexual assault.4
Harrison was thereafter sentenced to a total of fifteen years
imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions, ten years of
which would be suspended, with five years to be served at the
Rhode Island Training School. 5
On January 12, 2009, six months after sentencing, Harrison
was brought before the Family Court for a routine progress
review. 6 At this hearing both the state and the Public Defender
1. In re Paul Harrison, 992 A.2d 990, 991, 999 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id. at 991 & n.2 (citing in relevant part R.I. GEN. LAws §14-1-7.1
(1990) concerning waiver requirements).
3. Id. at 992; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS §14-1-7.2 (1990) (identifying
statutory requirements of certification process).
4. Id. at 991-92.
5. Id. at 992.
6. Id.
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acknowledged that Harrison "was doing well at the Training
School." 7 As a result, the Public Defender suggested that the
court take into account Harrison's notable progress and consider
placing Harrison in a "step-down program," such as a group-home,
when the court next reviewed his case a few months later.8 After
briefly inquiring as to which program might be suitable, the
Family Court justice instructed that Harrison be immediately
transferred to Ocean Tides, a Temporary Community Placement
(TCP) facility that treats adolescent males. 9
On January 16, 2009, the state filed a motion requesting that
the Family Court justice reconsider the order, which was
subsequently denied. 10 As a result, the state filed a motion to stay
the Family Court order and a petition for certiorari with the
Rhode Island Supreme Court."1 On February 9, 2009 the
Supreme Court stayed the Family Court's order and granted the
state's petition for writ of certiorari. 12 The Supreme Court then
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether a TCP was an appropriate placement for Harrison,
requiring "the Family Court justice to issue a decision that
contained 'the necessary findings of fact and rulings on pertinent
legal issues raised by the parties' counsel."13
On remand, the Family Court justice heard from the director
of social services at Ocean Tides, who testified that the facility had
accepted certified youths as TCPs in the past and that "Harrison
was a good candidate for the facility's sex-offender program."14 In
contrast, the state sought to establish solely through cross-
examination of the director that "Ocean Tides was not a locked
facility and that it had less rigorous supervision than the Training
1
7. Harrison "had received a GED, had made progress in his sex-offender
treatment, and he was free of serious disciplinary citations" during his time
served at the Training School. Harrison, 992 A.2d at 992.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The state also requested a stay in Family Court, which the justice
reserved judgment on. Id. at 992 & n.5.
11. Id. at 992.
12. The Supreme Court granted the state's motions, "noting that the
[Family Court] justice 'neither considered any testimony or other evidence
nor offered any legal rationale in rendering his decision."' Id.
13. Harrison, 992 A.2d at 992-93.
14. Id. at 993.
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School."15 After reviewing the testimony presented and the
parties' legal arguments, the Family Court justice determined
that transferring a certified minor to a TCP did not constitute a
modification of the minor's sentence, and "that the 'juvenile is still
under sentence at the Rhode Island Training School,"' according to
section 14-1-42 of the Rhode Island General Laws.16 The Family
Court justice further concluded that Harrison was an ideal
candidate for the sex-offender program at Ocean Tides and
ordered that Harrison be transferred to the facility as a TCP.17
The Supreme Court initially stayed this order, but soon after
vacated the stay and ordered that Harrison be placed at Ocean
Tides. 18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Upon review of the Family Court order, the Supreme Court
initially sought to determine whether the transfer of a certified
minor to a TCP amounted to a modification of that minor's
sentence in relation to section 14-1-7.3(a) of the Rhode Island
General Laws.19 Conducting a de novo review of the statutory
language, the Court focused on the parties' conflicting
interpretations of the provision: "to be served in the training
school for youth in a facility to be designated by the court."20
Finding the language of the provision "susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation," 2 1 the Court then sought to
interpret the ambiguous statutory language "in the context of the
entire juvenile justice statutory framework."2 2 Although the state
urged the Court to focus on section 14-1-42 for guidance in
interpreting the language of section 14-1-7.3, the Court found the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 993 & n.6 (citing in relevant part R.I. GEN. LAWS §14-1-42
(2009) as applicable to the Family Court's decision).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 993-94. The Supreme Court "further ordered that Harrison be
confined to the Ocean Tides premises, and that he be ineligible for weekend
passes, pending [the] decision in this case." Id. at 994 n.7.
19. See Harrison, 992 A.2d at 996.
20. Id. at 994, 995.
21. Id. at 996. "Although the Training School is made up of three
nominal facilities, a juvenile's long-term placement is determined by gender,
leaving no discretion to the Family Court justice." Id.
22. Id.
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state's reliance on section 14-1-42 misplaced.23 The Court instead
determined that Harrison's placement at Ocean Tides as a TCP
did not amount to a modification of his sentence according to the
statute, reasoning that Harrison's sentence was neither
suspended nor vacated. 24
The Court instead declared the amended statutory
language contained in section 14-1-36.1, entitled "Release from
training school," as essential to resolving the dispute.25 The Court
confirmed that subsection (a) enables a Family Court justice,
following a proper hearing, to release a delinquent or wayward
youth sentenced to the Training School.26 Even so, the Court
determined that the subsequent language within subsection (b)
allowing "[a] child so sentenced ... to be placed temporarily in a
community program outside of the training school," referred not
only to minors adjudicated as delinquent or wayward, but also to
those minors certified and subsequently convicted. 27 Finding
such, the Court held that this particular language adopted by the
General Assembly was intended to provide a Family Court justice
with the ability to place a certified juvenile in a TCP, even though
that juvenile had originally been sentenced to the Training
School. 28
Finally, the Court addressed the state's concern that
interpreting the statute in such a manner undermines the basic
foundation of the certification process, which was created to
protect society from those juveniles charged with the most serious
crimes.2 9 While acknowledging and appreciating "the state's
obligation to protect the public from dangerous juveniles,"30 the
opinion made clear that the Court "ha[s] long recognized the need
23. Id. at 996. The Court pointed out that section 14-1-42 outlines
"strict limitations on the modification of a sentence" in respect to a certified
minor, noting that this section "applies to the limited circumstances in which
'the court may suspend, but shall not vacate, the balance of the [juvenile's]
sentence."' Id. at 996 (quoting In re Nicholas V., 662 A.2d 447, 449 (R.I.
1993)).
24. Id. at 996.
25. Harrison, 992 A.2d at 996, 997 & n.11 (citing in relevant part R.I.
GEN. LAws § 14-1-36 (2009)).
26. Id. at 997-98.
27. Id.




'to strike a balance between the desirability of rehabilitating the
offending child on the one hand and the need to protect the
security of the community on the other."' 3 1 The Court opined that
the legislature considered and provided measures to balance these
competing interests in the certification process, while adhering to
the ultimate goal of rehabilitating even those youths charged with
the most serious crimes.32 As such, the Court found the transfer
of a certified youth to a TCP supported by the policy aims of
legislature and within the authority of a Family Court justice to
order, following a proper hearing.33
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that
the primary role of the Rhode Island Family Court and the
statutory scheme that controls it is to protect, rehabilitate, and
treat troubled minors, rather than to punish juvenile offenders for
their misdeeds. 34 As such, "the Family Court has at its disposal a
wide range of dispositions to accomplish its statutory mandate of
rehabilitation, ranging from probation and counseling at one end
of the spectrum to incarceration at the Training School at the
other."3 5 Within this framework, and as set out in title 14,
chapter 1 of the Rhode Island General Laws, the certification
process permits a minor "who is charged with an offense which
would constitute a felony if committed by an adult" to be tried as
an adult in Family Court. 36 During sentencing, however, the
presiding justice is given "broader options" when imposing a
sentence upon that minor than would be available to an adult
offender. 37
As such, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in this case sought
31. Harrison, 992 A.2d at 998 (quoting Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767,
772 (R.I. 1967)).
32. Id. at 998-99.
33. Id. at 999.
34. Id. at 994 (quoting State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 1048 (R.I. 2008)).
"The philosophy underlying the movement to create juvenile justice systems,
separate from the adult criminal system, stemmed from the belief that people
under a certain age inherently were less culpable than were adults." Id.
35. Id. at 995.
36. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7.2 (2009).
37. Harrison, 992 A.2d at 995 & n.10; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-
7.3(a) (2009) (detailing sentencing options for certified minors).
20111
496 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:491
to achieve an appropriate balance between protecting society from
dangerous minors and promoting the aims of the juvenile justice
system, by following the statutory scheme which governs it.
However, the facts of this case reveal that the balancing of these
principles may be easily lost among competing interests in the
juvenile justice arena. While the certification process for juveniles
is undoubtedly a necessary and invaluable tool for ensuring justice
in appropriate cases, the cases of children so adjudicated must be
continually evaluated with rehabilitation as its goal, with
adherence to the core principles of the Family Court. Only in
doing so will those children who are deemed dangerous to our
society be afforded the opportunity to eventually become
productive members of the community.
Similarly, although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that
a Family Court justice has the authority to order a TCP for a
certified juvenile, the concurring opinion points out that this
authority is not wholly discretionary and must be subject to the
same careful balancing act. 38 While it is evident that the Family
Court justice was acting in accordance with the rehabilitative
ideology of the juvenile system, both regard for the victim's right
to due process and society's interest in protection from violent
juvenile offenders was seriously lacking. By requiring the Family
Court justice to hold an evidentiary hearing and put forth a
decision based on the pertinent facts and legal issues raised by the
parties, the Supreme Court assumed a paternalistic role over the
case by compelling adherence to statutory constraints, thus
ensuring an outcome conforming to due process requirements.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a Family Court
justice is vested with the authority to transfer a juvenile who has
been certified for trial, adjudicated, and thereafter sentenced to
serve time at the Rhode Island Training School to a Temporary
Community Placement (TCP) without constituting a modification
of that minor's sentence. The Court determined this to be the
intent of the legislature, gleaned from the statutory language
governing the certification process and the primary objective of
38. Harrison, 992 A.2d at 1002.
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the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate young offenders.
Mariana Ormonde
Land Use. Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010). The
immunity provision of section 9-33-2 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, the anti-SLAPP statute, requires that a lawsuit is not a
mere sham, meaning that a lawsuit is neither objectively baseless
nor subjectively baseless.' If immunity is granted under this
provision, it is mandatory to award reasonable attorney fees and
costs to the prevailing party. 2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1991, George and Anna Karousos (collectively Karousos)
leased Fairlawn, an estate located at 518 Bellevue Avenue, in
Newport, Rhode Island, expecting that the building could be used
as a culinary school. 3 "In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Fairlawn
was used as a preparatory school and, for part of that time, as
Vernon Court Junior College." 4 After this time, the building was
used primarily as a residence reflecting the City's zoning
ordinance, which "permits the use of the building for residential
purposes, but considers its use for educational purposes to be
nonconforming." 5 Karousos's expectation was based upon a "1989
letter from Newport Zoning Enforcement Officer Guy Weston
(Weston)" to Fairlawn's previous owners, stating that the
building's use as a school had never been abandoned and thus "the
use of the property as a school remained a legal nonconforming
use."6  When Karousos began making improvements to the
property in preparation to open a culinary school, the City of
Newport initiated a zoning enforcement action.7 In September
1994, Weston corresponded with Karousos "detail[ing] the actions
that were necessary before the City of Newport would approve the
1. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2 (2009); Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263, 269
(R.I. 2010).
2. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2 (2009); Karousos, 992 A.2d at 272.







use of Fairlawn as a culinary school" but later informed Karousos
that the City approved such use when they took the necessary
actions.8
However, when Jonathan Pardee purchased the property
adjacent to Fairlawn, he appealed the City's ruling that
Fairlawn's use as a culinary school was permissible under the
zoning ordinance. 9 Through multiple hearings, the Newport
Zoning Board (the board) decided that the use "as a culinary
school was an illegal nonconforming use" and Karousos
appealed. 10 While the hearing and appeall" were ongoing,
"Karousos filed an abuse-of-process complaint in the Rhode Island
Superior Court" alleging that the defendantsi 2 had waived their
right to object to the proposed use of Fairlawn.i 3 In response, the
defendants based their defense upon section 9-33-2 of the Rhode
Island General Laws,' 4 the "anti-SLAPP statute,"15 which, in
pertinent part, provides that a "petition or free speech constitutes
a sham only if it is both objectively and subjectively baseless."1 6
Thus, the defendants claimed that the anti-SLAPP statute
provided them immunity because the appeal was neither
objectively baseless in light of the favorable decision of the board,
nor subjectively baseless because the appeal was initiated without
an ulterior motive.1 7
Accordingly the hearing justice entered summary judgment in
favor of the defendants since "Karousos had failed to offer any
ulterior motives for Pardee pursuing the zoning appeal, and thus
could not satisfy the elements of the claim."' 8 Further, a second
8. Id.
9. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 266.
10. Id.
11. On appeal the Superior Court justice reversed the "ruling that the
board had erred when it determined that Pardee's appeal was timely . . .
conclud[ing] that the only appealable action was Weston's 1989 letter, and
that the time to appeal from that letter had long passed." Id.
12. The complaint named twelve defendants in all, but herein this survey
will refer only to Pardee and the four others who answered the complaint
(collectively Pardee). Id.
13. Id.
14. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2 (2009); Karousos, 992 A.2d at 266.
15. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 266.
16. Id. at 269; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (2009).
17. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 266-67.
18. Id. at 267.
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motion justice awarded fees and attorney's costs in favor of the
defendants since such an award is mandatory under the anti-
SLAPP statute, however these awards were limited only to the
defendants' successful motions. 19 Following the Superior Court
justices' rulings, "Karousos timely appealed the grant of summary
judgment and the award of costs and attorney's fees . . . [while]
Pardee timely filed a cross-appeal on the amount of attorney's fees
and costs." 2 0
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Karousos argued that the motion justice erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because
Pardee's motion was a sham, and thus, not entitled to immunity
under the anti-SLAPP statute.21 When considering whether an
action is a sham and thus not entitled to immunity under the anti-
SLAPP statute, the court must determine whether the "petition or
free speech . . . is both objectively and subjectively baseless."22
Upon a de novo review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed
the motion justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. 23
The Court first examined whether Pardee's appeal was
"objectively baseless . . . meaning that 'no reasonable person
exercising the right of speech or petition could realistically expect
success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome."' 24
The Superior Court motion justice determined the actions to be
objectively baseless, ruling that there was no right to appeal the
letters from Weston as the "letters were purely informational and
nonbinding."25 However, because the Court found the second
prong satisfied, as discussed below, it did not rule on "the issue of
19. Id.
20. Id. at 268.
21. See id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (2009).
22. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 269; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (2009).
23. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 268, 273. Justice Flaherty authored the
opinion for the court joined by Chief Justice Suttell and Justice Goldberg. Id.
at 264. Justice Robinson concurred in part and dissented in part while
Justice Indeglia took no part in the consideration or decision of the appeal.
Id. at 264, 273.
24. Id. at 269 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2 (2009)).
25. Id. at 270.
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whether [Pardee's] efforts were objectively baseless."26
Therefore, the Court hinged its ruling on whether Pardee's
efforts were subjectively baseless, meaning that the activity was
"actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its
own direct effects." 27 The burden of proof is initially borne by the
party claiming immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute, 28 and the
motion justice was satisfied by Pardee's testimony claiming that
his motivation to appeal was based solely upon preventing
"commercial activity next to [his] planned home."29 Thereafter,
"the burden shifted to Karousos to offer some evidence to establish
that Pardee sought the appeal for its direct effects and not for its
outcome."30  Subsequently, Karousos repeated his earlier
allegations that given the long delay, "Pardee could have been
motivated only by an interest in causing further burdens and
delays to the opening of Karousos's culinary school."31 However,
"a party opposing a summary judgment motion may not simply
rest on the allegations and denials in his or her pleadings" 32 and
in so holding, the Supreme Court affirmed the granting of
Pardee's motion.33
The Court then examined whether the awarding of attorney's
costs and fees to Pardee for all of his successful motions was
consistent with the applicable provision in the anti-SLAPP statute
and Rhode Island case law. 34 Section 9-33-2(d) of Rhode Island
General Laws provides that if a party is granted immunity under
the anti-SLAPP statute, the prevailing party shall be awarded
"costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for
the motion and any related discovery matters."35 However, the
statute's provision does not provide "what costs are mandatory or
a specific measure of reasonable attorney's fees" and on appeal,
the Court gives great deference to the trial court's
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (2009)).
28. Id. at 271.





34. Id. at 272.
35. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 272 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2 (2009)).
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determinations. 36 Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that Pardee was entitled to the costs and fees incurred in
his successful immunity assertion, but denied any award for his
unsuccessful motions. In its last act, the Court determined that
Pardee was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs for his
appeal in defense of the granting of immunity and remanded the
case "for a determination of what those fees and costs should
be." 37
COMMENTARY
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court operated under
the correct standard of review, it is unfortunate that the Court
was unable to more fully address whether Pardee's claims were
objectively baseless. Immunity, under the anti-SLAPP statute, is
awarded if neither of the party's claims is subjectively baseless
nor objectively baseless.38 However, the "Court has had several
occasions to address" the definition of whether a claim is
objectively baseless and has never held that a party's actions were
such.39 In so doing, the Court has created a very tough standard
in blocking immunity for the claiming party.
However, in the lower court, the motion justice "determined
that Pardee's actions were objectively baseless because she ruled
that Pardee had no right to appeal Weston's letters."40 These
letters, the motion justice reasoned, could not be viewed as
binding, and thus Pardee could not have been aggrieved by these
correspondences. In so finding, the trial court recognized a
situation where the first prong of the test, to determine whether a
defendant was entitled to immunity, was satisfied. Since the trial
justice still ruled that Pardee's actions were not subjectively
baseless, the Supreme Court could completely ignore the
significance of a finding that Pardee's actions were objectively
baseless. 41
It is regrettable that the Court could not have further
examined this issue as Justice Robinson's dissent greatly calls into
36. Id.
37. Id. at 273.
38. Id. at 269.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 270.
41. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 270.
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question the granting of immunity to Pardee on his claims. 4 2 In
his dissent, Justice Robinson was "convinced that summary
judgment is not an appropriate mechanism for resolving
controversies that turn on an assessment of the subjective intent
of a party."43 He stated that "[i]t is self-evident . . . that the
determination of the presence of subjective baselessness vel non
requires the scrutiny of the human heart and mind."4 4 If the
majority could have rejected the granting of summary judgment in
favor of allowing the issue to be "grist for the mill of a fact-
finder,"45 it is very likely that the importance of the motion
justice's holding that Pardee's motion was objectively baseless
could have served to set excellent precedent on the applicability of
the immunity provision's objectively baseless prong for future
cases falling under the anti-SLAPP statute.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the motion
justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jonathan Pardee
because he was entitled to immunity under section 9-33-2 of the
Rhode Island General Laws.4 6 The court further deferred to the
motion justice's determination of reasonable attorney's costs and
fees to be awarded to Pardee for his successful claim for immunity,
since such an award is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP
statute. 47 Finally, the Court remanded the case to the Superior
Court to determine the reasonable attorney's fees and costs for his
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Timothy J. Grimes
42. Id. at 273-75 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
43. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 273 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 275 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 274.
46. Id at 271-72; see R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2 (2009).
47. Karousos, 992 A.2d at 273.
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Professional Responsibility. In re Law Offices of James
Sokolove, LLC, 986 A.2d 997 (R.I. 2010). Several Rhode Island
law firms objected to James Sokolove's application for a limited
liability company (LLC) license under the name "Sokolove Law,
LLC." The Court approved the application, holding that a
potential violation of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional
Conduct did not warrant denying a license as a LLC.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 2006, James Sokolove (Sokolove) organized a Delaware
LLC under the name "The Law Offices of James Sokolove, LLC"
and began the process of applying for a Rhode Island license as a
LLC.1 The process for applying in Rhode Island as a LLC has two
parts: (1) filing a limited liability entity charter with the Secretary
of State, and (2) within thirty days of filing with the Secretary of
State, filing a copy of the charter and an application for license
with the clerk of the Supreme Court. 2
Sokolove completed part one of this process by filing his
application for registration with the Rhode Island Secretary of
State on November 21, 2007.3 He then completed part two of the
registration process, under the firm name "The Law Offices of
James Sokolove," by applying for a license with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court on January 23, 2008.4 Sokolove later filed an
1. In re Law Offices of James Sokolove, 986 A.2d 997, 999 (R.I. 2010).
2. Id. This process is governed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
Rules for the Admission to Practice Law which state in relevant part that:
Within thirty (30) days after filing its limited liability entity charter
with the Secretary of State, each limited liability entity formed to
engage in the practice of law shall file with the clerk of the Supreme
Court a copy of its limited liability entity charter together with an
application for license on a form to be prescribed by the clerk ....
R.I. SuP. CT. ART. II, R. 10(d).
3. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 999.
4. Id. It is important to note that this application for a LLC license did
not comply with the Supreme Court Rules because the application was filed
with the Court outside of the allotted thirty-day timeframe and was also not
on the form prescribed by the clerk. Id.
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amended application with the Secretary of State and the Court
which changed the entity's name to "Sokolove Law, LLC."5
Sokolove Law, LLC, is a law firm that operates with a
complex, national referral system.6 According to Sokolove, the
firm practices law in every jurisdiction except South Dakota and
Rhode Island.7 In Rhode Island, the law firm was to be operated
by Brian J. Farrell (Farrell).8 Farrell filed an amicus curiae
memorandum in support of the license application.9 It was
asserted in this memorandum that Farrell is a member of
Sokolove Law, LLC, and that he would run the Rhode Island office
from his existing practice location.' 0 It was also asserted that the
Rhode Island office of Sokolove Law, LLC, would have "office
signage, letterhead [stationery] and business cards identifying the
name of the firm and its Rhode Island address and telephone
number."l1
This case arrived before the Court by a petition objecting to
Sokolove's LLC license application.12 The petitioners opposed
Sokolove's establishment in Rhode Island in two other manners.
First, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Supreme Court
Disciplinary Counsel, alleging that Sokolove's television
advertisements violated the Rules of Professional Conduct because
Sokolove is not licensed to practice in Rhode Island. 13 That
complaint was dismissed for failing to present evidence that met
the clear and convincing standard.14 Then, petitioners filed a
complaint with the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
5. Id. The Court assumed that Sokolove Law, LLC, complied with the
requirements of the Rhode Island Limited Liability Company Act which
states that the Secretary of State "may not accept for filing any document...
which does not conform with law." R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-8(a) (1999).
6. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 998.
7. Id. at 999. In most states, Sokolove Law operates as a limited
liability company. However, in California, Virginia, Michigan, and
Tennessee the firm operates as a limited liability partnership. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1000.
11. Id.
12. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1000. The petitioners are existing Rhode
Island law firms D'Oliveira & Associates, P.C., DeLuca & Weizenbaum, Ltd.,
and the Law Offices of David Morowitz. Id. at 998.
13. Id. at 1000.
14. Id.
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(UPLC) which made the same allegations as the first complaint.15
Sokolove reached an informal resolution agreement with the
UPLC which was to remain in place until the Court decided
whether the application to practice law as a LLC complied with
the Supreme Court rules and should be approved. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The objection to an application for license as a limited liability
entity was a case of first impression for the Court.17 The issue
was whether Sokolove's application for a license as a LLC
complied with the rules of the Court.18 In its per curiam decision,
the Court held that petitioners failed to show sufficient cause for
denying Sokolove's application and, therefore, approved the
application. 19
Supreme Court Rules: Article II, Rule 10
The application process for limited liability entities seeking a
professional license in Rhode Island is governed by Article II, Rule
10 of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules for the Admission to
Practice Law.20 Petitioners contended that, rather than working
for the new law firm, members of Sokolove Law, LLC would
continue to operate their individual law firms and have cases




18. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1000.
19. Id. at 998.
20. Id. at 1000-01. Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 10(d) provides in
pertinent part that the license application filed with the clerk of the Supreme
Court must set forth:
(1) The name and address of the limited liability entity;
(2) The names and addresses of all shareholders, directors and
officers, if the applicant is a professional service corporation;
partners if the applicant is a registered limited liability partnership;
and managers and members if the applicant is a limited liability
company, each of whom must be an attorney authorized to practice
law.
(3) The names and addresses of all of its attorneys who will practice
law in Rhode Island.
R.I. SuP. CT. ART. II, R. 10(d).
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LLC, in contravention of Rule 10(f).21 Petitioners further
contended that it was improper for Sokolove to begin advertising
in Rhode Island prior to the approval of the LLC application and
that Sokolove Law, LLC, should not be recognized as a legitimate
law firm because it was merely a referral network. 22
The Court found that the text of Rule 10(b) was clear and
unambiguous and must, therefore, be enforced as written by
giving the words their plain meaning.23 Rule 10(b) states, in
relevant part, that the term 'limited liability entity" includes
limited liability companies "organized to practice law pursuant to
the laws of any state or other jurisdiction of the United States and
which practices in Rhode Island."24 The Court determined that
this language made it acceptable for legal entities to exist outside
of Rhode Island but have offices in the state staffed by members of
the Rhode Island Bar.2 5
In support of this conclusion, the Court also looked to Rule
10(d)(2)(3) of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules for the
Admission to Practice Law, which requires companies applying to
be licensed for the practice of law as a LLC to set forth in the
application two separate classes of attorneys: 1) the principle
attorneys who must all be licensed to practice law, and 2) the
attorneys who will practice law in Rhode Island.26 The Court
decided that no requirement existed that each member of the LLC
be licensed to practice in Rhode Island.27 Furthermore, Sokolove
safeguarded himself against any presumption that he was
attempting to engage in the unauthorized practice of law by
stating in his advertisements that he was licensed to practice in
21. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1002. Rule 10(f) states, in relevant part:
The limited liability entity shall comply with and be subject to all
rules governing the practice of law by attorneys and it shall do
nothing which, if done by an individual attorney, would violate the
standard of professional conduct applicable to attorneys licensed to
practice law in this state.
R.I. SuP. CT. ART. II, R. 10(f).
22. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1001.
23. Id. at 1002 (citing Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc., 893 A.2d 216, 221 (R.I.
2006)).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1003.
27. Id.
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Massachusetts and New York.28
Fee-Sharing and Referrals
Article V, Rules 1.5 and 7.2 of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court Rules of Professional Conduct govern referral and fee-
sharing between lawyers. 29 Petitioners argued that Sokolove's
application amounted to nothing more than a fee-sharing
arrangement based on client-referrals.30 The Court found that
Rule 7.2 permitted attorney-to-attorney referrals, so long as
attorneys did not pay anyone "for funneling business or
'channeling professional work."' 3 1 Sokolove also safeguarded
himself by including in his advertisements the disclaimer required
by Rule 7.2(f).32
The Court's finding that Sokolove Law, LLC, would be more
than merely a referral service lessened the importance of
discussing fee-sharing. 33 Furthermore, the Court agreed with
28. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1003.
29. Id. Rule 7.2(c) states in relevant part:
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for
recommending the lawyer's services except that a lawyer may... (4)
refer clients to another lawyer or a nonlawyer professional pursuant
to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under these Rules that
provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the
lawyer, if
(i) the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive, and
(ii) the client is informed of the existence and nature of the
agreement.
R.I. SUP. CT. ARTV, R. 7.2(c). Rule 1.5 states in relevant part:
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm
may be made only if: (1) the division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation; (2) the client agrees to the
arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the
agreement is confirmed in writing; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.
R.I. SuP. CT. ART. V, R. 1.5(e).
30. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1003.
31. Id. at 1004 (quoting R.I. SuP. CT. ART. V, R. 7.2, comment [6]).
32. Id. Rule 7.2(f) requires firms referring a majority of cases they
receive in a particular area to include a disclaimer stating that most cases
are referred to other attorneys. R.I. SuP. CT. ART. V, R. 7.2(f).
33. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1004. However, the Court took the opportunity
to point out that fee-sharing is more stringently regulated than referrals.
Fee-sharing is only allowed between attorneys from different firms when
each attorney personally assumes joint responsibility for the case. Also, it is
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Sokolove's argument that a potential violation of Article V of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct was
an insufficient reason to deny Sokolove's application. 3 4 Any such
violations by those practicing law in Rhode Island should be
investigated by the Disciplinary Counsel in accordance with
Article III of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure. 35
COMMENTARY
The Court makes a point in this case to discuss the practice of
law as something special that must be reserved to only those who
are appropriately licensed by the Court.36 The practice of law may
be difficult to define because the law is constantly changing. 37
However, it is the responsibility of all members of the bar to stay
informed of these changes because they are obligated to abide by
all rules of professional conduct in order to assure "the most
effective guaranty of equal justice to all" under the law. 38
CONCLUSION
The Court approved Sokolove's application for a license as a
limited liability company under the name "Sokolove Law, LLC."39
In making this decision, the Court agreed with Sokolove's
argument that a potential violation of Article V of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct was an
insufficient basis to deny an application for a LLC license. 40
Adam D. Riser
assumed that fees must be split in proportion with the share of services
rendered. Id.
34. Id. at 1001.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1005 (citing R.I. Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A.
139, 140 (1935)).
37. Id. (quoting R.L Bar Ass'n, 179 A. at 146).
38. Id.
39. Sokolove, 986 A.2d at 1006.
40. Id. at 1001.
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Statutory Interpretation. Foster Glocester Regional School
Building Committee v. Steven A. Sette, 996 A.2d 1120 (R.I. 2010).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a town
council had the authority, express or implied, to remove a member
of a regional school building committee (RBC) after that member
had been appointed. The Court determined the RBC was not a
town office and therefore, neither the town charter nor chapter
109, section 4 of the Rhode Island Public Laws granted the town
council the authority to remove a RBC member it had appointed.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 2004, the Foster-Glocester Regional School District
Committee voted to create the RBC to supervise the construction
of a new middle school and the renovation of the existing middle
school.' In 2005, the Glocester Town Council (Council), in
compliance with chapter 109, section 4 of the Rhode Island Public
Laws,2 appointed three members to the RBC, including plaintiff
Gregory Laramie who became chairman of the RBC.3 Following
his appointment, a majority of the Council became dissatisfied
with Laramie, and on November 1, 2007, the Council "voted to
remove him from his position by declaring his seat on the RBC
vacant."4  "[P]laintiffs, the RBC and its eight individual
members," 5 initiated this action on November 13, 2007, seeking
"declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Laramie's removal
1. Foster Glocester Reg'l Sch. Bldg. Comm. v. Sette, 996 A.2d 1120, 1123
(R.I. 2010).
2. Chapter 109, section 4 of the Rhode Island Public Laws authorized
the formation of a regional school district for the towns of Glocester and
Foster and provided for the formation of a RBC consisting of four members
from each town. Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1122 (quoting 1958 R.I. Pub.
Laws 675). The primary function of the RBC "is to oversee the construction
of new schools or the improvement of existing schools within the regional
school district." Id. at 1122.
3. Id. at 1123.
4. Id.




The plaintiffs asserted that the Council was not vested with
the power to remove Laramie, but if the court found that such
authority did exist, it could not be freely exercised without
affording Laramie the right to a hearing.7 Plaintiffs sought to
"enjoin defendants from taking further action to remove Laramie
or from 'otherwise interfering with the duties of the [RBC]."'8
Conversely, defendants argued "that the Glocester Town Charter
expressly empowers the [Council] to remove those members"
appointed by the Council, and that even if the "charter does not
expressly grant the [Council such] authority," the Council has
removal authority by implication. 9
On January 16, 2008, a Rhode Island Superior Court hearing
justice decided "it [was] appropriate ... to rule simultaneously on
the request for declaratory judgment ... and on the request for an
injunction."' 0 The hearing justice then concluded that "the RBC is
'an agent of the State,"' and accordingly, the Council could only
have "removal authority" over its members if there is "explicit
legislation" granting such authority." On January 25, 2008, the
justice "ordered that Laramie be reinstated as a member of the
RBC, and he enjoined the [Council] from further attempts to
remove him."12 The defendants filed a timely appeal to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court after final judgment was entered.1 3
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
Superior Court's judgment in part, holding "that plaintiff
Laramie's seat on the RBC was not vacated when the new
[Council] took office in 2007[,] and that the [Council] lacks
authority to remove Laramie from the RBC."14 The Court vacated
the injunction entered by the Superior Court on the basis "that the
6. Id. at 1123.
7. Id.
8. Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1123.
9. Id. at 1122.
10. Id. at 1123.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1124.
13. Id.
14. Foster Glocester, at 1128.
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need for injunctive relief no longer exist[ed]."15
Defendants contended that the Superior Court hearing justice
erred when he declared the Council lacked the authority to
remove Laramie from the RBC.16 Defendants based this
contention on Article XJV, section C 14-2 of the Glocester Town
Charter,17 which "provides that the term of members of the RBC
extends only until the next town council is elected, at which time
the RBC members' offices are deemed to be vacant and the new
town council is free to appoint new members."' 8 Defendants
alternatively contended that even if their interpretation of the
charter is rejected by the Court, "common sense and Rhode Island
case law recognize an implied power in the [Council] to remove
members of committees that it has appointed."'19  Plaintiffs
maintained that the hearing justice ruled appropriately and that
the charter neither expressly nor implicitly provides the Council
with removal authority.20 Furthermore, plaintiffs contended that
even were the charter interpreted to provide Council with removal
authority, "Laramie would nonetheless be entitled to notice and a
hearing."21
The Court disposed of defendants' second argument by
distinguishing Laramie's position as a member of the RBC from
defendants' reliance on cases involving the removal authority
granted to other governmental bodies, with respect to their own
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1124.
17. Id.
Article XIV, section C 14-2 of the Glocester Town Charter reads in
relevant part as follows: 'The term of office of all Offices, members of
Boards, Commission or committees appointed with the approval of
the Council, or appointed or elected by the Council, shall be
concurrent with the term of the Council, unless otherwise provided
in the Charter or by State Law. Every elected or appointed officer of
the Town who is elected or appointed for a specific term shall
continue to hold such office until a successor is elected or appointed
and qualified. Any appointed Officer of a Board or Commission may
be removed from the office by the Town Council for due cause
following a public hearing.'
Id. at n.3 (quoting Charter of the Town of Glocester, R.I., art. 14, § C 14-2
(1991), available at http://ecode360.com/?custld=GL2062).
18. Id. at 1124.
19. Id. at 1125.
20. Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1125.
21. Id.
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employees, when there were no pertinent statutory provisions. 22
In considering defendants' first argument, that the charter
expressly provided the requisite removal authority to the Council,
the Court applied "the same de novo standard of review" used for
"questions of statutory construction."2 3 In reviewing the language
of the charter, the Court noted it would interpret it literally if the
language was clear and unambiguous. 2 4 Alternatively, if the
language was susceptible to multiple interpretations, the Court
would look to the intent of the legislature. 25
While defendants purport that the plain meaning of the
charter both authorizes the Council to remove RBC members and
allows a newly elected Council to fill a vacancy on the RBC, the
Court disagreed; 26 defendants' analysis of the charter was based
on a fundamental assumption, that the RBC was a town board,
commission, committee, or office within the meaning of the
charter. 2 7 The Court noted that "the RBC is not a town office, and
even though state law cloaks the [Council] with the authority to
appoint members to the RBC, neither the charter nor state law
empower the [Council] to remove a member of the RBC once he or
she has been appointed." 28 Furthermore, the Court did not find
the term of the RBC "concurrent with the term of the [Council]
because the RBC is not an 'office' within the Town of Glocester."29
Absent from either the town charter or chapter 109, section 4
of the Rhode Island Public Laws is any provision granting the
Council the authority to remove a member of the RBC after his or
her appointment. 30 As mentioned above, the charter refers only to
22. Id. at n.4.
23. Id. at 1126 (quoting Town of Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 127
(R.I. 2006)).
24. Id. at 1126 (quoting Stewart v. Sheppard, 885 A.2d 715, 720 (R.I.
2005)).
25. Id. (quoting Town of Burrillville v. Pascoag Apartment Assoc., LLC,
950 A.2d 435, 445 (R.I. 2008)).
26. Defendants interpret the charter to denote the term of the RBC to
run concurrently with the term of the elected council, thereby expiring "by
operation of law" with a newly elected town council. Following this reasoning
the RBC positions would become vacant after the term of the town council
that appointed them ended. See Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1123.
27. See id. at 1127.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1127-28.
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those municipal entities of Glocester, and though chapter 109,
section 4 of the Rhode Island Public Laws provides that in the
event of a vacancy among the three Glocester positions in the RBC
the Council may appoint a new member, it does not mention
whether a member of the RBC may be removed. 31 The Court
concluded that the language of both the Glocester Town Charter
and chapter 109, section 4 of the Rhode Island Public Laws are
clear and unambiguous, and contain no provisions providing
removal authority.32 Unwilling to assume the Council has such
authority without an express provision, the Court held that the
Council lacked the authority to remove Laramie from his position
on the RBC.33
Finally, with respect to the injunction ordered, the Court
noted "that the [Superior Court] hearing justice did not abuse his
discretion when he granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined
the defendants from engaging in further attempts to remove
Laramie from the RBC."34 The Court, applying a deferential
review, assessed the four necessary factors35 for reviewing a trial
court's grant of a preliminary injunction. 36 Finding these factors
satisfied by the plaintiffs, the Court, nevertheless, vacated the
grant of a preliminary injunction because after declaring the
Council lacked the authority to remove members of the RBC,
injunctive relief was no longer necessary. 37
COMMENTARY
The Court's majority opinion turned on its interpretation of
31. Id. at 1128.
32. Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1127-28.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1128.
35. '[I]n deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the hearingjustice should determine whether the moving party (1) has a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will suffer
irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the
balance of the equities, including the possible hardships to each
party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has shown
that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status
quo.'
Id. at 1124 (quoting Iggy's Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I.
1999)).
36. Id. at 1124, 1128.
37. See id. at 1128.
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the Glocester Town Charter and ultimately, its determination that
because the RBC is not a town office, the powers provided by the
town charter in regard to town boards, commissions, committees,
and offices are inapplicable to the RBC.38 This is a sensible
interpretation of the charter because any given town should not
have powers that extend beyond its town limits.
However, Justice Robinson disagreed with this interpretation,
albeit with some reticence, in his dissent.39 Recognizing it was
"an extremely close case," Justice Robinson interpreted the
charter less restrictively, concluding that it allowed the Council to
remove any appointed official from office so long as it is for due
cause following a public hearing.40 He found it significant that
State law gave the responsibility to the "elected officials of the
towns of Foster and Glocester" to appoint or elect the necessary
representatives. 41 Justice Robinson noted little difference when
comparing those appointed by the Council to the RBC and those
appointed by the Council to other boards or commissions within
Glocester. 42
While the majority's restrictive statutory interpretation may
be technically correct, Justice Robinson's dissenting opinion
provides a more useful, practical interpretation of the Glocester
Town Charter. The majority's interpretation begs the question,
who has the authority to remove a problematic appointee if the
charter does not grant removal authority to the Council? Chapter
109, section 4 of the Rhode Island Public Laws affords the Council
the right to appoint three members to the RBC and the right to
appoint a new member should a vacancy arise; however, it
provides no express removal authority to the Council. 43 If neither
the charter nor the statute make removal provisions then the
Council, and the town of Glocester by extension, could potentially
be in the untenable position of having no recourse for ousting an
unsatisfactory appointee.
Moreover, why should the Council not have the right to
38. See Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1127.
39. Id. at 1129 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 1129-30.
41. Id. at 1129 (emphasis in original); see also 1958 R.I. Pub. Laws 675-
76.
42. Foster Glocester, 996 A.2d at 1129.
43. Id. at 1127.
20111 515
516 ROGER WILLL4MS UN!IVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:510
remove a member? After all, it is their town that the Council
governs, and their town that the member of the RBC represents
on the regional board. Why should the elected officials of the town
not have the authority to look out for their town's best interests?
Perhaps it is because the RBC is a regional board and not a town
board, and thus, another town is relying on the consistency of
appointments. Perhaps it is to ensure that local political decisions
do not waylay school construction and renovation projects. Most
likely, it is because the Court is unwilling to overstep its judicial
boundary. If the Court were to infer the power to remove a board
member absent an explicit provision, it would undermine the
traditional legislative process and enter the arena of judicial
legislation.
Nevertheless, a town council must have the ability to look out
for the interests of its citizens, especially in the arena of
education. In fact the Rhode Island "state constitution provides
that it is the responsibility of the General Assembly 'to promote
public schools [ . .] and to adopt all means which it may deem
necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages and
opportunities of education."' 44  'Municipalit[ies] may adopt
charter provisions [affecting] education, as long as [they] are
ratified by" the general assembly, 45 but it is irrational to conclude
that a town charter would deny its council recourse for dealing
with inadequate appointees to the detriment of its citizens.
Therefore, Justice Robinson's broader interpretation of the town
charter granting the Council removal authority for due cause and
following a public hearing is a well-justified interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that neither the
Glocester Town Charter nor chapter 109, section 4 of the Rhode
Island Public Laws authorizes the Glocester Town Council to
remove an appointee of a regional school building committee. The
Court also held that the term of an appointee to a regional school
building committee does not run concurrently with the term of the
town council.
Nicholas Obolensky
44. Id. at 1125 (quoting R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1).
45. Id.
Tort Law. Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 2010). The City
of Newport owed a duty to visitors of the Cliff Walk, a municipally
maintained attraction, to refrain from willfully or maliciously
failing to warn or guard against a known danger. Although the
statutory immunity provided by the Rhode Island Recreational
Use Statute would normally apply, here, several similar accidents
had taken place in the past, putting the City on actual notice that
visitors were imperiled by the attraction's latent structural
defects.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
While on their belated honeymoon in Newport, Rhode Island,
twenty-three year old Simcha Berman, and his wife, Sarah (the
plaintiffs in this action), toured The Breakers, one of Newport's
historic mansions. 1 Their tour guide pointed out the Cliff Walk, a
pathway that runs for miles along Newport's rocky coastline and
attracts hundreds of thousands of visitors annually, and suggested
that the visitors "experience" the Cliff Walk after the tour.2 After
exiting The Breakers' grounds, the Bermans decided to follow
their tour guide's suggestion, and took an adjoining street to the
Ochre Point entrance of the Cliff Walk.3 According to the
plaintiffs, there were no warning signs posted at the entrance
indicating the dangers of the pathway. 4 The plaintiffs allege that
they discovered what appeared to be a "beaten path" leading away
from the Cliff Walk's paved portion, and down towards the water's
edge.5 Looks were deceiving, however, and shortly after stepping
onto what the couple believed to be the unpaved path, the ground
gave away beneath Simcha's feet, and he tumbled nearly thirty
feet to the rocks below. 6 Simcha suffered "catastrophic" injuries
1. Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. 2010). Since the time of
the accident, the couple has divorced. Id. at 1042 n.5.
2. Id. at 1041, 1042.
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as a result of the fall, including a severe spinal cord injury that
rendered him a quadriplegic. 7
Simcha and Sarah Berman subsequently filed an action in
Rhode Island Superior Court alleging that the City of Newport
(City), The Preservation Society of Newport (Society), and the
State of Rhode Island (State) "negligently caused Simcha's injuries
by failing to properly inspect, maintain, and repair the Cliff Walk
and, further, that they knew of its defects and failed to guard or
warn against them."8 All three defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Rhode Island Recreational Use
Statute (RUS) afforded them immunity from liability.9 Summary
judgment was denied by the original hearing justice; however,
when the plaintiffs subsequently moved for partial summary
judgment to prevent the defendants from asserting the RUS as a
defense, the defendants cross-moved on the issue, and the City
and the Society successfully argued to a second hearing justice
that the RUS entitled them to immunity.l0 Concluding that
neither the Society nor the City charged the plaintiffs an
admission fee to use the Cliff Walk, or discovered the plaintiffs in
an imperiled position prior to the Simcha's fall, the lower court
held that the RUS shielded both defendants from liability." The
7. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042.
8. Id.
9. Id. Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute was enacted "to
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability to persons entering
thereon for those purposes." R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-1 (2008). To accomplish
this goal, the statute provides, in pertinent part, that
[A]n owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits
without charge any person to use that property for recreational
purposes does not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any
purpose;
(2) Confer upon that person the legal status of an invitee or
licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; nor
(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to
any person or property caused by an act of omission of that
person.
Id. § 32-6-3 (2008). In 1996, the General Assembly amended the RUS,
expanding its coverage to municipal and state landowners as well as private
landowners. See id. § 32-6-2 (Supp. 2009); Berman, 991 A.2d at 1044.
10. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042.
11. Berman v. Sitrin, C.A. No. NC/2003-0402, slip op. at 11-12 (R.I.
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Superior Court granted summary judgment as to those defendants
accordingly. 12 The plaintiffs' appeal followed.13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court embarked on a
de novo review of the lower court's grant of summary judgment for
the Society and the City.14 In describing the current state of
Rhode Island premises liability law, the Court noted that by
explicitly restricting visitors to qualifying recreational areas from
being afforded invitee or licensee status, the RUS limits the
liability of landowners. 15 This includes municipal and state
landowners, who open up their land for free public use, reflecting
the General Assembly's intent "to treat those who use private
property for recreational purposes as though they were
trespassers."16 Landowners do not enjoy absolute freedom from
liability, however, as the RUS does impose limitations on
landowner immunity.17 Of particular relevance to this case was
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007), available at http:lwww.courts.ri.govsuperiorpdflO3-
0402.pdf.
12. Id. The Superior Court denied summary judgment for the State,
"conclud[ing] that there [wa]s a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
nature of the State's relationship to the Cliff Walk." Id. at 13. In particular,
the court found that because evidence indicated that the State had
collaborated with the City on repairs and maintenance of the Cliff Walk,
there was a question of fact as to whether the State qualified as an "owner"'
for purpose of the RUS. Id.
13. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1043.
14. Id. The Court noted that in reviewing a lower court's decision, it "can
affirm the Superior Court's judgment on grounds other than those relied
upon by the trial justice." Id.
15. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-3 (2008); Berman, 991 A.2d at 1043-44.
16. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-3 (2008); Berman, 991 A.2d at 1043-44 (quoting
Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056, 1060 (R.I. 1994)).
17. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-6-5 (2008). This provision excepts the general
immunity afforded to landowners by the RUS:
(a) Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which, but
for this chapter, otherwise exists:
(1) For the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against
a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity after
discovering the user's peril; or
(2) For any injury suffered in any case where the owner of land
charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for
the recreational use thereof ....
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the limitation placed on landowner immunity by the statute "[flor
the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a
dangerous condition, use, structure or activity after discovering
the user's peril."18
Potential Liability of the Preservation Society of Newport
The plaintiffs contended on appeal that the trial court
erroneously granted summary judgment for the Society.19 First,
the plaintiffs argued that because the Society charged an
admission fee for The Breakers, and the Cliff Walk "experience"
was part and parcel with the mansion tour, the RUS does not
apply.20 The Court quickly rejected this argument, however,
pointing out that while the Society charged an admission fee to
tour The Breakers and its grounds, Simcha's injury occurred not
within the mansion's ground, but rather on a public easement that
was accessible from a number of points.21 Thus, the Court
concluded, the fee charged by the Society was not for access to the
Cliff Walk, but rather for access to and a tour of the mansion.22
The plaintiffs next asseverated that they were not merely
members of the public utilizing the Cliff Walk, but rather were
invited guests of the Society by virtue of the tour guide's invitation
to experience the Cliff Walk after the tour.23 The Court rejected
this argument as well, noting that because the Cliff Walk "is free
and open to the public," "an invitation to visit is not necessary."24
The plaintiffs' third argument - that the Society was engaged
in a joint enterprise with the City to maintain the Cliff Walk, and
thus should be liable to the same extent as the City - similarly fell
flat.25  The Court noted that "there [wa]s not a scintilla of
evidence in this record suggesting that the Society and the city
were involved in a joint enterprise."26 In fact, a municipal
resolution assuring that the City "will maintain the public
18. Id.; Berman, 991 A.2d at 1044.






25. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1046.
26. Id.
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easement of passage along the Cliff Walk," militated in favor of a
conclusion that the adjoining landowners never "agreed or even
contemplated acting in such a close relationship with the city (or
state) that a joint enterprise is a plausible construction of their
relationship."2 7
Having disposed of the plaintiffs' contentions with regard to
the Society's liability under the RUS, the Court next turned to the
question of whether the Society might be liable to the plaintiffs on
some other basis. 28 For the plaintiffs to prevail on a negligence
claim against the society, they would need to demonstrate that the
Society owed them a legal duty.29 However, the record clearly
demonstrated that the Cliff Walk was a public easement, and "[i]t
is a well established legal principle in this jurisdiction, as well as
others, that a landowner whose property abuts a public way has
no duty to repair or maintain it."30 Therefore, courts "[t]ypically,
courts will not impose liability for injuries that occur on land over
which the owner has no control, and significantly, no duty to
repair."3 1 Analogizing this case to the factual situation in Ferreira
v. Strack, where a church was not liable for injuries sustained by
exiting parishioners who were hit by a drunk driver while crossing
an adjoining public street over which the church had no control,
the Court here concluded that because the Society did not control
the Cliff Walk, a public way, it had no duty to prevent injuries
that might occur there, even if they were foreseeable. 32 Instead,
public easements are the responsibility of the government, and
adjoining landowners owe "no duty to warn, construct fences, or
take any other precautions" to prevent injury.3 3 Thus, because
the Society owed no legal duty to the plaintiffs, the Court affirmed
summary judgment for that defendant. 34
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 1046-47.
29. Id. at 1047.
30. Id.
31. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1047.
32. Id. at 1047-48 (citing Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 684, 686 (R.I.
1994)). The Court further noted that this position is in accord with decisions
in other jurisdictions. Id.
33. Id. at 1048.
34. Id. The Superior Court had granted summary judgment upon a
finding that the RUS precluded the Society's liability because it neither
charged admission to the Cliff Walk, nor "discovered plaintiffs in a position of
2011]
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Potential Liability of the City of Newport
On the issue of the City's duty to the plaintiffs, the Court
reached a different conclusion. 35 The RUS provides a two-pronged
test under which a landowner who would otherwise be afforded
immunity by the statute will become liable to an ill-fated visitor
upon his land when the landowner (1) discovers the user's peril,
and (2) willfully or maliciously fails "to warn or guard against a
known danger."36 The City maintained that it owes no duty to
Cliff Walk visitors under the RUS unless and until a City
employee actually discovers a specific visitor approaching danger
thereon. 37  However, the Court observed that such a literal
reading of this exception "would lead to an absurd and blatantly
unjust result" by "render[ing] the exception meaningless in the
context of this case."38 The Court therefore declined to take such
a rigid approach to its construction of the RUS, instead "striv[ing]
to adopt a construction of a statute that avoids an absurd or
unjust result."3 9
The Court noted that in this case, the record clearly
demonstrated that the City had actual knowledge of the Cliff
peril." Id. at 1045. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on other grounds,
pointing to the Society's lack of control over the Cliff Walk, and corollary lack
of duty to any of the Cliff Walk's visitors. Id. at 1048.
35. Id. at 1053.
36. Id. at 1049; see also, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-6-5 (2008). The second prong
of this test - whether there was a willful or malicious failure to warn or
guard against a known danger - is a question of fact and could not be
resolved on appeal and would instead need to be considered by the fact-finder
on remand. See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1049, 1053.
37. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1048; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-5 (2008).
38. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1049-50.
39. Id. Writing in concurrence, Justice Flaherty emphasized that the
City's reading of the statute would allow a landowner, "saturated with the
knowledge that some feature of his land presents a clear and present danger
to completely innocent users, simply [to] adopt a 'see no evil, hear no evil,
speak no evil' attitude and use the statute as a shield from liability." Id. at
1054 (Flaherty, J., concurring). This, Justice Flaherty reasoned, could not
possibly have been the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the RUS,
as it "would provide an incentive to landowners to be callous and altogether
irresponsible with respect to the safety of people entering upon their land for
simple recreational pleasure, in the face of danger known to the owner, but of
which the recreational user is totally unaware." Id.
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Walk's hidden hazards. 40  In particular, the Cliff Walk
Commission's Annual Report warned that drainage defects cause
rain runoff to create erosion trails, like the one the plaintiffs had
ventured down, which would appear to unsuspecting visitors to be
a foot path.41 Similarly, reports prepared during the past four
decades by the National Park Service, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, and the United States Department of
Agriculture Soil Conservation Service described the latent defects
of the Cliff Walk that put its pedestrian visitors at great risk.42
Additionally, the City was aware of at least two other tragic
accidents that had occurred on the Cliff Walk that were strikingly
similar to Simcha's. 43  Thus, although an employee or
representative of the City did not literally discover the Bermans
as they approached imminent danger, "[i]t [wa]s beyond dispute
that for many years, the city has had actual notice of the
dangerous instability of the ground underneath the Cliff Walk and
its eroding edge." 44 In effect, the Court concluded that when the
City became aware of the Cliff Walk's hidden defects and the risk
they posed to unsuspecting visitors, there arose "an affirmative
duty to take reasonable steps to warn and shield unsuspecting
visitors, such as the Bermans, against these known and grave
dangers in some reasonable manner." 45 Rejecting the notion that
the legislature "intended to relieve the city from any responsibility
whatsoever to the many tourists who visit the Cliff Walk," the
Court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied the first prong of the
40. Id. at 1049-50.
41. Id. at 1049 & n.12.
42. Id. at 1050.
43. Id. at 1049-50. The first of these accidents occurred in 1987 when a
Salve Regina student fell to his death as a result of the Cliff Walk's weak
structure. See id. at 1050. Salve Regina's president repeatedly implored the
City to install fencing around a structurally defective portion of the Cliff
Walk to delineate for visitors the point at which it is unsafe to pass. Id. In
1991, another Cliff Walk visitor, Michael Cain, also fell to his death when he
stepped onto a "well-worn spot"and the "ground beneath his feet gave way."
Id. at 1049 (quoting Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 158, 168 (R.I. 2000)
(Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In fact, Cain's fall
occurred nine years, almost to the day, before Simcha Berman's fall, and the
Supreme Court's ruling in Cain came down only twenty-three days before
Simcha tumbled from the Cliff Walk to the rocks below. See id. at 1041 n.1,
1049.
44. Id. at 1050.
45. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1051.
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exception's two-part test, and the City thus owed a duty to
recreational users of the attraction notwithstanding the immunity
typically afforded by the RUS. 4 6
In elucidating the second prong of this test - "the willful or
malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous
condition"47 - the Court relied on the plain meaning of the
statute's terms, defining "willful" as "[vloluntary and
intentional,"48 and malicious as "[s]ubstantially certain to cause
injury."4 9 Additionally, the Court defined "guard" to mean "[t]o
protect from harm or danger, esp[ecially] by careful watching; ...
[t]o take precautions,"50 and "warning" to be "[t]he pointing out of
a danger, esp[ecially] to one who would not otherwise be aware of
it."51 The Court then concluded that based on these definitions, "a
fact-finder reasonably could find that after learning about the Cliff
Walk's instability, particularly along the area of Ochre Point, the
city voluntarily and intentionally failed to guard against the
dangerous condition."52  Furthermore, given that the City
"jealously guards and promotes the Cliff Walk as a cornerstone of
its tourism industry," and had received millions of dollars from
federal, state, and municipal sources for upkeep, the Court was
simply "not persuaded that the Legislature intended the RUS to
serve as an invitation to ignore known hazards while profiting
from this major tourist attraction where such danger is present."53
46. Id.
47. R.I. GEN. LAWS 32-6-5 (2008).
48. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1052 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1737
(9th ed. 2009)).
49. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (9th ed. 2009)).
50. Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 580 (2d ed. 1985)).
51. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1722 (9th ed. 2009)).
52. Id. at 1052. The Court also noted that this construction was in
accord with interpretations of courts in other jurisdictions applying
equivalent statutes. Id. In particular, the Court noted that under Georgia
law, a landowner may be liable, despite the state's immunity provision, after
discovering a hidden condition that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to
visitors, and failing to warn about or guard against that defect. Id. (citing
Quick v. Stone Mountain Mem'l Ass'n, 420 S.E.2d 36, 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)).
Similarly, under Illinois law, an otherwise immune landowner may incur
liability after becoming informed of prior injuries caused by a dangerous
condition on the land, if the landowner does not attempt to remedy the
hazard. Id. at 1052-53 (citing Cacia v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 290 F.3d
914, 920 (7th Cir. 2002)).
53. Id. at 1053.
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Thus, the Court vacated judgment and remanded the case for a
determination by the trial court as to whether the City acted
willfully or maliciously in failing to post warnings or otherwise
guard against the known danger. 54
In dissent, Chief Justice Suttell, joined by Justice Robinson,
argued that the plain meaning of the statute and settled
jurisprudence militated in favor of the opposite result as to the
City. 55 In particular, the dissent emphasized that according to the
holdings of prior cases, the RUS merely codified the common law,
insulating landowners by classifying visitors as trespassers for
purposes of liability.56 Furthermore, the Court had previously
held that under common law principles "a landowner owes a
trespasser no duty until he or she is actually discovered in a
position of peril."57 Thus, the dissent argued, although the City
was aware of the dangerous condition generally, but not of Simcha
Berman's peril specifically, under the plain meaning of the statute
as well as the Court's prior interpretations of the underlying
common law principles, the City owed no duty the plaintiffs. 58
Finally, the dissent emphasized that while Simcha's catastrophic
injuries may well have been prevented by a simple warning posted
at the entrance to the Cliff Walk, it is the purview of the
legislature, and not the Court, to alter the liability scheme that
dictates the duty owed by landowners to users of recreational
lands. 59
COMMENTARY
Two interesting points may be drawn from this case. First,
this case signifies an apparent departure from earlier
jurisprudence construing the RUS. In prior cases holding that
government-landowners owed no duty to injured users of
recreational areas, the Court "on several occasions exhorted the
General Assembly to revisit the provisions of the RUS, 'especially
where public parks and similar public recreational areas are
54. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1053.
55. Id. at 1054 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1054-55.
57. Id. at 1055 (quoting Cain, 755 A.2d at 161) (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1055-56 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
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concerned,"' finding it 'troubling (to say the least) to be confronted
with a legal regime' in which no duty of care exists for users of
state and municipal recreational sites."60 By contrast, here, after
inaction by the legislature in the intervening years, the Court
discontinued its prior policy of merely imploring the General
Assembly to revisit the statute in light of the injustice worked
upon innocent visitors.61 Instead, the Court asserted its own
authority, ameliorating for the plaintiffs at bar "the unfortunately
harsh consequences that flow from classifying those who use
public recreational facilities as trespassers."62 While the majority
premised its markedly different approach in this case on its
distinguishing characteristics - similar accidents had previously
occurred on the Cliff Walk, making the City aware of the
attraction's structural inadequacies 63 - the majority's departure
from its position in prior cases 64 may also reflect the Court's
building frustration with the Legislature's unresponsiveness to its
pleas.
Second, through this decision, the Court has substantially
lowered the hurdle that injured plaintiffs must clear in order to
make out a claim against the owner of the recreational land where
an injury occurred. Rather than being required to demonstrate
actual knowledge on the part of the landowner of the particular
user's individualized peril, an injured litigant need now show only
that the landowner had either actual or constructive knowledge of
the condition that caused the injury, and thereafter willfully or
maliciously failed to warn or guard against it.65 Thus, the Court's
60. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1055-56. (quoting Lacey v. Reistma, 899 A.2d
455, 458 (R.I. 2006)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1044 n.8.
63. Id. at 1051.
64. See, e.g., Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1037, 1041 (R.I. 2006)
(holding that when a visitor to a city-owned park tripped, fell, and was
injured while trying to evade a swarm of attacking bees, the city was immune
from liability under the RUS, as "the city's duty would arise [only] at the
point when a city employee discovered that [the visitor] was approaching an
area where there was a known risk of bees"); Lacey, 899 A.2d at 456, 458
(holding that when a young boy sustained serious injuries after riding his
bicycle off of a cliff at a state park, summary judgment was properly granted
because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants had
discovered the boy's immediate peril).
65. See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1050.
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holding in. Berman will likely allow more plaintiffs to recover,
notwithstanding the apparent immunity afforded to landowners
by the RUS, by expanding the statutory exception to that
immunity.66
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, emphasizing the need to
construe Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute in a manner
that would not produce an absurd or unjust result, held that when
the City of Newport had actual and constructive knowledge about
a latent defect of a popular municipal tourist attraction, which
had caused deaths in the past, it had "discovered" the visitor's
peril, such that the City was not statutorily immunized from suit.
Because the second part of the liability inquiry - whether there
was a willful or malicious failure to guard against or warn about
the danger - required a finding of fact, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded to the Superior Court for further
proceedings.
Katherine Newby Kishfy
66. Although it would appear that the Berman Court's holding would
apply equally to government landowners as it would to private landowners,
the Court did emphasize the Cliff Walk's status as a municipally maintained
attraction, for which the City has received considerable funds to maintain.
See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1053. Similarly, in Lacey, the court emphasized the
injustice worked by the RUS as to injuries that occur at public recreation
areas, reflecting a concern as to the injustice created by the immunity of
governmental landowners under the statute. See Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458.
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2010 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 021, 022. An Act Relating to Education
- School and Youth Programs Concussion Act. Directs the
Department of Education and the Department of Health to jointly
develop guidelines to inform and educate coaches and participants
in youth sports programs of the risk of concussion and head
injury. The Act requires coaches, trainers, and volunteers
involved in youth sports programs to complete a training course in
concussions and traumatic brain injuries. Youth athletes who are
suspected of sustaining a concussion or head injury in a practice
or game must be removed from competition and must not return
to play until they receive written clearance from a licensed
physician.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 025, 028. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Explosives and Fireworks; Health and Safety -
Fireworks and Pyrotechnics. Legalizes low-level fireworks
including, but not limited to, ground-based and hand-held
sparkling devices (non-aerial fireworks). Among the types of
fireworks now permitted to be stored, possessed, sold, transported,
and used by persons in the state of Rhode Island who are at least
sixteen years of age are: fountains, illuminating torches, wheels,
ground spinners, flitter sparklers, sparkers, party poppers,
snappers, toy smoke devices, snakes, glow worms, wire sparklers,
dipped sticks, and paper caps containing not more than 0.025
grains of explosive mixture ammunition. Permits must be
obtained for display and aerial consumer fireworks.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 030. An Act Relating to Criminal
Procedure - Sentence and Execution. Provides that where a
defendant has contested a violation of his or her probation or
suspended sentence, upon the defendant's motion, the sentence of
violation shall be quashed; any imprisonment shall be terminated
when any of the following occur on the charge, which was
specifically alleged to have constituted the violation: (1) a not
528
SURVEY SECTION
guilty verdict or a motion for judgment of acquittal or dismissal is
made and granted pursuant to Superior or District Court Rule of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 29; (2) a "no true bill" is returned by the
grand jury; (3) a "no information" based upon a lack of probable
cause is returned by the attorney general; (4) a motion to dismiss
is made and granted pursuant to section 12-12-1.7 of the Rhode
Island General Laws and/or Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules
of Criminal Procedure; or (5) the charge fails to proceed in District
or Superior Court due to a lack of probable cause or where the
state believes there is reason to doubt the culpability of the
accused.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 082, 085. An Act Relating to Businesses
and Professions - Confidentiality of Health Care Communications
and Information Act - Health Care Communications and
Information. Expands upon the "Confidentiality of Health Care
Communications and Information Act." A health care provider
may release confidential health care information to a legal parent
or guardian of a minor child if the health care provider believes
the child is, or has been, physically, psychologically, or sexually
abused and/or neglected.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 092, 132. An Act Relating to Motor
Vehicles and Other Vehicles - Passing, Use of Lanes, and Rules of
the Road. "Franks Act" creates the offense of "Unsafe Passing of a
Person Operating a Bicycle." This legislation sets forth: (1)
procedures that a driver of a motor vehicle must follow when
passing a bicycle on the road; and (2) certain exemptions. The fine
for violating this statute according to section 31-41.1-4 of the
Rhode Island General Laws is $85.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 100, 106. An Act Relating to Education
- Military Children: Interstate Compact on Educational
Opportunity for Military Children. This compact is designed to
remove barriers to educational success imposed on children of
military families due to frequent moves. The law applies broadly
to children from a wide range of military families including active
duty, severely injured veterans, and members who die during
active duty. The law attempts to streamline the way these
students are treated when transferring between schools. A
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student is to be admitted to a school with only unofficial education
records and without the required immunizations in order to limit
delays which are harmful to the student's progress. Schools are to
recognize the course placement authorized by the student's
previous school and waive specific course requirements if similar
course work has been taken at a previous school. The law
requires cooperation among governmental agencies, local
education agencies, and military installations to ensure
participation and compliance with the compact. Additionally, the
law creates the "Interstate Commission on Educational
Opportunity for Military Children," which will contain one voting
representative from each member state. This commission will,
among other things, provide dispute resolution between member
states, promulgate rules to further the purpose of the compact,
and create uniform standards for collecting and exchanging data
among the states.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 102. An Act Relating to Motor and
Other Vehicles - Suspension or Revocation of Licenses. Enhances
sanctions by making it a felony to operate any vehicle while under
the influence of "intoxicating liquor, drugs, toluene, or any
controlled substance," where the defendant's license is suspended,
revoked, or cancelled for an underlying conviction of operating
under the influence. Punishment may be imprisonment for up to
three years and a fine of up to $3000. Additionally, alcohol and/or
drug treatment is mandatory and cannot be suspended.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 103, 109. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Sexual Offender Registration and Community
Notification. Repeals the portion of the "Sexual Offender
Registration & Community Notification Act" that provides for an
automatic stay when an offender appeals the trial court's
determination of risk level/community notification.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 110, 229. An Act Relating to Food and
Drugs - Medical Marijuana Act. Amends the 'Medical Marijuana
Act" to provide that applications and supporting information
submitted by qualifying patients, their primary caregivers, and
their practitioners are not only confidential, but are also exempt
from the provisions of section 38-2 of the Rhode Island General
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Laws, the Rhode Island Access to Public Information, and are not
subject to disclosure.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 124, 125. An Act Relating to Education
- The Education Adequacy Act. Establishes a permanent
statewide school-financing formula, which goes into effect for the
2011-2012 school year. The Act ties state aid to the number of
students a school district serves and the proportion of low-income
students within that district. The formula takes into account a
municipality's ability to meet the costs of education by including
the equalized property value and the median family income of
each city and town. The Act requires the state to pay an increased
share of the costs of regional transportation, school construction,
and teaching high-need special-education students. Also, the Act
reduces and eventually eliminates bonuses for regionalized school
districts.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 128, 256. An Act Relating to Criminal
Procedure - Sentence and Execution. Provides that upon
successful completion of a deferred sentence the defendant's case
shall be dismissed, shall be deemed "exonerated," and therefore
shall have recourse to section 12-1-12 of the Rhode Island General
Laws (Sealing of Records). This legislation attempts to implement
the corrections that the Rhode Island Supreme Court set forth
with section 12-19-19 of the Rhode Island General Laws in State v.
Briggs, 934 A.2d 811 (R.I. 2007). (Superior Court does not have
the statutory authority to dismiss a defendant's deferred sentence
as statute is written). The Superior Court recently held that this
statute is unconstitutional as it presents a separation of powers
issue. Cases are currently pending on appeal in the Rhode Island
Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of the statute
and whether the statute applies retroactively.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 163, 167. An Act Relating to State
Affairs and Government - Criminal Procedure Sentence and
Execution - Hate Crimes. Expands the definition of hate crimes to
include any crime motivated by prejudice against a person who is
homeless or is perceived to be homeless.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 165, 169. An Act Relating to Criminal
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Procedure - Identification and Apprehension of Criminals.
Provides for the creation of a Task Force of criminal justice
stakeholders empowered to: (1) identify and recommend policies
and procedures to prevent the injustice of a wrongful conviction
caused by mistaken eyewitness identification; and (2) improve
lineup procedures during criminal investigations. The Task Force
was required to submit a report of its findings, which is currently
pending a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 166, 175. An Act Relating to Health
and Safety - Expedited Partner Safety. Allows a licensed
physician, licensed physician assistant, or certified registered
nurse practitioner to prescribe and dispense prescription drugs for
the treatment of sexually transmitted chlamydia or gonorrhea to a
patient's sexual partner(s) without first examining the partner(s).
The Act immunizes any authorized prescriber under such
circumstances, as well as the healthcare facility or group where
the prescriber works, from civil and criminal liability.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 180, 197. An Act Relating to Insurance
- Extended Medical Leave. Allows employers to offer medical
benefits for up to eighteen months to an employee who: (1)
provides written documentation explaining that the employee or a
member of the employee's immediate family is unable to work full-
time for medical reasons; (2) anticipates eventual return to full-
time employment; and (3) has been placed on extended medical
leave by his/her employer. The decision as to whether an
employee is eligible for extended medical leave rests entirely with
the employer, and the employer may require the employee to pay
for all or part of the cost of the extended medical benefits during
the eighteen month extended medical leave period. After eighteen
months have elapsed, the employee is eligible for extended
medical benefits as though he or she had been involuntarily
terminated, pursuant to section 27-19.1-1 of the Rhode Island
General Laws.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 201, 210. An Act Relating to Public
Utilities and Carriers - Wheelchair Accessible Transportation.
Authorizes and directs the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
to develop the "John J. MacDonald, Jr. Transportation Initiative"
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to provide on-demand wheelchair accessible taxicab service
throughout the state, especially at train stations and T.F. Green
Airport. The federally funded program is intended to reduce
barriers to transportation services and expand the transportation
mobility options available to disabled individuals needing
wheelchair accessible transportation beyond the requirements of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Certificates to
operate wheelchair accessible taxicab services will be issued to
qualified applicants approved by the Division of Public Utilities
and Carriers. Purchase of the taxicabs is fully funded by federal
grants and the taxicab operators, such that the vehicle purchases
and maintenance shall have no negative impact on the transit
authority's budget. Implementation of the initiative was directed
to begin on or before January 1, 2011.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 232, 240. An Act Relating to Courts and
Civil Procedure - Procedure in Particular Actions - Death By
Wrongful Act. Amends the current "Death By Wrongful Act" to
allow for the son or daughter, regardless of the son's or daughter's
age, to recover damages for the loss of parental society and
companionship, where the parent's death was caused by the
wrongful act, neglect, or default of another person. This
amendment also provides that a parent may recover damages for
the loss of a son's or daughter's society and companionship,
regardless of the son's or daughter's age, where the son's or
daughter's death was caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or
default of another person.
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 242, 253. An Act Relating to Motor and
Other Vehicles - Motor Vehicle Offenses - License Suspensions
("The Colin B. Foote Act'). Requires that any person convicted of
moving violations on four separate and distinct occasions, within
an eighteen month period, attend sixty hours of driver training
and perform sixty hours of community service. Additionally, if the
court determines that the person's continued operation of a motor
vehicle "would pose a substantial traffic safety hazard," the person
may be subject to a fine of up to $1000, drivers' license suspension
for up to one year, or court-ordered drivers' license revocation for
up to two years. Any person whose license has been revoked
under this provision may petition the court for restoration of the
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privilege at the expiration of the time of revocation, and must
present proof of financial responsibility as well as evidence that
"establishes that no grounds exist which would authorize refusal
to issue a license."
2010 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 308, 313. An Act Relating to Food and
Drugs - Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Amends the
"Uniformed Controlled Substances Act" by adding that anyone
who distributes a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analogue to an individual without that individual's knowledge,
while having the intent to commit a crime of violence, shall be
punished by up to ten years imprisonment.
